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Abstract
For the past three decades China‟s economic reform has led to rapid and unprecedented
economic growth and social change. These socioeconomic changes have had a significant
impact on China‟s elderly rural citizens. There is considerable literature on China‟s
socioeconomic transformation and its impact on the country‟s social fabric. However,
many of these studies have focused on urban residents, industrial issues and urban
communities. There is relatively less literature on rural residents and rural communities
and comparatively little attention has been paid to China‟s elderly rural citizens. The aim
of my study is to examine the impact of China‟s socioeconomic changes that began in the
1980s on the life of the country‟s elderly rural citizens. My research indicates that while
in the most general sense China‟s economic reform has promoted the livelihood of the
country‟s rural population, the majority of China‟s elderly rural citizens lack income
security and in a substantial number of cases neither family support nor government
assistance are providing them with sufficient resources.
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Glossary of Chinese Terms
Chengshi hukou

Those who register as a resident of urban areas/cities.

Hukou

Household registration system that officially identifies a person as
a resident of an area (a rural or urban area).

Nongcun hukou

Those who register as a resident of rural areas.

Nongmin

Rural residents in China. China‟s residence registration system
distinguishes between rural and urban residents, who hold different
types of residence certificates. Those who hold a nongcun hukou
are called nongmin in China. Nongmin gong Rural-to-urban migrants
who hold nongcun hukou and get paid jobs in urban areas.

San luan

Illegal fees and charges placed on rural residents. These include
arbitrary charges (luan shou fei), arbitrary fines (luan fa kuan) and
arbitrary apportionment of fees (luan tan pai).

Sannong

„Three rurals‟: agriculture (nongye), rural areas (nongcun) and
rural residents (nongmin).

San ti wu tong

„Three village levies (san ti)‟ and „five township-pooling funds
(wu tong)‟. The former consisted of education fees and a
supplement, social help, one-child policy, militia training, and
collective transportation levies. The latter refers to a village
accumulation fund, a public welfare fund and expenditure on
village administration.

San xian yi jin

Three insurances and one fund refers to superannuation, medical
insurance and unemployment insurances (three insurances/san
xian) as well as housing common accumulation fund (one fund/yi
jin).

Shimin

Urban citizens in China. Those who hold a chengshi hukou are
called shimin in China.
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Introduction

Since the early 1980s, „reform and opening-up‟ has been a national policy in China. This
policy has promoted fast development and made China one of the most powerful
economies in the world. However, China‟s elderly rural citizens have not enjoyed the
same degree of benefit from „reform and opening-up‟ as their urban counter-parts. The
majority of them continue to be obliged to rely on their adult children for support and care.
This situation put the elderly rural residents in a vulnerable condition and some are
enduring difficult circumstances. The purpose of my study is to examine the impact of
socio-economic changes that began in the 1980s on the life of China‟s rural elderly
residents. Having established the extent of the problems faced by the rural elderly, I then
highlight the key issues, both social and economic, that are preventing positive change to
remedy the situation.
Rural residents and communities, including the rural elderly, are a vital component of
Chinese society and of their country‟s economic success. China‟s population is over 1.33
billion, of which the rural population is 758 million. Those deemed to be rural citizens
represent over 57.01% of China‟s total population. The rural elderly (categorised as 65
years of age and over although regarded by the Chinese government as 60 and over)
number over 58 million and account for 7.8% of the country‟s total population (Xinhua,
25 September 2005; NBSC: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006, 2010, 2011;
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency of the USA, 2010). Substantial demographic changes
mean that the proportion of elderly in China‟s total population increased from over 7.7%
of the total population in 2005 to 8.88 by 2010 (NBSC, 2011) and will increase to over
30% of the population by 2050 (UN: United Nations, 2008). The majority of elderly
citizens, those holding rural citizenship (nongcun hukou), are not entitled to pensions or
free health care (Chinese Government, 2004; Wang 2006; OECD: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007; Yang et al. 2009) and in this sense, they
have been discriminated against when compared with those holding urban citizenship
(chengshi hukou) (Shi 1994; Xinhua, 7 September 2004; Biao 2007). While the majority
1

of China‟s rural elderly continue to be obliged to rely on their adult children for care
(OECD, 2007; IOSC: Information Office of the State Council of the People‟s Republic of
China, 2006; Chinese Government, 2004; NPC: The National People's Congress of the
People‟s Republic of China, 1996) shrunken family size, increasing young and middleaged rural-to-urban migrants and changing attitudes and obligations mean that supporting
elderly rural residents has become a heavy burden for families. Some have found they
cannot support their elderly relatives (Jia 1988; Yan & Chi 2001; Xinhua, 25 September
2005; Zhao & Guo 2007; Lowry 2009).

I have based the discussion I present in this thesis on both primary and secondary
sources. I have also used both Chinese language and English language material and I have
undertaken grass-roots interviews. I have spread my review of the secondary literature,
my primary material including government reports, surveys and interviews throughout my
chapters. My interviews were a particularly valuable source of information. I conducted
them in China from January to February 2008 and from December 2008 to February
2009. The interviews were held in Liujiahui Village, Pingshan County, Hebei Province. I
found these interviews to be essential for understanding the actual living reality currently
experienced by China‟s rural elderly. Many of the views and insights I gathered are not
available in either official published sources or in secondary sources.
I was born and grew up in Liujiahui Village. I experienced the people‟s commune and
the Cultural Revolution as a primary and then a junior high school student. I finished my
high school education in my home town. I left the village in 1982 when I went to
University. I then witnessed the reform of rural areas as an adult and as a member of the
academic staff of Hebei University. While at Hebei University I participated in a project
that surveyed rural women‟s health, fertility and education conducted in the village of
Dingzhou in Hebei Province. I left for Australia in 2000. Many of my relatives, including
my mother, continue to live in my home village. I keep in touch with them through visits
and telephone calls. As a former resident, I have been able to use my own personal
impressions and experiences to provide a control for the information I collected from my
fieldwork.
As I have followed the plight of China‟s elderly rural citizens under reform policies
and at a time of substantial socio-economic and demographic change, I have reached back
to profile the life they lived under the commune system of Mao‟s governments and then
2

under the Deng government‟s reform period and during the more recent Hu-Wen period.
The comparisons are interesting and serve to underline the issues that currently dominate
the lives and livelihood of China‟s elderly rural citizens.
In 2006 the Chinese government launched a campaign to build a new socialist
countryside. The campaign aimed to achieve social fairness and justice, but my grassroots research has shown that it has not significantly improved the living conditions of
village based rural elderly. There is an obvious failure to meet the basic needs of the rural
elderly. Affording basic access for all Chinese citizens, particularly for the elderly rural
citizens, cannot be left to their families alone. It must be a basic component of a modern
service-oriented government (Wen 2011; UNDP: United Nations Development Program,
2008).
In order to undertake my interviews I returned to Liujiahui village for considerable
blocks of time. For example, in December 2008/February 2009 I was resident in the
village for six weeks. I interviewed villagers including ordinary farmers and cadres from
the governing village committee. Thirty rural residents were invited to participate in my
interviews. I categorised my interviewees into three age groups: elderly 60 to 90 year
olds; middle-aged 36 to 59 year olds; and young residents who were 25 to 35 years old.
Sixty percent of my respondents were elderly, a little over 23 percent were middle-aged
and almost 17 percent were young.
At the time of my interviews there were 1407 people in Liujiahui. There were 214
elderly people aged 60 and over, accounting for 15 percent of the total population. There
were 137 elderly people 65, accounting for 9.7 percent of the total population in the
village in the Sixth National Population Census of 2010 (Huo 2008-2009; Pingshan
County Council, 2011). I selected the participants according to age, gender, marital status,
education experience and so on. A total of 18 elderly were interviewed accounting for
13% of the total village elderly population aged 65 and over, 8.4% aged 60 and over.
I also interviewed county and provincial level officials and agents including the
deputy head of Pingshan County and an official from the Department of Agriculture,
Hebei Province. Altogether I spent 350 hours interviewing respondents. I recorded
important sections of interviews, but did not take notes, preferring to take notes once I had
collected primary information. I visited interviewees in their homes and also chatted to
them in the village gaining valuable insights into their attitudes, experiences and
3

impressions. A number of interviewees visited me in my mother‟s home. I have chosen to
protect the personal confidential data of my participants and have withheld their names in
my thesis (Greenfield 2002; Bauer & Gaskell 2000). All the interviews were carried out
in the local dialect. My interview questions were set around a set of themes including
daily living situations, social welfare provision, government policies and social security
system reform.
There were several reasons for selecting a village in Hebei Province as the site of my
fieldwork. Apart from my access to respondents (I know the people interviewed and
expect them to offer candid opinions), in economic terms Hebei is an “average” Province.
Like many of China‟s provinces Hebei has a long history of agricultural production and at
the same time it is a major industrial base for coal, steel, and textiles. The province is one
of the most important producers of cotton and wheat in China and it also has a large
number of rural-to-urban migrants (HBS: Hebei Province Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
Politically, Hebei has not been the site of special economic policies instigated by the
central government such as taxation reduction measures. Hebei has simply been the site of
implementation of Beijing‟s general policies and it shares this position with the majority
of China‟s provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. For its part, Liujiahui is an
ordinary and average rural village in terms of its population size, resident‟s income, living
standards, and the amount of farmland available. This means that the elderly residents of
Liujiahui village are representative and their experience can be generalised to other
provinces. I am fortunate that my access to the elderly residents of Liujiahui village has
allowed me opportunity to study the impact of economic reform and social transformation
on elderly village residents in China as a whole.
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Hebei

Figure 1 The location of Hebei Province in China

Background on Liujiahui Village
Liujiahui is located at the western Hebei Province on the North China Plain (Huabei
pingyuan). It is approximately 50 kilometres north-west of the provincial capital,
Shijiazhuang, and 8 kilometres south-west of Pingshan County. It is a remote and
undeveloped village in the sense that it is inaccessible by public transport such as rail and
bus. However, since 2006 there has been a contracted shuttle bus connecting the village
with the county city, Pingshan. Water transport has not been developed although the
village is close to the Taihang Mountains (Tai hang shan). Three canals were built in the
1960s and 1970s which irrigate the majority of the farmland and one river that runs
through the village.
Liujiahui is a middle-sized village according to local standards. The village had a
population of around 1,400 in 2009 and arable land of around 2,000 mu (1 mu ≈ 0.16
acres) which has been distributed to each family based on number of persons in a
household. The arable land is classified into three types: “grain-ration” land (kouliang
tian), “family plot” land (ziliu tian), and “responsibility” land (changbao tian). In the
early 1980s, under the Deng Xiaoping government‟s program for economic reform, the
5

collective-owned land was distributed to all residents of the village regardless of age and
gender. “Grain-ration” land and “family plot” land allow villagers to produce basic food
for their own consumption. Villagers can plant wheat, maize and rice for their own
consumption on “grain-ration” land, and at the same time, they can plant vegetables for
themselves on “family plot” land. The two types of land guarantee basic food for residents
of the village because farmers don‟t need pay any form of taxation or provide product for
quota sales to any level of government. However, all forms of farmland including
“responsibility” land are not required to pay the central government‟s agriculture tax
anymore. The agriculture tax was abolished in 2006.
“Responsibility” land is the largest portion of collective farmland distributed to
villagers. Before 2006 villagers who received “responsibility” land were required to sell a
portion (quota) of their crop to the government at below-market prices and to pay the
designated agricultural tax and fees to all levels of government. This promoted a big issue
related to “responsibility” land. Many poor villagers went into debt after selling their crop
and paying designated taxes and the great number of fees and charges to all levels of
government. This circumstance led to some poor villagers and some elderly suffering.
Today, by way of contrast, villagers receive subsidies annually from the central
government (CCCPC&SC: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and
the State Council, 2008; Wu 2008).
Compared with other villages, Liujiahui has not had a standardized road. It has not
been connected to the road network. However, this situation has been gradually changing
since the beginning of 2009 after the “Decision on Major Issues Concerning the
Advancement of Rural Reform and Development” was approved. The “Decision” was
approved by the CCCPC&SC in October 2008. A cement road from the village to towns
and the county city is currently under construction. In the course of my fieldwork I was
told the main purpose of the road was to ensure that local officials demonstrate their
political merits to higher level officials, although the villagers will also benefit from the
road. The majority of elderly villagers have not had any experience of taking trains to the
outside world. Some have never left the village. There is no sewage station in Liujiahui.
The toilets exist as they have for hundreds of years (I took photos during my fieldwork in
2008). There is no improvement except for outside materials. Bricks and cement have
replaced stone and mud. Toilets are obviously the breeding ground for a number of
6

common diseases such as dysentery and enteritis, particularly in the summer months.
Liujiahui is an average Chinese village or a little lower than the average
economically. From the statistical data for per capita net income of rural households in
2007, the national average is 4140.36 yuan (NBSC, 2008). The average for Hebei
Province is 4293.43 yuan (NBSC, 2008) and the average for Liujiahui is around 2613
yuan based on my interviews in 2008. There are no enterprises or businesses owned by
the Liujiahui community. The main cash income for villagers is from the sale of their
crops and from dagong (doing casual work as a migrant in a city or town). The main
occupation of the villagers is farming in general, but many young and middle-aged people
go to city to find wage-paying work. They are rural-to-urban migrants called nongmin
gong or dadong zu. They have done this since the mid-1990s.
There are no libraries, no recreation rooms, and no sports grounds in the village or
around the neighbourhood. The villagers in general and the elderly in particular can watch
television programs in their own home or spend their leisure time gathering in the centre
of the village to chat or play Chinese chess or majiang or poker complete with a little
gambling (I took photos during my fieldwork in 2008).

Chapter Outlines
I have organised my thesis discussion in the following manner. In chapter one I have
briefly outlined the main elements of economic reform and social transformation. I have
argued that decentralisation, liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation are the central
components (the essence) of China‟s economic reform policy. I have also noted the
increase in inequality that has accompanied reform and the difficulties associated with the
provision of public goods and social services.
In chapters two and three I have outlined family support for China‟s rural elderly,
including problems associated with socio-demographic transformation (population
ageing, decreased family size and rural-urban migration). I have also addressed the issue
of Chinese traditional filial piety and social attitudes under present economic and social
conditions. Filial piety has been the core of Chinese traditional culture, but this social
norm is now challenged. This has resulted in a crisis in the care of elderly rural residents.
I then move on to discuss government support for the country‟s rural elderly. I focus on
the changes in China‟s social security provision including social insurance, social welfare
7

and social relief measures implemented in rural areas. China‟s social security provision
discriminates against the country‟s rural citizens, particularly the elderly. The majority of
rural elderly are not entitled to enjoy the benefit of government provided social security
provision. This is an important reason why individual households find they are obliged to
continue to be the main provider of care for the rural elderly.
In 2006 the Chinese government launched a campaign to build a new socialist
countryside. The campaign aimed to achieve social fairness and justice, but my grassroots research has shown that it has not significantly improved the living conditions of
village based rural elderly. There is an obvious failure to meet the basic needs of the rural
elderly. Affording basic access for all Chinese citizens, particularly for the elderly rural
citizens, cannot be left to their families alone. It must be a basic component of a modern
service-oriented government (Wen 2011; UNDP: United Nations Development Program,
2008).
In chapter four I continue my discussion of the burden imposed on rural families who
find that they are expected to shoulder responsibility for elderly members. I also outline
the living standard and the declining social, economic and health status of China‟s elderly
rural citizens. Providing the basic necessities of life for all citizens must be recognised as
a fundamental right of all Chinese people and a bedrock responsibility of the Chinese
government.
In chapter five I consider taxation as a key issue which prevents systemic improvement in
the provision of social services. I canvas the association between effective taxation
collection (with an efficient system of national individual taxation offering a possible
solution) and government provision of social services and rural infrastructure. The former
includes the provision of pensions for the rural elderly and the latter includes transport
infrastructure, the provision of clean water to village residents, education and health care.
In chapter six, the final chapter in my thesis, I discuss China‟s persistent urban-rural
inequality and the equally persistent problem of local level corruption. Government policy
is the means to address national funding of a comprehensive social security system. It also
provides a means for addressing China‟s considerable urban-rural inequality and a means
to at least limit local level corruption. I conclude that effective government policy is the
means whereby the lives and security of the nation‟s rural elderly can be significantly
improved.
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Chapter 1
Overview of China's Economic Reform

Introduction
China‟s economic reform has led to rapid and unprecedented economic growth and social
change (White 1993:3; OECD, 2007). This change began to be implemented in the early
1980s. A main goal of China‟s economic reform has been to transform a planned
economy into a market integrated economy.
Many researchers have undertaken significant studies on the question of China‟s
economic reform and social transformation and the impact on China and on Chinese
citizens. For instance, Oi (1989, 1999), Blecher (1997), Unger (2002), Nolan (2004),
Saich (2004), and Guthrie (2006) all examine China‟s economic reform and social
transformation and provide a comprehensive discussion of many aspects of economic
reform and social changes. In addition, scholars including Wang (2006), Hannan (2006),
He, N. (2009), He, X. (2006), Hansen et al. (2011), and Lowry (2009) have explored
issues such as social unrest and social fairness in the context of economic reform and
social transformation and provide valuable insights into the relation between economic
development and social fairness and justice.
Hu (2006) offered particularly useful insights when he explored China‟s economic
and social transformation categorised the transformation into two stages. The first stage of
this transformation, „the era of economic construction (jingji jianshe shidai)‟ takes class
struggle as the key to socialist modernization and economic construction. The second is
from economic construction to institution building called „the era of institutional
construction (zhidu jianshe shidai).‟ Hannan (1995) has concluded that China‟s
socioeconomic reform is a two-edged sword. It has improved the living standard of
majority of Chinese people, but it also caused considerable social complaints and tensions
among Chinese people.
In this chapter I provide a brief literature overview of China‟s economic reform. I
argue that China‟s reform is in essence a policy of decentralisation, liberalisation,
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privatisation and globalisation. I have also referred to the impact of economic reform on
social fairness and justice and have noted the impact of reform policies on the provision
of public services.

Decentralisation, Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation
In China the process of decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation, and globalisation has
included economic planning and structure, market and ownership, and social security
provision. These processes, as shown in Table 1.1, have played an important role in
China‟s economic development in China and in the day-to-day lives of China‟s citizens
(White 1993: 63).
Table 1.1 Decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation, and globalisation and
China‟s economic reform (edited by the author).
Decentralisation

Liberalisation

Privatisation

Globalisation

Economic

From central plan-

From local planning to

Individual plan-

Planning at the

Planning

ning to local

individual planning (full

ning as a part of

international

planning

liberalisation)

privatisation

level

Structure of

From heavy

Heavy industry:

TVEs, small

the economy

industry, through

adjustment of production

and middle size

light industry and

structure and technical

SOEs are

companies, joint

agriculture to the

advancement.

privatized;

ventures and

service industry

Light industry,

Large SOEs are

agriculture and service

limited

industry

A new form:
Foreign

wholly
independent
enterprises

Markets

Local government

The price of the majority

Private

Integrating the

(including

has the right to set

of products are set by the

company‟s role

Chinese market

price setting)

prices

market

and freedom to

into the interna-

enter market

tional market

Ownerships

From collective or

Ownership is diverse

Privatizing

Multinational

state-owned enter-

based on free market

TVEs or

companies in

prises to private

small and

China

and individual

middle size

owned enterprises

SOEs
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China‟s economy depends mainly on agriculture, light industry, heavy industry and the
service sector. These sectors are owned variously by the state, collectives, and private
enterprises, and foreign and joint-venture enterprises. Decentralisation, privatisation,
liberalisation, and globalisation have sped up China‟s economic reform and
socioeconomic transformation, but they have also brought many issues to the fore which
put disadvantaged groups such as the rural elderly and children into a vulnerable position.
In the following sections, I will examine decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation, and
globalisation respectively and their relationships, as shown in Figure 1.l (edited by the
author). I also address the related issues rising from each of them.

Decentralisation

Privatisation

Liberalisation

Globalisation

Figure 1.1 The interrelationships between decentralisation, privatisation,
liberalisation and globalisation in the context of China‟s economic reform

Decentralisation and Economic Reform
Decentralisation is defined as increasing the policy authority of local/lower-level state
officials relative to national-level state officials (Eaton 2001; UN, 2009). Decentralisation
is not a new phenomenon or novel phenomenon. Many developing countries have
experimented with the decentralisation of economic administration and revenue as well
with transferring expenditure decisions to lower levels of government (Eaton 2001; UN,
2009).
White (1993) discussed economic decentralisation and the „socialist commodity
economy‟ in the early stage of China‟s reform. He then examined the decollectivisation of
agriculture and elaborated on the political dynamics which have conditioned the character
and effectiveness of the process through analysing the politics of institutional reform in
industry and agriculture. He also examined the impact of the economic reform on China‟s
traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology, political institutions and the Communist Party of
China (CPC or Party) and he demonstrated that economic reform led to significant
changes in social attitudes, interests and institutions. These changes have put pressure on
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the imperative of reforming political institutions. White concluded that economic
transformation cannot be achieved without fundamental institutional and political change.
Wong (1997) introduced economic decentralisation in China in the 1950s and 1960s
and then argued that decentralising bureaucratic power over industries to lower levels of
government and market institutions are two related components in the process of
economic reform. For their part Kung and Lin (2007) have claimed that fiscal
decentralisation in the 1980s granted greater decision-making autonomy to local
government and built a close link between fiscal revenue growth and financial and career
rewards for local officials. These changes created strong incentives for local officials to
use large amounts of human, financial and physical resources to promote the growth of
township and village enterprises (TVE's) and to address revenue and employment issues.
In another approach Uchimura and Jütting (2007) examined the effect of fiscal
decentralisation on health outcomes in China using panel data set at national county-level.
They argued that counties in more fiscally decentralised provinces have performed better
with respect to health outcomes than counties where the provincial government remains
the main spending authority. For their part, Uchimura and Jütting concluded that fiscal
decentralisation could lead to the more efficient production of local public goods. They
have also highlighted the conditions required for this result to be obtained.
Decentralisation (fangquan) in China is one of the official initiatives or strategies
approved by the Chinese government in relation to economic reform in the late 1970s. In
fact, economic decentralisation originated in the 1950s during Mao‟s era.
In the early 1950s, the central government adopted a system of directive, centralized
economic planning derived from the Soviet model (White 1993). This system
subordinated the economy to state planning and administrative agencies. This is the wellknown state planned (or centrally administered) economy. For example, the central
government made the decisions relating to industrial investment and production (Wong
1997; Oi 1989; Unger 2002; Hu et al. 2005). The central government also decided on
agricultural production and distribution (for example, the amounts of different crops to be
planted across the country) and influenced agricultural output through production
assignments, quotas, and price policies (Wong 1997; Oi 1989).
However, Mao Zedong disliked Soviet-style administrative planning. He argued that
the Chinese people should not follow the example of the Soviet Union and concentrate
everything in the hands of the central authorities. This would shackle the local authorities
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and deny their right to independent action (Zhou 1995; Mao 1956). In 1956, Mao outlined
his own method under the rubric of the „Ten Great Relationships‟ (Mao 1956). His
approach differentiated the Chinese economy from the Soviet centrally planned economy.
Mao encouraged the initiative of both the central government and local governments in
order to improve the performance of managing China‟s economy. He recognised that
local governments have much more knowledge of local conditions than the central
government (Mao 1956; Nolan 2004). Then, the Chinese government decentralised
economic planning and management down to provincial and lower-levels of government
(Saich 2004; Wong 1997) according to the principles of local „self-reliance‟ and „two
enthusiasms are better than one‟. This was done in order to reduce „some of the problems
of over-centralization in Soviet-style planning‟ (White 1993: 22; Mao 1956). This
economic decentralisation was considered to be administrative decentralisation which
transferred power of economic planning and management from the central government to
lower levels of government (Breslin 2000). Local governments, especially provincial
levels of government, gained considerable power and autonomy. They could establish
their own comprehensive local industrial systems without taking into account the needs of
specialisation and exchange between areas (Mao 1956).
The decentralisation of some important aspects of economic decision-making from
the central government to lower levels of government in the period of economic reform
started at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s and has been seen by some
as a continuation of the above decentralisation. More specifically, the government
delegated greater fiscal and administrative power to the provinces and granted a larger
share of their revenues and the ownership of the majority of large state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) (Zhou 1995). Economic reform has used the policies of economic decentralisation
to „adjust‟ the relationship between state planning and market behaviour in order to
mitigate the „systematic inefficiency and waste‟ involved in a state planned economy
taking into account that the Chinese government‟s centralised state planning control over
many detailed and concrete activities in the economy was both „impractical and
undesirable‟ (White 1993: 9). Furthermore, economic decentralisation under economic
reform has aimed to decentralise economic decision-making power and to revitalise
market-type relations between individuals and enterprises through transferring power
from all levels of government down to enterprise (White 1993: 45; Painter 2008).
Economic decentralisation was realised by the adjustment of the relationship between
politics, administration and economy. One of the most important adjustments has been the
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Chinese government‟s depoliticisation of economic decision-making at all levels. China‟s
„politics‟ and „economy‟ were now to be seen as occupying different spheres (White
1993: 44; Painter 2008). The politics and administration of the Party are to be separate
from everyday economic affairs. The government reduced, merged, or cancelled national
bureaucratised ministries that were directly related to the economy.
The Chinese government‟s decentralisation of China‟s planned economy stressed the
development of light industry and the service industry and promoted the rapid production
of consumer goods for sale both on domestic and overseas markets. A central aspect of
this decentralisation of the economy was that „the state regulates the market and the
market guides enterprises (Ma 1995: 5)‟. This policy was introduced in 1987 (White
1993: 65). It can be considered to be market decentralisation (Breslin 2000) which aims to
dismantle the power of economic management of all levels of government and so
liberalise economic activity and increase the autonomy of enterprises. The enterprises can
then produce what they want and distribute their produce on the free market under the
general guideline of national development (Painter 2008).
Further decentralisation of the planned economy took place when China‟s central
government drastically reduced state price controls and allowed prices to find their level
through the operation of the market (White 1993: 69; Hannan 1995: 59-80). In 1988, the
central government further decentralised the power to conduct foreign economic
transactions (White 1993: 70; Hannan 1995: 59-80). There was also extensive fiscal
decentralisation (Uchimura & Jütting 2007). As a result, since the late 1980s local
authorities have controlled 70% of the central government spending and tax revenues
(OECD, 2001).
With economic reform China‟s central government has sought to achieve its planned
objectives by seeking to influence enterprise behaviour in certain directions, rather than
by issuing administrative orders. Micro-economic decisions can be taken at enterprise
level where they belong. Economic reform meant that the enterprise gained greater power
in decision-making in relation to investment, output, wages, price setting, procurement
and marketing, and behaved more directly in pursuit of its profit (White 1993). This
situation represents a transformation of the relationship between politics, administration
and the economy (Painter 2008; Oi 1989).
In agriculture, the „household responsibility systems (HRS)‟ carried out in rural China
was also a case of economically decentralisition. Prior to economic reform the system of
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agricultural collectives controlled farming and use of the land and the everyday activities
of peasants. Decentralisation in agricultural reform was an incremental process from 1979
to 1984 through first „contracting output to the household‟ (bao chan dao hu) carried out
in the late 1970s and then „contracting work to the household‟ (bao gan dao hu) and on to
the „household production responsibility system‟ (lianchan chengbao zeren zhi). The
latter was carried out in the early 1980s.
Under the HRS an individual household can control everyday farming activities
completely including production and the distribution of products, as well as the means of
agricultural production such as labour, tools, draft animals and mechanical equipment.
This encouraged the incentive of the household (White 1993; Unger 1985-1986, 2002).
By 1982-1983 the Chinese government had enforced agricultural decentralisation based
on the „household responsibility system‟. This enforcement was at a speed comparable to
that of agricultural collectivisation in the 1950s (Saich 2004; Lin 1988; Unger 19851986). The HRS was adopted nationwide in 1984. Production teams, the key economic
unit in the rural China, were officially abolished (Lin 1988; Unger 1985-1986). Their
production role was transferred downward to individual households (Lin 1988). This was
a significant transformation from the former situation where the State exercised
centralised control over agriculture. The new system was far more flexible. Marketoriented regulations and guidance of agriculture was promoted. Agricultural
decentralisation accelerated agricultural commercialization and specialization. However,
this was also what Mao had disliked. He had rejected decentralizing economic power to
individual households. He was concerned that these capitalist tendencies would take root
and that this would undermine his country‟s socialist characteristics and the socialist
revolution (Saich 2004: 52).
With the decentralisation of the economy the power of the central government over
the economy was significantly reduced and the era of an „integrated national economy
under the central control‟ was terminated (White 1993: 76). It was finished by the early
1990s. The economic functions of the central government were separated from everyday
administrative work. At the same time, the decentralisation became the driving force in
China‟s economic and political transformation (OECD, 2001). But as Painter (2008) has
noted, a dual process of horizontal and vertical decentralisation was occurring
simultaneously in both the economic and political arena in China with economic
transformation from a planned economy to a market integrated economy, and then a
growing set of performance accountability problems in the delivery of public services and
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social welfare provisions by the government emerged. There was an increasing gap
between the social need for public goods and the declining capacity of the State to ensure
accountability and performance. This has happened even though China‟s government has
continued to recognise the importance of state planning, which is still considered to be a
fundamental characteristic of „socialism‟ (White 1993: 64). For example, the central
government still designs the „Five-Year Plan‟ which continues to be pivotal in guiding the
direction of China‟s social and economic development (NPC, 2011). The central
government still controls the supply of many raw materials, communication, traffic and
transportation infrastructure, and heavy and machine-building industries. This gives the
central government significant influence over the rest of economy (Breslin 2000).
For their part local governments maintain an active role in attracting investment,
creating jobs, enforcing government regulations, providing local public goods services,
managing an active industrial policy and environmental protection (Yao 2006). Extensive
decentralisation has moved China towards a fragmentation of its market (OECD, 2001;
Painter 2008) and this has given the country‟s various provinces, municipalities and
autonomous regions increasing autonomy over their economies, taxation and social affairs
particularly public goods provisions, though it is a system that hampers the building of a
single nationally coherent domestic market. Decentralisation has consolidated the
importance of provincial boundaries as determinants of economic activity (Breslin, 2000).
It could create the devolution of economic power and functions within the state as well as
the devolution of the country‟s political and administrative power. This then might lead to
a significant fragmentation of the state (Painter 2008) and serious side-effects in terms of
economic development in the context of global economic integration (Hu 2006; Painter
2008). Furthermore, decentralisation of China‟s economy devolves the responsibility and
capacity of both the central and local governments for the provision of public goods such
as health care and education to rural areas. Finally, decentralisation has been leading to
liberalisation and privatisation of China‟s economy, as illustrated by Figure 1.1 and this
has been increasing the disparity and inequality both in income and access to public
services between rural-urban households as well as between rich and poor in both China‟s
urban and rural sectors (Uchimura & Jütting 2007).

Economic Liberalisation in the Context of China’s Reform
The liberalisation of China‟s economy has drawn increasing attention from among
western and Chinese academics. For example, White (1993) has argued that China‟s
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economic liberalisation led to the dispersion of power over economic resources which
further led to reduced government revenue. At the end of the 1970s, in order to deepen
economic reform, the Chinese government encouraged „economic liberalisation and
followed a non-interventionist or laissez-faire approach to economic activity relying on
market forces for the allocation of resources (UN, 2009; Nolan 2004: 234). In popular
representation the key idea behind the reform was Deng Xiaoping‟s cat theory:
disregarding the colour of the cat, as long as it can catch mice, then it is a good cat.
Politically, Deng addressed a situation where he argued that the Party had become too
heavily involved in the everyday running of the economy and could improve its
effectiveness and credibility by withdrawing to a less interventionist role (White 1993).
Furthermore, the politics of economic liberalisation would, as I have noted, change the
balance between the State and market. Economic liberalisation is often involved in cutting
public expenditure. Agricultural reform that began in the early 1980s was also based on
economic liberalisation. A report on the World Social Situation 2010 by the United
Nations (UN) (2009) has identified a compelling case for rethinking poverty and povertyreduction efforts and demonstrated that economic liberalisation and over-reliance on
market forces have led to neglect of nationally designed and developmentally-oriented
strategies that can improve the living standards of the world‟s poor. Then, the report
stated that governments should play a significant role in integrating economic and social
policies to support inclusive output and employment growth while combating inequality
and promoting social fairness and justice.
The Chinese government freed the small and middle-sized collective/state owned
enterprises in suburbs or rural areas in the late 1980s in order to practise or speed up
economic liberalisation. That is, the government leased the factories to the workers and
put responsibility for production in the hands of the producers (Grasso, Corrin & Kort
2004). Rural „township and village enterprise‟ (TVEs) were allowed to operation and in
the 1980s with increased freedom in resource allocation and recruitment they became a
highly dynamic part of China‟s economy (Nolan 2004:1). The liberalisation of economy
promoted a boom in small and middle-sized enterprises especially TVEs. As a member of
WTO since 2001, China‟s economy has also enjoyed extensive and continuing economic
liberalisation in the area of international economic relations (Nolan 2004).
Autonomy is an obvious consequence of decentralisation and liberalisation of China‟s
economy. Under economic reform China‟s large SOEs increased their autonomy from the
central authorities (Nolan 2004). However, this autonomy made it impossible for the large
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SOEs to merge with other strong enterprises. Strong enterprises often merge with other
„strong‟ enterprises in the world outside China, whereas in China strong enterprises have
remained largely independent of each other. Moreover, there are very large and important
SOEs in China such as PetroChina and Sinopec that have struggled for autonomy in
business management (Zhu et al. 4 May 2011).
Prior to economic reform and transformation it was usual for China‟s SOEs to
develop as small societies. The enterprises had relatively comprehensive functions such as
the provision of education, social insurance, and employment (Wong, Heady & Woo
1995). For example, Daqing - a large state-owned petrol company - was like a small
country within China in many ways. Like many other large SOEs the company provided
all services to workers and their families. Services were provided covering the period
from birth to death including kindergarten, schooling (primary, high school and college),
and hospitalisation. However, economic reform and the economic globalisation forced the
large SOEs to change their function. They have become relatively professional or
specialised enterprises based on their production output. Their role as social service
providers has ceased, though many enterprises have continued to be obliged to provide
services such as housing to retirees and to „surplus‟ workers shed during the process of
reform. It is at this point that a number of issues arise, including the question - At which
level should an enterprise be liberalised, autonomous and decentralised? This issue has
been much debated in China. At least, the full autonomy of large and economically
important and strategic SOEs seems to be unfeasible in China. To date, the central
government still controls more than 150 large SOEs that they identify as being „pillars‟ of
the national economy through economic, political or social methods based on the
principle of „separation of ownership from management‟ (Nolan 2004: 208). These
controlled SOES - the „pillar enterprise‟ include PetroChina and Sinopec. In practice, the
Party can regain control of the former SOEs that have become joint-stock or privatised if
it is deemed necessary. In this sense, China is no longer a planned economy, but it is not
yet a fully capitalist/market integrated economy.
Economic liberalisation allows greater mobility of persons, goods, and capital and
thus the development of a domestic market (OECD, 2001; Chow 2006). Market
liberalisation is an important and central ingredient in economic liberalisation. However,
economic liberalisation has also led to the downsizing and/or privatisation of public
services (UN, 2009). For example, according to my field work in Liujiahui, Rural Credit
Cooperatives (RCCs, nongcun xinyongshe) which were a solely state-owned banking
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service for rural areas have been liberalised and decentralised and then almost every
branch in rural villages has been closed in recent years in order to maximise profit. It has
led to rural residents, particular the elderly, and other people living in rural areas, having
difficulty in accessing their credit and savings accounts. The villagers in Liujiahui, for
example, have to go to the Yangxiye branch of the Rural Credit Cooperative where they
have had to tolerate rude and bad service. This is the closest bank to the village and it is
around 2.5km away from the village. A woman I interviewed, aged 74, went to the branch
to withdraw her money one day in the winter of the 2007 on foot. She is illiterate but she
was required to sign a document even though she showed her identification. She was told
she must sign otherwise she would not be permitted to withdraw her money. Finally, she
had to go home and get her son to come and provide a signature. As many elderly have
recognised, liberalisation and decentralisation of RCCs has been a disaster for elderly
rural citizens seeking access to basic banking services. The central government has now
promised that basic banking services would be available in all villages in rural areas in the
next three years (CCPCC&SC, 2010).
A UN Report published in 2009 recognised that economic liberalisation and
decentralisation could carry high risks and a lack of service access for some. This is a
situation that has been borne out by the experience of residents in Liujiahui and
neighbouring villages.

Privatisation in Economic Reform
Privatisation in China‟s economic reform and social development has attracted increasing
attention from academic scholars, particularly since the 1990s. For example, Yao (2006)
has examined the government commitment and the privatisation of the SOEs in the
context of economic reform. He has concluded that privatisation can facilitate reform of
the Chinese government. Chow (2005) draws attention to the corruption and the economic
reforms in the early 21st century in China. He has concluded that past economic reform of
the state sector in China consisted mainly of the privatisation of agriculture and of small
and medium-sized SOEs, in which the process of privatisation such as bureaucrats
managing state assets and the selling of assets involved massive corruption. Corruption
has been a major obstacle to China‟s further reform. Taking another approach,
Blumenthal et al. (2005) have explored privatisation and its discontents through a review
of the Chinese health care system. They have claimed that privatisation of the Chinese
economy has caused problems in health care delivery in both urban and rural areas.
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Privatisation is not a new concept in China or in other countries. One of the most
important revolutionary goals for Mao and his followers was to nationalize all private
enterprises that were a source of exploitation and poverty among the overwhelming
majority of Chinese people until 1949. The goal of China‟s economic reform was to
transform China‟s poorly performing planned economy into a market-oriented economy
capable of increasing income and economic growth and to achieve „a common prosperity
for all‟ (Hannan 1995). Public choice theory supposes that privatisation will spur
economic growth and hence reduce poverty (UN, 2009). However, privatisation is not the
stated public policy goal of the central government‟s economic reform, even now it is still
not officially used in the government‟s public policy edicts, legal documents, and
statements (Constitution of the PRC, 2004; Saich 2004: 23, 93; Lew 1997), although there
have been pragmatic calls for privatisation since the late 1980s and 1990s (Engardio
2005; Yao, 2006). Privatisation was carried out in certain aspects of China‟s economy in
the late 1980s and 1990s, although there was intense criticism in 1998 over privatisation
leading to the loss of state assets (Yao 2006; Chow 2005). In some regions, all local
industries especially TVEs and small SOEs were privatised (Saich 2004) and 80% of the
firms at or below county level were privatised by the end of 1998 (Yao 2006).
Throughout the 1990s a large number of public enterprises including TVEs and SOES
had been either privatised or turned into shareholding entities dominated by private
owners (Kung & Lin 2007). During 1997 and 1998 large-scaled privatisation of China‟s
state-owned enterprises including some large-sized SOEs took place through liquidation
and the sale of State assets to private investors (Guo & Yao 2005). The number of SOEs
also drastically decreased in the period from 2001 to 2004 and the private sector grew
remarkably (Nolan 2004). The private sector exceeded the state sector‟s share of GDP for
the first time in 1990s (Brandt & Rawski 2008:19) and accounted for as much as 70% of
the total GDP by 2005, whereas the state-owned sector shared only 30% which is less
than that in many developed countries (Engardio 2005). The private economy has played
an important role in the Chinese economy since the 1990s. Public ownership in China‟s
economy has been transformed into private ownership although the Chinese government
does not officially encourage and support privatisation per se and continues to declare its
commitment to socialism (Lew 1997; Saich 2004; Constitution of the PRC, 2004).
China‟s privatisation, like every other reform initiative, has taken a bottom-up
approach. Privatisation was initiated experimentally in several localities. The central
government then sanctioned and promoted privatisation where it was successful (Guo &
20

Yao 2005). The approach was one of „from countryside to city‟ as in the case of from
agricultural reform to industrial reform. The household responsibility system was in effect
the privatisation (dangan) of agriculture, although agricultural land has not been sold on
the market freely. The early success of agricultural privatisation in the countryside
accelerated the lease and contracting of collective enterprises and the privatisation of
TVEs and small as well as middle-sized SOEs in towns and cities. Some of China‟s large
SOEs were then privatised nationwide. However, the loss of the State assets and the need
to provide for a minimum living standard for laid-off workers has also created problems
including social tensions and complaints and disparity between rich and poor. It is quite
clear that there were serious side-effects from the privatisation process.
The public choice theory expects that privatisation will make governments spend
more on public services for poor households through selling failing state-owned
enterprises and alleviating the burden of financing investment (UN, 2009). This is the
reason why the World Bank links privatisation to poverty reduction and encourages
developing countries to carry out privatisation. However, it is hard to say that massive
privatisation in China directly resulted in poverty reduction based on my fieldwork.
Although the TVEs increased remarkably in the 1980s due to the implementation of lease
contracts (OECD, 2001), privatisation of TVEs, based on my interviews in Liujiahui,
reduced employment opportunities of rural areas and the income of villagers. Some
villagers were in debt because they had had to deposit money as part of „voluntarily‟
fundraising by TVE‟s in return for employment. They lost this investment. The villagers
did not withdraw their money from the TVEs when the TVEs were privatised and they
also were not capable of seeking legal or court assistance. This meant that their deposited
money was lost to the private owner of the TVE. This was not unusual in the privatisation
of TVEs in rural areas. A large fund of wealth and assets held by collectively-owned
TVEs was taken from ordinary citizens through corruption of the privatisation process.
With the collapse or privatisation of the majority of collectively-owned TVEs in the
1990s a large number of rural people had to leave for cities as rural-urban migrants
workers (Blecher 1997; Chase 2000). This worsened the situation of many elderly rural
residents.
The privatisation of massive state-owned enterprises resulted in a large number of
laid-off workers on one hand and; on the other hand, it also reduced or terminated welfare
provisions such as health care and housing that had been provided by state-owned
enterprises. These moves led to social unrest including protests and petitions (Brandt &
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Rawski, 2008). At the same time, privatisation reduced the developmental role of
governments, which could, in turn, affect public employment and poverty reduction.
Additionally, weak governance and regulatory capacity, as well as corruption, increased
in the privatisation process and led to poor control of market abuses by private utility
companies chasing profits (UN, 2009) even to the point of harming people‟s principal
interests as in the case of the now infamous accident of toxic baby milk powder in 2008.
The factory was in Shijiazhuang, capital of Hebei Province. Melamine is a chemical used
in plastics but the producer added it to infant formula to get more profits because the
industrial chemical melamine can make the milk the appearance of being higher in
protein. Many babies have been poisoned and some died from drinking this milk powder
tainted by the melamine (Baidu, 2008; Newsmedical, 18 September 2008. The detailed
report can be linked to http://wenku.baidu.com/view/2dedf384ec3a87c24028c4e7.html).
The provision of and access to public utilities should be maintained regardless of
ownership. Public utilities, even privatised utilities, should be regulated so that they
provide adequate services particularly to disadvantaged groups like the elderly in rural
areas. Privatisation also appears to have increased inequality in not only income, but also
in areas such as education and health care between rural-urban areas, between regions,
and between individual citizens.
The most commonly adopted form of privatisation of SOEs in China is based on
shareholding companies (Guo & Yao 2005; Chow 2005). The privatized SOEs are
seldom registered under individual ownership. For small and medium-sized SOEs,
privatisation has allowed many former government officials in the name of lease contracts
to take over the enterprise and make it his/her own. For the large-sized SOEs the shares
are mostly held by the government and government agencies and by other enterprises.
The different interests of different social strata in society may suffer or benefit in various
ways from moves toward privatisation and deregulation of the economy (White 1993: 8).
For example, some of my friends became unemployed because of the privatisation of their
affiliated SOE and experienced a hard time in the 1990s, whereas another friend became
the manager of the privatised SOEs and is enjoying a modern luxurious life-style.

Globalisation and Economic Reform
In Mao‟s era, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, China was blocked from economic,
cultural, scientific and technological exchanges with developed countries (Khan 2008;
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Xiao 2008). Due to the „Cold War‟, the UN did not recognize the legitimate status of the
People‟s Republic of China (PRC) until 1971(Taipei Times, 22 August 2004, p.8). In such
a tough international situation Mao had to use „independence and self-reliance (duli zizhu,
zili gengsheng)‟ combined with „hard struggle (jianku fendou)‟ to encourage the Chinese
people to develop their country. However, some scholars like Chow (2006) have argued
that China in Mao‟s era as was the case during the Qing Dynasty, practised a policy of
closing its door to the world and rejected joining economic globalisation. Prior to the late
1970s foreign trade played a negligible role in the economic development of China. In
other words, there was no significant impact of economic globalisation on China‟s
economy before economic reform was introduced in the late 1970s. With the
normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the USA in 1979 and the
restoration of China's lawful seat at the United Nations in 1971, it was possible for China
to become a member of the global economic community (Saich 2004: 307). When Deng
took power, a main component of economic reform was the open-door policy.
The Chinese government has attempted to take advantage of all productive forces,
including those developed by capitalist societies (Grasso, Corrin & Kort 2004: 246). The
government has sought to learn from the experience and lessons of other countries. For
example, in the early 1950s, China learned central planning from the socialist economy of
the Soviet Union in order to stabilise and develop its devastated economy in the wake of
civil war. Since the introduction of economic reform the Chinese government has learnt
from the market experience of many developed countries. China has also learnt from the
planning experience of Japan and South Korea (Nolan 2004).
If entrance to the UN in 1971 is seen to have opened the door of China‟s economy to
the world, then economic reform can be considered as the door that opened the process of
globalising China‟s economy (Chow 2006). Joining the WTO in 2001 then built on
China‟s developing economic integration into the global economy and demonstrated the
country‟s commitment to being an active member of the world economic community
(Saich 2004: 305; Chow 2006). The globalisation of China‟s economy has quickened the
pace of the integration of China's economy into the world economy.
There is much useful research on the globalisation of the Chinese economy. For
example, Nolan (2004: 185-296) has examined the situation in the first years of this
century and the challenges and possible strategies for the on-going globalisation of
China‟s economy. Chow (2006) has then studied globalisation and China‟s economic
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development through examining the flow of goods, capital, technology/information and
human resources from and to China. He has concluded that the globalisation of China‟s
economy is essential to the country‟s modernization and that China has benefited from the
process of economic globalisation, although there are short-run side effects. Morrison
(2009) explores China and the global financial crisis of 2008 and points out that China has
become a major player in global economic affairs and has been playing the role of a
responsible power in response to the global financial crisis.
The definition of „globalisation‟ can vary in emphasis on from economy and
technology to socio-culture and politics (Croucher 2004:10). However, globalisation is
economically the flow of goods, capital, information/ technology and human resources
across borders of countries and the effect of these flows on the economy of participating
countries

(Croucher

2004:10-14).

The

Chinese

government

has

encouraged

interdependence and mutual development between the national and international
economies through introducing corresponding policies. For example, foreign investment
regulations were introduced in 1984. The central government has accepted foreign funds
from both government and private sources and encouraged foreign direct investment
(FDI) through wholly-owned or joint ventures. China has also established „special
economic zones (SEZs)‟ and „open cities‟ as a means of fostering foreign capital
participation in the development of China‟s economy (Grasso, Corrin & Kort 2004: 247).
China‟s economic globalisation has made China one of the fastest growing economies in
the world (Chow 2006; Morrison 2009). China has also become a major contributor to not
only the growth and development of the world economy but to off-setting the
consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis (Morrison 2009). On the other hand,
China has also suffered pain and disaster as a consequence of the 2008 global financial
crisis. The crisis has damaged economic growth and significantly slowed China‟s
economy, although the Chinese government announced plans to provide billions of
dollars to stimulate the domestic economy and boost its holdings of U.S. Treasury
securities in order to mitigate the pressure from international markets (Morrison 2009).
With the continuing global financial crisis the export sector including manufacturing and
processing industries were particularly hard hit and millions of rural-urban migrants lost
their jobs. This obviously led not only a decrease in rural household cash income but also
promoted the prospect of social instability (Chen 2009; Morrison 2009). Furthermore, the
whole population has not equally enjoyed the benefits of China‟s economic globalisation.
The gap between rich and poor, rural and urban areas has continued to widen. Rich people
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are enjoying most of the benefits of economic globalisation whereas the poor have not
received any significant benefit. A study on both economic growth and equality in
developing countries from 1977 to 1997 conducted by the World Bank (UN, 2009) has
found that the more globalised the country, the faster the economic growth, whereas
income inequality did not significantly change. This has not been China‟s experience. It is
important for both policy-makers and researchers to find a way to let all Chinese citizens,
particularly rural people including the rural elderly equally enjoy the benefits of economic
reform and globalisation.
In addition to the above, in the process of China‟s economic globalisation China‟s
major exports have been manufactured goods and in the manufacturing process there has
been significant degradation of the environment. Pollution is presented as a benefit-cost
(World Bank, 2007). As a report of the World Bank (2007) has stated, rapid economic
growth in China has carried a large environmental and human health cost even though the
Chinese government declares that it has given environmental protection a high priority in
the 12th Five-Year Plan 2011-2015 (NPC, 2011). Indeed, the Chinese government has put
forward many different laws and regulations regarding environmental protection and
resource management. However, these policies and regulations have not been effectively
enforced. This is a result of the weak and corrupted institutional structure of governments
at all levels.
Globalisation of the Chinese economy has also had to confront an intense and
unprecedented challenge from multinational companies in almost all industry sectors.
China as the world‟s second-largest economy has only 54 companies in the Fortune 500
in 2010 (Yu 2010). One of the most significant challenges is that China's large-scale
industries are facing immense difficulties on the „global level playing field‟ (Nolan 2004:
185). A giant multinational corporation is a unified company possessing a cohesive
corporate culture that integrates subordinate companies (Nolan 2004). It has stable
„strategic alliances‟ with related multinational giants from upstream to downstream
business. Therefore, a giant multinational corporation is an empire in one or more sectors
in global industry, more powerful than an empire of a country many years ago although it
does not have its own military forces. A giant multinational corporation with its allies has
enough economic and political power to control the whole economy of a small country or
overturn a lawful government of a small country. Developing countries could learn the
lessons of the 1997 Asian financial crisis in which Thailand and a number of other Asian
countries suffered considerable financial loss and attendant social crises while China was
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not hit. A developing country has to be agile in order to negotiate the negative impact of
one or a few giant multinational corporations on its government and its people.
Market liberalisation means price liberalisation and the removal of entry barriers,
which allows for the entry of private firms and intensifies competition among enterprises.
Market liberalisation also reduces the government‟s contribution to enterprises when it
comes to accessing financial resources, material supplies, and finding markets (Guo &
Yao 2005). It is more difficult for privatised enterprises in a developing country,
including China, to compete with the giant multinational corporations on the „global level
playing field‟. This situation has contributed to China‟s current Hu-Wen administration
reversing many of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the period since 2005. For instance, the
government has significantly increased investment in the privileged state sector in order
to promote the rise of large „national champions‟ and so compete with giant foreign
corporations. Ironically, this policy has not benefitted the majority of Chinese citizens. It
has increased the disparity in income and attendant dissatisfactory as demonstrated by the
increase in petitions presented by laid-off workers.
It should also be noted that foreign agencies and international organizations have
become increasingly important in China‟s economic and social development since the
beginning of economic reform. For example, the WTO, the World Bank, Food and
Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations have provided advice and assistance
including financial assistance. It is important that these international organizations use
their authority to achieve social justice and fairness.
Private interests invest when and where they expect to make a highly profitable
return, but this situation can result in the principal interests of the poor, especially rural
people, being ignored and harmed when it comes to loss of employment and income and
reduced access to basic public services (UN, 2009). While increased use of markets is
championed as an avenue for development and increased economic wealth, there is also
no clear evidence to show that the disparity in income and services in China has narrowed
with economic reform, decentralization, increased use of markets and increased
interaction with the global market-place. Indeed, as a result of reform the gap has been
significantly widened.
China‟s economic reforms have increased inequality and have impacted on social
fairness and justice within China. Nevertheless the living standards of the overwhelming
majority of citizens have significantly increased with China‟s rapid economic growth in
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comparison to the pre-reform era. It is a significant venture for both policy-makers and
researchers to explore the question of how to promote social fairness and justice in the
process of decentralisation, liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation.

Conclusion
In this brief chapter outlining essential elements of China‟s economic reform I have
recognised that the decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation have
influenced and permeated almost every aspect of economic reform and social
transformation as well as people‟s life in China. These four essential elements of the
reform process have had considerable effect on the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens. On
one hand, these processes have sped-up China‟s economic reform and socio-economic
transformation. On the other hand, they have brought many problems such as a decrease
in public goods provisions and a widening disparity between rural and urban areas and
between rich and poor citizens. The provision of social services has proved to be a
particularly difficult issue. Some groups such as the rural elderly have found themselves
in a vulnerable economic and social situation. They are at risk. Nevertheless, China‟s
economic reform and social transition, including more than three decades of agricultural
reform, has played a pivotal role in improving the living standard of many people,
including many rural citizens.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Socioeconomic Transformation on the Rural
Elderly Living in Liujiahui

Introduction
In this chapter I will examine the impact of socioeconomic changes on the rural elderly
particularly those living in Liujiahui village. My discussion is based on my fieldwork in
Liujiahui. I have asked whether socioeconomic transformation directly affecting China‟s
rural population in relation to matters such as migration, changed traditional values,
culture, perspectives, and demographic change. I wanted to know how much the life of
the rural elderly has altered. I also wanted to find out whether the standard of living of the
rural elderly has significantly improved since the central government‟s campaign to build
a new socialist countryside was introduced in 2006. My research soon showed that not
only has economic reform and social transformation had a dramatic effect on the lives of
rural residents, but that their traditional values and culture has also been substantially
affected. My discussion includes issues such as the effect of population ageing and
decreased family size in rural areas and the now well-established practice of rural workers
migrating to cities to find work. I have considered the impact these issues have had on
support for the rural elderly and I have also considered changes in filial piety and the
differing understanding of this concept held by the older and younger generations of
China‟s rural populace.

A Brief Literature Review
China‟s socioeconomic reform and transformation and its impact on China have been
drawn a lasting attention from academic communities and policy-makers since the end of
the 1970s. The Chinese scholar Hu (2006) has explored China‟s economic and social
transformation from the late 1970s onward. He provides insight into the challenges and
opportunities for China‟s development and the government‟s thinking on economic and
social issues. In particular, he has examined the impact of demographic shifts like
population ageing on the long-term development of China‟s economy. Hu argued that
developing human resources to cope with the challenge of population ageing is extremely
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important in terms of current Chinese policy-making. He has suggested that the
development of human resources may be even more important than the establishment of
an effective social security system. White (1993) examined the political origins and
impact of reform in the post-Mao period (from the 1980s) and argued that some social
groups‟ interests, particularly the elderly, women, and children in the rural areas have
been ignored. However, he did not look at how the rural elderly have had almost no
opportunity to benefit from reform. Guthrie (2006) has studied the social, economic and
political transformation of Chinese society and showed how socioeconomic changes have
affected the life chances of individuals at the micro and macro level.
The English language literature on China‟s post-Mao economic reform and social
transformation tends to emphasise changes at a macro level and recognises the challenges
for China caused by policies associated with social, economic and political reform. In
contrast, the growing Chinese language literature focuses on the impact of socioeconomic
transformation on Chinese traditional culture and norms of behaviour. Fu (2004) studied
the imperative for moral reconstruction in the context of China‟s social transformation
from a historical perspective, while Jiang (2006) has discussed the relationship between
socioeconomic changes and the decay in traditional moral values. He (2007) argued that
in China‟s rural areas traditional moral orders or norms have been losing their effect, but
have not yet been replaced with modern alternatives.
The study of rural communities and the lives of the rural elderly require a strong
commitment from scholars. It takes time to develop a meaningful dialogue with these
communities. Gao‟s study (1999) is especially significant. He grew up in the village that
he writes about (i.e., Gao Village in Jiangxi, China). He returned to his village annually
from Australia, during the 1990s, compiling information on lives, living standards, health
care, education, migrant workers, change and continuity of culture and customs in rural
China. His work covers four decades from the 1950s to the 1990s. It falls into four
distinct themes: the village before and after land reform; the commune system; the
dismantling of the communes; and the unfolding impact of the market economy,
including increased migration to urban areas from the late 1980s onward. He concludes
that while the education opportunities of urban residents were paralysed for some time
during the Cultural Revolution the radical policies implemented at that time brought
significant improvement in education and health care in rural China. Rural residents
including rural elderly benefited from the Mao period.
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Unger (2002) has discussed the transformation of rural China in the era of Mao (the
collective era or the commune era) and in the post-Mao period (reform and openness era).
He provides comprehensive insight into the realities of the Chinese countryside by
examining empirical data and analysing political, economic and social trends. Shaw
(2006) explores China‟s social problems especially violent crimes such as homicide and
collective violence and the problems of substance abuse and gambling in rural areas in the
context of economic reform and social transformation. Brugger and Reglar (1994) have
traced the relationship between the central government and the countryside in terms of
agricultural policy, including the collectivisation of Mao‟s era and the decollectivisation
at the beginning of the Deng era. They argue that neither Mao, nor his successors, could
narrow the rural-urban socioeconomic gap. Chan, Madsen and Unger (1984) studied the
impact of a series of political campaigns and upheavals that took place in the mid-1960s
and the late 1970s sponsored by the government and substantially affecting the lives of
rural people (Chan grew up in China). The authors do this using detailed micro-study of
Chen village, a common farming village in South China. They show that socioeconomic
and political changes in the village community resulted from various political campaigns
and national upheavals of that time.
Rural communities and the rural elderly in China are vital for the further economic
and social development of China. According to the 1% National Population Sample
Survey conducted by the NBSC in the end of 2005, the total population of China was
1306 million, of which the rural population was 745 million, accounting for 57% of total
population. The population aged 60 and above was 144 million accounting for 11% of
total population (NBSC, 2006). The Sixth National Population Census of 2010 showed
that the figure for people aged 60 and above reached around 177.65 million, accounting
for 13.26% of total population. The proportion of elderly population was up by around 2.3
percentage points compared the population survey of 2005 (NBSC, 2011). In addition, the
majority of China‟s rural elderly are not entitled to social welfare including pension and
health care benefits (Chinese Government, 2004). Families are still the major providers of
elderly support in rural areas (NPC, 1996; Giles et al. 2010). Therefore, the rural elderly
are more likely to be in poor health compared to their urban counterparts and they can
very easily push their family into poverty.

Population Ageing - Challenges for the Rural Elderly
Over the past five decades China has completed historic demographic transformation with
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the implementation of family planning program. This demographic transformation has
resulted in major change in China‟s population. (NPFCC: National Population and Family
Planning Commission of China, 2007; Zhao & Guo 2007; Lowry 2009).
Zhao and Guo (2007) note that there are major challenges attached to all forms of
rapid demographic transition. Feng and Xiao (2007) classify the characteristics of China‟s
population transformation into the following categories: the high proportion and large size
of the elderly population; rapid growth in the population of the oldest old of the old; a
growth rate of the ageing population that is faster than that of the whole population; and
the problem of getting older before becoming rich. They state that there are great
differences in population ageing between urban and rural regions in China. The
proportion of population ageing in rural areas is higher than in urban areas and population
ageing in rural areas is a more acute problem than population ageing in urban areas.
Population ageing is having a significant impact on the sustainable development of rural
communities and on the socioeconomic advancement of China as a whole (Zhao & Guo
2007).
China‟s population is not only ageing, but ageing rapidly. According to the World
Health Organisation (WHO) a nation is rated as having an ageing society when the
proportion of population aged 65 and above has reached more than 7% of total population
(WHO, 2009). The 1% National Population Sample Survey of 2005 shows that in China
the population aged 65 and above numbered 100.45 million, accounting for 7.7% of the
total population (This compares with my observation above that in 2005 11% of total
population were aged 60 and above) while the population aged 65 and above was around
118.83 million, accounting for 8.87% of the total population in Sixth National Population
Census of 2010 (NBSC, 2006, 2011). This means that China has become an ageing
society (NBSC, 2006). Compared with the Fifth National Population Census of 2000
conducted by the NBSC the population aged 65 and above was up by 0.73 percentage
points by 2005 and by 1.91 percentage points by 2010 (NBSC, 2001, 2006, 2011). This
means that China remains the country with the largest cohort of aged in the world in terms
of both absolute size and proportion (NBSC, 2006; Eberstadt 2009). Furthermore, a report
from the UN states that the elderly population of China will increase from 100 million in
2005 to 329 million in 2050 and the proportion will increase from 7.7% in 2005 and to
over 30% of overall population by 2050 (UN, 2008). The number of elderly aged 80 and
above (the oldest of the old) will increase at a faster rate from 15 million in 2005 to 101
million in 2050 and the proportion will rise from 1.1% to 7.2% of the total population
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(UN, 2008). However, the Fifth National Population Census of 2010 showed that the
share of population in the age group of 0-14 was down by 6.29 percentage points while
that of the age group of 60 and over was up by 2.93 percentage points compared with the
Fifth National Population Census of 2000.
My grassroots research has suggested that the majority of village elderly recognise
that the Chinese government and its policies play a vital role in the well-being and life of
the elderly. When undertaking grass-roots research in Liujiahui village I found that all but
one of the 18 elderly interviewed had heard about the problem of China‟s „ageing
society‟: Two interviewees got this information from newspapers and eight from
watching television programs while four of them had heard about ageing from their
village fellows and three from their adult children. The respondents had a negative picture
of China‟s population ageing. They had been led to believe that there would not be
enough resources including institutional capacity and human resources such as care-givers
and service staff to provide for the burgeoning elderly. This was because the working-age
population could not afford the burden of a relatively large number of elderly in need of
support.
From the view-point of the government, it is quite clear that there will not be enough
money to support the rural elderly not because the government does not want to do its
best for the rural elderly, but because China has a particular historical inheritance.
Therefore, the rural elderly should understand the government‟s situation, which means
that they should accept the reality of their life, including those who are obliged to live in
rural communities. They should not blame their government. Many village elderly
recognise that their tough living situation is a consequence of socioeconomic
transformation. Some of them do not believe that the government wants to evade its
responsibility for supporting the elderly. They believe they should thank their government
if the government offers them benefits no matter how negligible the benefits are. Two of
the village elderly (both categorised as the oldest old of the old) said with tears in their
eyes that: „Hu Jintao is one of the best emperors in Chinese history because only he offers
a pension for the rural elderly‟. When answering the last question, the majority of village
elderly were concerned over the issue of China‟s ageing rural population even though it
has not really affected their material life. For example, a retired village primary school
teacher told me that there were around 15-35 students in one grade (e.g. Year 3) in the
village primary school from the 1960s to the1990s, whereas there were only around seven
in the 2000s. An accurate village population figure and the ratio between mortality and
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birth-rates from the 1950s to the 2000s is not available from the village committee.
However, the Fifth National Population Census for the year 2000 gave a village
population of 1,919, while the census for 2010 gave a reduced population of 1,407.
(Pingshan County Council, 19 May 2011; Huo 2008-2009). The death rate is higher than
the birth rate and the village‟s elderly have witnessed a dramatic decrease in village
population. They worry that the village could disappear in the future. As one elderly
person said to me, the policy of family planning can result in population ageing and the
government should also have the ability to develop a corresponding policy to tackle the
issue of population ageing. The rural elderly do not blame the government for the unfair
social welfare policy although they do worry about their later life prospects.
Unsurprisingly, the majority of village elderly are pessimistic with regard to their
prospects during later life. One elderly person said she would commit suicide if nobody
supported her in her later life.
The government has tried to evade its responsibility for supporting the rural elderly by
publicising the negative impact of population ageing on socioeconomic development.
Less educated rural people have accepted the government‟s account without suspicion.
The Chinese government should provide a decent living standard to their country‟s rural
elderly residents although it is an arduous task; particularly many are “old before rich”.
This is a basic component of a moderately prosperous society (xiaokang shehui) proposed
by the Chinese government (CCPCC&SC, 2010).

Decreasing Family Size - Challenges for the Rural Elderly
It is widely acknowledged that the family size in China has been decreasing with the
implementation of the family planning policy that began in the late 1970s although the
policy has not been strictly carried out in rural areas. As shown in Table 2.1, an average
family size was 3.10 persons in the Sixth National Population Census of 2010 (NBSC,
2011). It had decreased by 1.3 persons in the past three decades from 1982 to 2010. It had
been 3.13 persons in 2005 and 3.44 persons in the Fifth National Population Census in
2000 (NBSC, 2006). The figure in 1990 was 3.96 persons in each family. It has decreased
by 0.44 persons in a decade, compared with 4.4 persons in the Third National Population
Census of 1982 (NBSC, 1990, 1982). The „1:2:4:8‟ (urban) or „2:2:4:8‟ (rural) is a
popularly cited ratio used to demonstrate the reason for considerable pressure on the
family-based elderly care now and in the future. This means that one or two children born
under the family planning policy may have to care for two parents, four grandparents and
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eight great grandparents.
Table 2.1 The decreasing family size in China in the past three decades*
Year

1982

1987

1990

2000

2005

2010

Family size

4.4

4.2

3.96

3.44

3.13

3.10

*The data is taken from the National Population Census from 1982 to 2011 (NBSC, 2011,
2006, 2001, 1990, 1987, 1982).
Fertility rates, mortality rates and decreasing family size in relation to elderly care in
rural areas has been considered by Zimmer and Kwong (2003) based on an analysis of the
Survey of Support for the Elderly in Rural and Urban China conducted in 1992 by the
China Research Centre on Ageing (CRCA). It is very difficult to ascertain the design of
the interview questions used in this survey and whether the answers are likely to reflect
the thoughts and feelings of rural interviewees. Zimmer and Kwong (2003:41) conclude
that „a decline in fertility alone will not lead to a collapse of the traditional support
system‟. However, this conclusion is only valid for some households. These are
households where there are at least two children or where elderly residents are entitled to
welfare. A rural family with only one child often means that that child is incapable of
providing sufficient care for his/her infirm elderly parents or parents-in-law either
instrumentally or financially. Thus, the traditional family-centred elderly care system is
more likely to be in crisis than it has been in the past. It is worthwhile paying attention on
the relationship between decreased family size and China‟s largely family-based elderly
care system in rural areas and the life of the rural elderly who are not entitled to either a
pension or health care.
Studies demonstrate that decreased family size is generally associated with reduction
in the provision of family-based aged care (Jia 1988; Yan & Chi 2001). However,
Zimmer and Kwong (2003) argue that family size does not always relate to the provision
of effective support for the elderly. This means that a big family with more children does
not always provide more support whereas a small family with few children does not
necessarily equate with inadequate provision for elderly parents. They then conclude that
reduced family sizes have not had a significantly negative impact on elderly support and
that adult children appear to be able to provide the basic support needed by the elderly.
My fieldwork in Liujiahui also shows that number of children plays an important role
in providing support for elderly residents on one hand and on the other hand, that family
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size does not always associate with the degree of support provided. For example, one of
my interviewees, a widower, aged 75, has three sons whose nuclear family‟s income and
living standard are higher than the local average. However, his life is not easy. He has
been hungry and cold (in winter) because his two sons and daughters-in-laws do not
provide him with basic support and necessities. This is not an isolated case in rural China.
A terrifying story shocked China in 2010. Jinghua Shibao (2010), a popular newspaper in
Beijing, reported that an elderly woman, aged 80-years-old and living in Zhangxin
Village, Tongzhou, Beijing was abandoned by her four sons and died of hunger in her
room. Nobody knew about her death until her grandson visited her on 9th April 2009. Her
body had dried out. The four sons did not provide basic support for their old mother, but
this was not because they were not financially capable of providing care. These four sons
were recognised as rich people in the village. As one elderly person said, more adult
children with a relatively high income and living standard does not always mean that they
provide more care for their old parents, whereas less children with a lower income and
living standard does not necessarily equate with poorer provision for elderly parents
either. In fact, the latter conclusion is true only if the elderly parents do not suffer from a
serious disease and live at home. Otherwise, a poor household could not provide adequate
support, as one case from my fieldwork demonstrated. An elderly father, aged 78,
suffered from a serious stroke and has been bedridden for a number of years. But his
divorced daughter, a mother of two school age children, has to look after their farming
land so the family can survive and so she has less time to take care of her father. I was
told that the father calls out making terrible sounds. He yells „I want to pee, my trousers
are wet, I am thirsty, I am hungry… ‟. He does this when his daughter goes to farm. We
can imagine how hard life is for both daughter and father. The daughter told me that her
father could be looked after better if she had brothers. Her father agreed that his
daughter‟s burden of care would be less if he had sons. Both daughter and father suffer
moral panic because the daughter has to contend with a conflict between surviving and
her moral duty to care for her father. Her father feels guilty for putting a heavy burden on
his daughter rather than providing help for his daughter. The toughest time for both
daughter and father was when the daughter was in hospital due to a high fever lasting a
few weeks in 2009. A big issue arose: Who could look after the father? The daughter
could not employ a nursemaid (baomu) taking into account her economic situation. She
had to ask her closest disabled relative to take care of her father.
It is quite clear that decreased family size affects family-centred elderly care
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physically, financially and emotionally. In particular, the majority of hospitals do not
provide basic services for patients such as going to the toilet and bathing. One family
member must stay in hospital to look after their elderly relative if the elderly person is
treated there. I have had this experience when I lived in and visited China. For example,
my father was in a county hospital due to a serious stroke in 2010. I had to sit by the side
of his bed when he was given an infusion because I must call a nurse to transfer to another
bottle of medicine if the first bottle is almost finished. At the same time, I must help my
father to go to the toilet if necessary because his infusion takes four to five hours. It is
common in China for the majority of patients in a hospital to have at least one family
member to tend to their basic needs. The burden on families and households is obvious.
However, in the absence of children, neither government nor communities and market
currently provide at least physical care for the elderly rural residents in current rural
China.

Rural-urban Migration – Challenges for the Rural Elderly
There is an inconsistency in the total number of rural-urban migrants in China cited by
government sources and by scholars. For example, some scholars like Nielsen and Smyth
(2008) estimate there are between 120 and 200 million rural-urban migrants in the first
decade of the 21st century. Liang (2007) concludes that the total population size of
migrants would have been 126 million by the end of the twentieth century. He has used
national population surveys and census of 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 conducted by the
NBSC in China. The figures on migrant population supplied by the Chinese government
were 147 million in 2005, 225 million in 2008, 230 million in 2009 and 261 million in
2010 (NBSC, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011; Xinhua, 10 March 2010). Some Chinese scholars
such as Liu (2006) and Sui (2005) argue there are around 240 and 312 million rural-urban
migrants respectively in the 2000s in China. Obviously, there are significant discrepancies
(over 100 million) in estimates of the population size of migrant workers offered by
official government sources and scholars for the same year. Based on the data from the
NBSC (2010) and CIA (2010) we can conclude that the proportion of the rural-urban
migrants (230 million) in the total rural population increased to over 30% in 2010. What
is clear is that rural-urban migrants have formed not only the largest migrant population,
but also the biggest mobile population in China‟s history (Zhu 2007; Murphy 2002). This
is the reason why the impact of rural-urban migration on urban communities and rural
communities has received a great deal of attention from both academics and policy36

makers (Gao 1999; Murphy 2002; Roberts 2007). Most studies on the impact of ruralurban migration on rural communities have focused on wives and children left behind and
their contribution to individual households and local economies (Gao 1999; Murphy 2002;
Unger 2002; Liang 2007; Roberts 2007; Biao 2007).
The massive post-reform rural-urban migration has contributed to the rapid economic
growth of urban areas. Rural-urban migrants have been paid low wages to take on
dangerous, labour-intensive work in poor working and living conditions. Migrants have
worked hard and have been without social welfare, social protection and career
advancement prospects. Rural-urban migration has also improved the living standard of
migrant original families and communities through their remittances. Their wages have
been earned at the cost of the isolation and separation from their family members
including their wives or husbands, elderly parents and school age children. These people
are called „the left behind‟ or the 38-61-99 army (Biao 2007). The 38 represents women
because March 8 is International Woman‟s Day and the 61 is children because June 1 is
International Children‟s Day. The last figure, 99, refers to elderly because September 9
(based on Chinese calendar) is the day for honouring the elderly in China. Although they
and their family members have been suffering unfair treatment, social fairness and justice
for rural-urban migrants and their family members is still not the targeted objective of
China‟s policy-makers and the government.
While the subject of rural-urban migration and the fate of the migrant worker is a
common theme in the literature, there is less consideration of how rural-urban migration
and how the resultant socio-demographic change has challenged the traditional familybased elderly care system in rural areas (Biao 2007; Zhuo & liang 2006). My fieldwork
has shown that all 18 of my elderly respondents and 7 of 8 middle-aged respondents had
adult children working in towns and cities as migrants. In Liujiahui there is at least one
migrant in every village family.
Zhuo and Liang (2006) have explored the impact of migration on the well-being of
the elderly in rural China based on the data from the 10% sample of the 2000 China Aged
Population Survey conducted by the China Ageing Committee and the China Centre for
Scientific Study of Aging. They find that the rural elderly with migrant adult children
have more chance of receiving money and accessing improved housing. However, they
have not explained why the elderly with migrant children and those without migrant
children express similar degrees of satisfaction. In contrast with the research of Zhuo and
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Liang (2006), Biao (2007) probes the problems encountered by the left behind elderly. He
then argues that 73.5% of the left behind elderly are more satisfied with their lives in
general, compared with 65.7% of those without migrant children. In the latter case the
children continue to reside in the village. He concludes that out-migration has not caused
a serious crisis in terms of support for the elderly. Nevertheless, out-migration does
present potential challenges for family-centred rural aged care system taking into account
that the people subjected to the planned birth policy are now approaching 60-years-old
and above and have only one or two children. The main purpose of Biao‟s study (2007) is
to call for the removal of the urban-rural divide and an improvement in public service
provision for rural communities. The difference between the results of Zhuo and Liang
study (2006) and that of Biao‟s (2007) might lie in different data and on differing views
of the relationship between money and satisfaction. Unlike Zhuo and Liang (2006), Green
(2010) and Biao (2007) look at why the left behind elderly are left behind. Green (2010)
has claimed that a large number of rural-urban migrants have resulted in physical hardship
particularly for elderly people suffering chronic illness. Green (2010) then recognises that
it is not migration that causes hardship for the rural elderly. His conclusion is that
migration is only practical and that it is a good way to help alleviate hardship among rural
elderly residents.

A Comparison Between the FGMW and the SGMW
China‟s Nongmin gong (rural-urban migrants) can be categorised into two groups: the
first generation migrant workers (FGMW) and the second-generation migrant workers
(SGMW) (Wang 2003). First generation migrants are the older generation of migrant
workers. They were born before the 1970s (Tang & Scoble 2010; Yue et al. 2010). They
have worked in towns and cities as rural-urban migrants since the 1980s. Most of the
FGMW have been gradually returning permanently to their original places of residence
due to various factors such as the existing hukou system, their own physical condition and
the need to care for elderly parents. Now their children are following in parent‟s footsteps
and joining the rural-urban migration as second-generation migrant workers. Second
generation migrants were born after the 1980s (Tang & Scoble, 2010; Yue et al, 2010; He
2010). The SGMW are also called the „new generation of migrant workers (xinsheng dai
nongmin gong)‟. This title was first coined in 2001 by Wang Chunguang of the Chinese
Academy of Social Science (Wang 2003; He 2010) and was then formally coded into the
No. 1 Document of the CCPCC&SC in 2010 (CCPCC&SC, 2010; Li 2010; People’s
38

Daily Online, 10 March 2010). The term immediately spread in the Chinese media and
has been used from then on. The current labour market employs migrant workers who are
almost all new generation nongmin gong (RISC: Research Institute of the State Council of
the PRC, 2006; Tang & Scoble 2010). These migrants are sending money to their original
families, doing the 3D jobs (the dirty, dangerous and demanding jobs) and are working
hard for their family‟s survival. At least this is the common image of the nongmin gong.
However, while it is an image that fitted the FGMW, it is not a particularly good fit for
the SGMW. There is a big difference between the two generations in terms of bearing
family responsibility, educational attainment, motivation for labour migration, family
socio-economic situation and so on. For example, the statistics provided by the NBSC
indicate that the SGMW are better educated than the FGMW. A large proportion of
second-generation migrants, 92.9%, graduated from junior high school whereas a more
modest 82% of the first generation had graduated from junior high school (Tang & Scoble
2010).
The statistics provided by the NBSC also demonstrate that the desire of the SGMW
for consumer goods is much stronger than the FGMW‟s desire for these products. The
SGMW pay more attention to their appearance, their clothes and the style and colour of
their hair. Compared with the FGMW who only laboured on building sites and in labourintensive electronic assembly and manufacturing plants, a large number of the SGMW are
not interested in such low-paying, physically demanding jobs on construction sites or long
hours doing repetitive factory work. Many of them work in the service sector. Unlike their
parents, the majority of the new generation migrants can speak Putonghua (Mandarin).
Their spoken language and appearance from hairstyle to shoes is not different from their
city counterparts. What is different is their official registration (hukou). They are city
slickers. As one of my young female interviewees claimed, she is not different from a city
girl except for her registration as a rural resident. The migrant worker image of a
dishevelled person holding big striped bags, carrying quilts and wearing untidy dress has
almost disappeared.
Unlike the FGMW, earning money in order to raise the family household‟s living
standard is not the main aspiration of most of the SGMW. Their goal is to have a better
future. This is what motivates them to leave for cities to seek new opportunities (Solinger
1999). They are less concerned about how much they earn than what they can learn about
the outside world from life in cities (Zhou 2009). As one of my interviewees said, he is
concerned about how much he could learn from his boss rather than how much his boss
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pays him in his early career. These are differences that underlie different contributions to
their original families in terms of farm labouring which many of the SGMW have never
undertaken, financial help and supporting the elderly. As my fieldwork showed, six of the
seven middle-aged participants I interviewed complained that their adult children not only
seldom helped with farming chores, but they also seldom sent money back home and
some borrowed money from their parents. The SGMW are contributing less to their
parents‟ welfare on one hand; on the other hand, the SGMW were born under the planned
birth policy and they do not have enough siblings to reasonably share the responsibility of
caring for their parents. The FGMW were able to share care for the elderly among a
greater number of siblings. This situation is one that could lead to a worsening crisis in
the care of the rural elderly in the near future.
Stories of the FGMW and the SGMW: Father and Son
The following story is from my fieldwork. The father, aged 55, has one son and a
daughter. He had worked on construction sites and in a stone collection factory. These
jobs are typical of the heavy labour, dangerous and dirty jobs undertaken by FGMWs. He
used his wages to fund the building of a house for his son‟s marriage, to support his
children‟s schooling, and to support his elderly parents. His family is an average family
economically and demographically in his village. He alternated between working in the
city and the village, which means he helped his wife with the family farm during the busy
farming season and worked in the city in the slack season. After nearly ten years‟ hard
work and saving money as a nongmin gong he had not only supported his son to complete
the education at a vocational college, but had also built a new house for his son. His
remittances also financed the cost of his son‟s marriage and his parents‟ funerals. He, as a
Chinese farmer, has successfully achieved his life-cycle goals of building a house,
financing his son‟s marriage and provision for his elderly parents. These tasks have long
been held to be essential in rural China. This provision is fundamental to social
reproduction through the transmission of material and human resources from present to
future generations (Murphy 2002). The father had to return to the village in the early
2000s because it was very hard for him to continue to do heavy labouring work. He has
been farming and helping his wife look after their grandson since then.
The son was born in 1981. After graduating from junior high school and then from a
two-year course at a vocational college in the late 1990s the son has been working in
restaurants and hotels in cities and towns. He is a typical new generation migrant worker.
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As he said, he holds rural residency which means that his official occupation is farmer.
However, he has done little agricultural work over the past ten years. Like many of his
generation he does not know how to farm. Indeed, he is unwilling to do any farming.
Unlike his father, the son seldom sends money back to his parents although his salary is
higher than his father was earning. He is not willing to put up with hardship in the city as
his father had done. The son has a stronger desire for consumer goods such as famous
brand mobile phones and fashionable clothes. He wore fashionable clothes and glasses
with a popular dyed hairstyle when I visited his home during the 2009 Chinese New Year.
He has no intention of working hard and saving money. He will not struggle as his father
did, so that the family in Liujiahui can build a spacious house, buy electronic appliances
and enjoy a decent life. Compared with his father, the FGMW, the son, a SGMW has
been raised in relatively good conditions. He is under much less pressure to take on
family responsibilities. The son‟s mother complained that young couples are not willing
to help with farming chores in the busy season.
It has become common for FGMWs fathers to support SGMWs, sons and the latter‟s
nuclear family in Liujiahui. The following story illustrates how parents in their middleaged parents assist their adult children. One of my middle-aged interviewees is an old
generation migrant. He is in his early 50s and has worked on construction sites for over 20
years. He has not only financed his two children‟s vocational education and marriages,
but has also built a quality house for his son. He gave financial support to his daughter
when she bought a unit in the county city where she works as a textile worker. His
daughter says that she longs for the city life and could not return to the village to work in
the field as a nongmin. Possessing a unit and enjoying the decent life in a city is her life
dream, but she and her husband do not have incomes that would allow them to afford to
buy a unit in the county city even though the young couple has worked in a factory for
over five years. She had to ask her father for help. The father withdrew his all savings
from the bank and gave them to his daughter, although the money had been intended for
use by his wife and himself in their later life.
Old generation migrants have quite often used up their savings for their family. They
have returned permanently to their village. However, SGMW are unwilling to return to
the village and many have been unable to financially and physically support their elderly
parents. This potential elderly is facing difficulty day-to-day life in their later life.
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Changing the Life Cycle of Villagers and Risks Faced by the FGMW
For years and years building houses for children has been one of the three tasks in the life
cycle of China‟s rural residents (Murphy 2002). However, with rapid urbanisation and
migration this life cycle has been changing from solely building a house in the village to
not only building a house but also purchasing a unit for grown-up children in cities or
towns. Middle-aged parents helping SGMW children to purchase a unit are becoming a
new trend in Liujiahui. For example, two of the five young people I interviewed had
purchased a unit in Shijiazhuang, the provincial capital of Hebei Province, where they
work. One is a female and one is a male. The former graduated from a vocational college.
She has been working as a chauffeur for a private construction company. Her father has
alternated between the city, towns and the village since the late 1980s. As her mother
said, their savings are full of her husband‟s sweat and blood. The girl with rural
residential registration (nongcun hukou) wants to marry a boy with a city hukou. She
believes she must own a unit in order to increase her attractiveness and advantage in terms
of her marriage prospects. The father withdrew all his savings of 80,000 yuan from the
bank so that his daughter could purchase a unit.
One of my younger interviewees is a retired voluntary solider with a rural hukou. He
graduated from junior high school and is working in a factory in Shijiazhuang. His wife
has a city hukou. She is an office worker and has a bachelor degree. Their marriage is
unbalanced from the point view of Chinese social values and customs. His father plants
and retails mushrooms. The father has to get up early in the morning and go home in the
evening in all seasons to earn enough money to support his son‟s purchase of a unit. The
purchase serves to keep a balance in the marriage. The father has suffered serious arthritis
due to tough working conditions over the years and as his father said, he may not be able
to work any more five years hence.
Building a house in the village is cheaper than purchasing a unit in urban areas.
Possessing a unit for a rural-urban migrant is indicating a better socioeconomic status
recognised by the general public in China. As one of my younger interviewee stated,
purchasing and possessing a unit in a city or town is a life dream for most of the new
generation migrants, but building a house in the village has been an important goal for
their parents‟ generation. In many cases members of the FGMW have built a house in the
village and have provided financial support to their children so they can purchase a unit in
an urban area. In other words, middle-aged FGMW parents have had to spend at least
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double the money spent by their parents‟ generation. This trend can put many middleaged parents, the FGMW, into a position of potential risk because some may spend most
of their savings supporting their children, the SGMW and would not have sufficient funds
to provide for their post-working life. In answer to the question in my fieldwork: Why did
you give your all savings to your children to purchase a unit in the city? - The above
parents said that they hoped their children would have a better future in the city.
However, the SGMW living in the city hardly support their nuclear family and have
little ability to support their parents in the village. The question then is - What will their
parents rely on for support late in their lives when they have lost their ability to labour and
have spent their savings on purchasing units for their children? In some cases, supporting
adult children purchasing units in cities and towns has led to middle-aged parents getting
into economic difficulties late in life. There are also cases of aged parents getting into
debt to build a house for a son who is marrying. It is quite clear that the middle-aged
parents are facing potential risk in their later life when the new trend of purchasing a unit
in urban areas is prevailing.
Settlement and Occupational Choices of the SGMW - Potential Challenges for the
System of Rural Elderly Care
China is experiencing rapid urbanisation with more and more rural young people working
and living in cities and towns. The number of young migrants aged between 16-30-yearsold increased from 90 million in 2005 (NBSC, 2006) to 142 million in 2009 (NBSC,
2010). At the same time, research looking at the settlement intention of rural-urban
migrants shows that most of the SGMW are not intending to return to their original home
to undertake farming and are intending to permanently live in cities or towns (People’s
Daily Online, 10 March 2010; Yue et al. 2010; Zhou 2009; Zhu 2007). My fieldwork also
has shown that four of the five young people interviewed would like to live in cities
forever. One of these four wanted to live in the county city close his original village, but
is not willing to return home to engage in farming. The other three absolutely did not
intend to go back to farming and preferred to stay working and living in cities no matter
how hard their urban life.
Almost all young people in Liujiahui have left the village to work in urban areas after
finishing junior high school as 15-year-olds or completing training programs and
vocational schools as 16-17-year-olds. They have chosen to go to the cities rather than to
stay at home to farm the land. The village accountant estimates that only three young
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villagers under 25 years are not involved in migration. Two of them need look after their
disabled mothers. The third is disabled. Only groups in the central street of Liujiahui
chatting, playing majong and poker during my fieldwork were the elderly and some
women. It is unusual to see younger people in the village or in the fields except during the
Chinese New Year period. As Biao (2006) noted, the village in China is stagnant and
occupied by elderly, women and children and so, as Gao (1999) has argued, the village
will disappear in the near future if migration continues. Interestingly, most parents in the
village like their children to venture to cities and towns for better opportunities rather than
have nothing to do at home. In answer to the question: Why do you encourage your
children to venture to cities even when they will experience hard living and working
conditions there? - Two of my seven middle-aged interviewees responded that they have
enough labourers for farming and their children can earn money and so increase the
family‟s cash income. The rest hoped their children would escape from a rural life of
„face to soil and back to sky (mian chao huangtu, bei chao tian)‟ and have a better future
in the city. Encouragement from parents is an important push factor for the SGMW. It is
also worth noting that the majority of households in Liujiahui have been free from
absolute poverty and so the children do not necessarily need to venture to cities where
they are subject to institutional and social discrimination. The new generation migrants
have been making an informed choice to work in the cities. The outward trend of ruralurban migration in Liujiahui shows no sign of slowing down. The issue arising from my
above discussion is: Who will provide physical and financial care for the ailing elderly
left in the village if the current migration process continues?
Most of first generation migrants have gradually been withdrawing and fading from
the migration scene and second generation migrants have gradually constituted the
majority (Yue et al. 2010; Wang 2003). There are big differences between the two
generations. Most of the FGMW have returned to their original villages and have
continued farming when they reach their late 40s and early 50s, whereas the SGMW are
not intending to go back their original hometowns and undertake farming. It is worthwhile
paying attention to the potential challenges to rural elderly care associated with the
settling in cities and occupational intention of the SGMW. Zhu (2007, 2009) focuses on
the impact of the settlement intention of new generation migrant workers on China‟s
current social and economic policies. He explores this issue using his fieldwork and
official data from the NBSC (from 2002 to 2006) and demonstrates that the settlement
intention of new generation migrant workers living in cities has significantly increased.
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Zhu has also recognised that the majority of the SGMW are unlikely to undertake
agricultural production as farmers. Giles and Mu (2007) study the elderly parents‟ health
associated with the migration decisions of adult children and conclude that young rural
adult children appear to bear the traditional responsibility for caring for the elderly no
matter what kind of arrangement is made. Their argument is based on the residence of
adult children within the village. They also claim, relying on their conceptual framework
that adult children who need to look after their ailing parents will be less likely to migrate.
However, my fieldwork shows a different story in the context of the current settlement
and occupational intentions of the SGMW.
One of the main motivations for Chinese couples in rural areas for raising children is
to provide for security in their old age (yang er fang lao). This security has traditionally
taken the form of co-residence with adult children who provide daily help and economic
support. This traditional arrangement has become uncertain in the context of sociodemographic transformation. Co-residence has decreased in rural areas with increased
rural-urban migration (Wang 2004). In answer to the question: Where would you prefer to
live? Would it be with your nuclear family if you could make a free choice and why? - All
of the young migrants I interviewed said that they intended to settle in urban areas. In
answering the second part of the question, most were more concerned with the future of
their children and themselves than with the comfort and security of their parents. They
believed that their nuclear family should be integrated into local communities and that
they would have a better future in urban areas while their children would get a higher
quality of education in cities compared with the poor educational resources provided in
rural areas. As one of my young, male interviewees said - He prefers to live in a city even
if he only has one-room although his original house in Liuiahui has three bedrooms with a
big backyard. He had various opportunities in urban areas, but nothing except farming
was available in Liujiahui. His children could potentially go to a key university and have
a better future in cities. They could only graduate from junior high school in Liujiahui and
they would still be at the bottom of society. Their family would be caught in a vicious
circle.
Most new generation migrants are unlikely to take up farming and to live in their
home village Yue et al. (2010), Zhu (2007, 2009). The majority of young villagers have
also no experience of farming in Liujiahui. As one of my young, female interviewees
stated - a dull countryside life would kill her. She has never worked in farming and is
already accustomed to city life. She hates walking on muddy village roads in the rain and
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going to the dirty and pit-toilets without sewage. She would prefer to pick up trash in
urban areas than farmland in the village. She would rather fight for survival in a city than
be in the village. Interestingly, none of the new generation migrants I interviewed said
that they were concerned about future provision for their parents. The possible
explanation for this is that their middle-aged parents are generally healthy and are still
family breadwinners. Another possible explanation is that the younger generation are
putting their nuclear family first rather than caring for their elderly parents.
As French (2006) has reported, it is a trend in rural areas for young people to pay
attention to their children rather than their parents, and the children have become the
centre of little empire of the family/the little emperor of the family (xiao huangdi). The
elderly have been neglected. With regard to the question - How would you provide
physical and financial support for your ailing parents if you live in a city? - The majority
of my young interviewees claimed that they had never thought about this and did not
know how to fix this problem. Most of younger generation migrants could not afford the
cost of living with their elderly parents under the same roof in the city. They also could
hardly provide financial support for their elderly parents living in the village if the current
social and economic policies for rural residents are not changed. The lives of senior rural
residents without children living in the village could become a tough situation, although
some argue that rural-urban migration has a positive impact on rural communities. They
argue that it has increased rural elders‟ living standard including the condition of their
housing and their cash income (Liang 2007). If they neglect their parents, adult children
living in cities could suffer some moral pain. For example, in answer to the question What will happen to you if your parents are bedridden and in poor economic
circumstances and you could not practically and financially support them and at the same
time keep your small family in the city? - Most of the young people indicated that their
heart would be broken and their souls would go to hell. On the other hand, most of them
are optimistic over this issue. They believe what the Chinese famous proverb claims drivers can finally find a way out as long as the car goes to the foot of the mountain (che
dao shan qian bi you lu). One possible explanation for this is that the new generation has
not yet endured really hard times. With regard to the further question - What will you do
if your parents or public prosecutors sue you through the courts due to your lack of
provision for elderly parents? - None of the young villagers I interviewed thought this was
a potential issue. They only expressed concern when this issue was presented to them. As
one of my young, female interviewee said - she wants to provide support for her parents
46

because she loves her parents. Supporting her parents is also her social, moral and legal
duty. She did not intend to abandon her parents. In reality, she does not provide any
support for her parents. She is not able to do this although she works hard. Is she a keen
girl, devil or criminal? The left behind rural elderly cannot be taken care of by their
migrant children because the migrant children lack sufficient resources (Green 2010).
There is a resource deficiency caused by distorted socioeconomic policies rather than by
rural-urban migration. Therefore, stopping migration would not resolve this issue.

Weakening Filial Piety and the Impact on the Rural Elderly
The essence of Chinese traditional culture and norms is filial piety. The essence of filial
piety is xiaojing. The essence of xiaojing is that adult children unconditionally support
and respect their parents according to Confucius (Ikels 2004; Yan 2003). With dramatic
socioeconomic changes in China in past decades the understanding and practice of filial
piety has changed substantially (Yan 2003; Ikels 2004; Wang 2004; Chow 2006).
Nevertheless, the concept of obligatory support for the elderly with reverence as the core
of filial piety continues to be recognised by many Chinese people, by the law and by
Chinese scholars. The practice of filial piety has two layers of meaning: providing basic
needs for the elderly such as food and shelter, and emotional care including moral support
and emotional attachment (Yan 2003). Chow (2006) categorises the practice of filial piety
into three groupings. They are providing material support to satisfy elderly parents‟
physical needs and comfort; deferring to parental wishes and attending to parental
preferences; and behaving in a way that makes parents happy with honour and respect
from their communities.
The tradition notion of filial piety, depending on one‟s political perspective, either
implies a positive benefit for society or it represents a repressive traditional value that has
been increasingly rejected by the new generation of Chinese. Nevertheless, it remains a
crucial element in any consideration of China‟s ageing population. Martin Whyte
observed that if filial piety remains strong then „the task of supporting an ageing
population may not produce a crisis‟ (Whyte, 1997: 2). It has been argued that the lack of
respect and care for the elderly was the result of the communist revolution led by Mao.
The Cultural Revolution saw young Chinese pressured to denounce their parents (Whyte
1997: 2). Furthermore, in the post-1949 period, with steady economic growth in China
and a shift towards industrialization and modernization, family relationships have altered
leading to a decline in filial piety (Whyte, 1997: 3).
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Whyte‟s study recognized that urban Chinese in particular were inclined to more to
please authorities rather than their parents (Whyte 1997: 2). But social changes
implemented in urban settings do not necessarily translate into the rural population, or at
least not without some delay. This thesis argues that in the Mao era the concept of filial
piety remained relatively strong in the rural case study undertaken. Certainly in
comparison with the more recent decades, the elderly were more respected and better
cared for. Since the early 1980s socioeconomic reforms have led to diminished
expressions of filial piety in rural China.
Filial piety, as the linchpin of old age security, has been receiving increasing attention
from the academic community. A large literature now exists on how radical socialism and
political campaigns such as those waged during the Cultural Revolution and economic
reform has weakened filial piety (Yan 2003; Ikels 2004). For his part Yan (2003) explores
elderly support and the crisis of filial piety by investigating the current living conditions
of the elderly and the views of adult children on old age security based on a case study of
a rural village in Northeast China. He concludes that with China‟s socioeconomic
transformation that began in the 1980s, the demystification of parenthood and the radical
political campaigns that were implemented from the 1950s to 1970s, filial piety has
deteriorated. Ikels (2004) studies filial piety in Asian countries and claims that
modernisation has depreciated the status of the elderly both in their households and within
their communities.
The following three issues have become my concerns: How does weakened filial
piety affect the life of China‟s rural elderly? How much have the rural elderly contributed
to their community and individual household? How could intergenerational understanding
and practice of filial piety be better understood in order to support the harmony of family
members and societies?
In the following section, I will address these issues from three perspectives based on
my fieldwork in Liujiahui. First, I will make a comparison of the socioeconomic status of
the village elderly residents between in the commune period and reform period from the
perspective of socioeconomic transformation. I will then look at the village elderly
contribution to individual households, to rural communities, and to China‟s
industrialisation as well as urbanisation from a historical perspective. Finally, I will
explore intergenerational understanding and practice of filial piety from the perspective of
community and social harmony.
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A Comparison of Socioeconomic Status of the Village Elderly Between in the
Commune Period and in the Reform Period
In the commune period (from the Great Leap Forward until the introduction of economic
reform and the household responsibility system) the village elderly in Liujiahui enjoyed
high socioeconomic status and were treated well. First, communes took responsibility for
the elderly in the communities they administered. The communes provided a socialist
safety net for aged people. The basic livelihood of the rural elderly was assured. In terms
of the distribution system of the commune period, it was often the case that the senior
male as a household head represented the household and would receive grain and cash
income from the production team and production brigade based on the total work points
of the household. These points were earned by household labour. The head of the
household would also control the household budget. Obviously, that distribution system
benefited village elders. In terms of an intervention mechanism, the communes actively
mediated the affairs of parental neglect in the name of socialist morals. As the two former
production brigade cadres in the village said, compared with the cadres of the commune
period, current cadres are less responsible for villagers particularly for the elderly. They
told me that the commune system granted village cadres effective power to mediate in
cases of parental neglect and abuse and that the cadres at that time were very helpful with
regard to the interests of the village elderly. For example, it is often the case that under the
leadership of a commune and production brigade unfilial adult children could be punished
and either forced to provide material support such as buying clothes or they might lose
face including being obliged to make a public apology called jiancha. This apology would
be made using a village broadcast station whenever the elderly complained that their adult
children did not provide support or neglected or abused them either verbally or physically.
The latter worked very well because most young villagers did not want to lose face in the
village. A higher level collective such as the commune could intervene in the affairs of a
household or a villager if a lower level collective could not solve the issues related to
elderly care no matter who the offender was. A story that was circulated in Liujiahui
when I was a child was that an elderly father of an official in the army was angry with his
son because the son did not provide pocket money for him. The father sought the help of
the commune. The commune had no right to communicate with army members according
to regulations. The county government intervened in the affair and the son had to provide
money for his elderly father.
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In terms of workload allocation in the commune period, the elderly were employed to
do the least physically demanding jobs. They had considerable farming experience in
areas such as planting and tending vegetables. They could usefully supervise young
people farming who were farming. The elderly earned the same work points as younger
and stronger labourers. Many old interviewees had fond memories of the commune period
when the elderly enjoyed a secure and respected existence. As an elderly interviewee
claimed, he was valuable not only from the point of view of his collectives, but also
valued by his family. In that period the government also used cultural and ideological
means to advocate supporting the elderly. Filial piety and the virtue of socialist morals
were promoted while feudal, patriarchal and familial customs were attacked (Yan 2003).
Compared with the commune period, the village elderly in the reform period have
become a vulnerable group. They have a much lower socioeconomic status. With the
implementation of the HRS and socioeconomic transformation from a planned economy
to the market economy, the elderly are considered to be less productive and to only
manage a lower level of productivity than younger and stronger household members. This
is particularly the case in terms of labour intensive farming and other heavy physical
work. At the same time, they are also less capable of involvement in the labour markets
and in obtaining a paid job in the cities. Employers make no secret of their preference for
young workers. The elderly are economically less viable and they contribute less to the
individual household. Most of the property of individual households has been
accumulated during the reform period. This is the period when adult children have proven
to be more adaptable to the market economy and so their economic contribution to the
individual household has significantly exceeded that of their parents. Having little to
exchange with the adult children in the game of intergenerational reciprocity, elderly
parents have found themselves in a more vulnerable and embarrassing position.
Consequently, elderly parents in Liujiahui have fallen into a position where they are
economically dependent on their adult children. They have therefore seen a significant
decrease in their parental power and authority. The HRS has weakened the patriarchal
role of elderly parents. Under the HRS and a market economy, elderly women in the
village have found they are particularly disadvantaged. In answer to the question - What
degree has your daughter-in-law followed what you advise? - All the elderly female
interviewees replied that they followed what their daughter-in-law said. When these
women were young they were obliged to follow what their mother-in-law said. This was
during the commune period. As one 80-years-old elderly woman stated, their generation
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is the victim of both old China and economic reform. Their parents were the beneficiaries
of the Old China and children are the beneficiaries of New China. In the reform period the
government has encouraged people to concentrate on making money rather than
practising filial piety. Making money has then become the most important priority for all
individuals and thus money has become the standard of social judgment for an individual
instead of their practice of social and family responsibilities (Jiang 2006; Yan 2003).
Furthermore, with the collapse of the commune system in the early 1980s, the
Chinese governments withdrew public services and economic and political support at the
local level. Local cadres and governments focused on extracting more and more resources
and money from local villagers and neglected to provide public services for local people
particularly for disadvantaged groups such as the village elderly and women. Local cadres
and grassroots governments in the commune period played an important role in solving
disputes related to provision for and treatment of the elderly, whereas local governments
in the reform period have neglected to take responsibility for public services. The
effective mechanism for institutional intervention that operated in the commune period
collapsed in rural areas and there is no sign to show that the government intends to restore
this mechanism.
More importantly, as many villagers recognised, adult children who neglect their
parents were rarely punished by the legal system for parent abuse or abandonment. There
was a gap between law and practice. I was told a story. An elderly woman, aged 65, was
suffering from poor economic circumstances and poor health. She showed her distorted
knees to me. She and her husband were often abused verbally and physically by their
younger son. Her younger son does not have a good reputation due to his bad behaviour
in the village. He has never supported his elderly parents either practically or financially.
On one occasion the son publically bashed his father and scolded his mother for being a
„shameless lazybones‟ and „glutton‟. A neighbour was very strong and said to the son that
he would beat him if he again punched his father and scolded his mother. Then the son
stopped. Some villagers advised the mother that she should sue her son in the court but
the mother did not like to do so. She said that the local court could force her son to pay for
their living expenses, but there was no way for the local court to force her son to pay
respect and provide emotional comfort for his parents. The mother believed that once she
brought her son before the court the parent-child relationship would completely break
down and this would break her heart. This is not an isolated case in the village. No abused
or neglected parents living in Liujiahui had ever sought legal intervention so far.
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Empirical studies such as Yan‟s (2003) and my fieldwork have indicated that legal
intervention on behalf of the elderly does not work well and at the same time local cadres
use the situation as an excuse for their lack of action on behalf of the elderly. Two village
cadres I interviewed argued that they were unable to do anything because it is the business
of the court. One of them told me that they couldn‟t solve disputes related to the elderly
because even the law does not work effectively in these disputes. Like Yan (2003:170)
and I have concluded that both village cadres and local government organisations do not
want to intervene in mediating unfilial behaviour. They prefer to keep their ears deaf and
their eyes blind, even when villagers complain. It would be of practical significance in
relation to protecting the interests of the elderly living in China‟s villages if an efficient
and effective institutional intervention mechanism could be put in place that protected the
interests of the elderly living in villages.
Contribution of Elderly Villagers to Individual Households
Most of rural elderly spent their golden years in Mao‟s collective period. They directly
contributed to not only individual households and rural communities but also China‟s
industrialisation and modernisation. With regard to the present contribution of the village
elderly to individual households, they have raised more children than the generations on
either side of them - their parents and their adult children. Their parents suffered poverty
and the long-time chaos of wars before the founding of the PRC in 1949, whereas their
adult children have been subject to the strict family planning policies in place since the
1970s. The current group of elderly have taken on their responsibility for raising their
children and supporting their elderly parents. They have practised filial piety. They have
also financed their children‟s schooling and they have often financed the building of a
house at the time of their children‟s marriage or they have bought units for their children
in urban areas. In this sense they have already completed their main life cycle tasks
(Murphy 2002). However, by the time they have become elderly rural China has been
transformed from a commune system and a planned economy to the HRS and the market
economy of the economic reform era. Compared with their adult children they are a
significantly disadvantaged group. Most of the elderly in the village voluntarily look after
their grandchildren and do farming including chores such as raising pigs and chickens.
The adult children migrate to cities and increase the cash income of the household. In this
sense the elderly should share this household wealth. However, this is often not
happening. Their adult children have not taken on their responsibility to provide for the
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elderly. Obviously, doing voluntary work for adult children has become a big issue
because many elderly are not rewarded for their contribution. As Zhang (2004) has
pointed out, the village elderly do not generally benefit from the full advantages that can
be gained from current economic opportunities. This is because they have already retired
or are about to retire, but it is also because household income is not always distributed to
them, at least, not beyond the provision of the basic needs of food, shelter and clothing.
The following story from my fieldwork illustrates the problem.
An elderly widow, aged 80, has two sons and one daughter. When I conducted my
fieldwork in 2009 she told me her story. She was a child-bride. She was 8-years-old. Her
parents were very poor and had to send their daughter to be a child-bride. This was the
only way they could get a little money and save their daughter. The money came from the
family of the groom and foster care was also provided for their daughter. This situation
was very common in Old China (before 1949). Luckily, her parents-in-law were kind to
her in her formative years. Her husband treated her very well after their formal marriage
as 16-year-olds. She and her husband worked hard every day after their marriage. The
couple also had a good reputation in the village due to their filial piety. I was told that the
woman always paid her submission dues and practised obedience to her parents-in-law.
The couple built two separate new houses for their two sons when the sons married.
However, building the houses and the cost of the wedding ceremonies depleted their
savings. This meant they had to rely on the support of their two sons, particularly after her
husband suffered a serious stroke in the late 1990s. The widow then found herself having
to be rotated after her husband died in 2007 although she does not like it. She was crying
during the interview. But compared with most of her fellow village elderly, she is lucky
because her married daughter regularly provides pocket money and clothes for her
although the daughter was disabled after she delivered her first baby. I was told that her
two sons seldom provide economic support for her. She has also not liked to ask them to
assist her because she believes that she would be embarrassed given that her daughter-inlaw does not want to help her. Actually, she experienced embarrassment when she wanted
to collect pocket money from her daughter-in-laws. She was obliged to leave her son‟s
house without dignity when her daughter-in-law deliberately denied the money she had
asked for. In Liujiahui most of the elderly do not need to worry about basic material
provisions such as food and shelter, but they are quite often short of cash and emotional
comfort. I was told that one elderly widow openly cried in the street because she lost five
yuan (less than one Australian dollar).
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Contribution of Elderly Villagers to Rural Communities and China’s
Industrialisation and Urbanisation
With regard to the contribution of the village elderly to their communities, it should be
remembered that these people have significantly contributed to not only the sustainable
development of their rural communities through the construction of rural infrastructure
and land improvement, but also to China‟s industrialisation and urbanisation between the
1950s and 1990s (Cheng 2006) when they were young and middle-aged.
In the commune period Mao‟s government had ceaselessly mobilised rural residents
especially young and middle-aged people to undertake projects to improve agricultural
infrastructure in the slack agricultural season. This was done in order to mitigate and
prevent natural disasters such as floods and droughts. Some of the projects involved
hundreds of thousands of people (Gao 1999; Unger 2002). The nongmin (rural
residents/peasants) undertook these projects in that period without adequate recompense.
They only received normal work points (White 1993; Unger 2002). The work points per
day for a strong labourer in Liujiahui ranged from around 0.20 yuan in 1950s to one yuan
at the end of the 1970s according to the village accountant. Most of the villagers‟ works
were, to some extent, voluntary in that period. The important consequence of these
countless projects was that an irrigation network was established by the end of the 1970s
in the majority of rural areas in the country. General agricultural infrastructure had also
been improved. This was fundamental for the success of agricultural reform in the 1980s
(Gao 1999). Previous severe natural flood and drought disasters abated. All the projects
were completed under tough working conditions. Those conditions were worse than those
borne by today‟s migrants. During the cold winter months, for example, young and
middle-aged villagers left their families and homes and lived in unheated crowded rooms.
They undertook construction projects without the benefit of machine equipment and
safety protection. They used basic tools such as spades and other hand-transported tools
and their two hands and two shoulders. For some this resulted in permanent disablement
and even death. In my memory, at least five people accidentally died on a construction
site in Liujiahui (the Yingang canal project). They died participating in a provincial
project to build a canal to transport water from Gangnan reservoir. Furthermore, in the
practice of these collaboration projects, the cooperative spirit, consciousness of teamwork,
discipline and order of every participant had been cultivated. These countless projects
could not have been done in Old China (Hinton 1966) because a private and household
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agricultural economy (dangan) was in place rather the cooperation of the commune
period. Such large infrastructural projects relying on cooperation cannot be undertaken in
current China either (Gao 2008), because the peasants can no longer be massively
mobilised. Now, a huge amount of money must be invested for the construction of such
projects under the market-economy. As Gao (2008) has claimed, the successful
agricultural reform begun in the early 1980s would have been impossible without the
existing agricultural infrastructure constructed during Mao‟s area.
At the same time, in the practice of urban and industry-centred policies in the planned
period from 1950s to 1980s, as Tao and Qin (2007), Cheng (2006) and White (1993) have
demonstrated, the State excessively extracted resources from agriculture and farmers
through mandatory procurement and a distorted price mechanism called a „price scissors‟
(jian dao cha). This increased the price of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and
pesticides and decreased the price of agricultural products. In that period, the collectives
and farmers were obliged to sell most of their agricultural output to the State at a low
fixed price that effectively subsidised the industrial sector in order to speed up national
industrialisation and urbanisation. The contribution of rural residents as a whole to the
industrialisation and modernisation of the nation has now changed from the price scissors
of the past to providing cheap labour-time for manufacturing and providing land. The
official document shows that China‟s farmers contributed an accumulated fund of
Chinese currency, RMB (ren min bi) 950 billion yuan to the industrialisation of China
through the price scissors differences in the period from 1952 to 1990 and non-farm
construction has received a net profit of RMB 1420 billion yuan through the price scissors
mechanism when buying and selling of farmers‟ land. In 2002 alone China‟s rural
labourers have contributed an estimated RMB 520 billion yuan to China‟s urbanisation
and industrialisation through undervalued salaries (Cheng 2006). Furthermore, from 1952
to 1978 the government is estimated to have extracted RMB 800 billion yuan from rural
residents using the price scissors mechanism (some experts estimate the accumulation is
between RMB 600 billion yuan to 1000 billion yuan (Li 2010). Additionally, farmers also
faced further levies imposed by collectives to fund local investment such as the collective
accumulation fund and welfare fund because the State was not responsible for providing
public services to rural residents. This meant that little income was left for farmers to
improve their living standard. In other words, in the commune period, the State deprived
wealth from rural residents. In terms of their personal wealth, rural residents were
relatively poor in that period. This means that the best labour of Chinese farmers was
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voluntarily contributed to not only their communities, but also the urbanisation and
industrialisation of the country. However, with the collapse of the commune system and
implementation of the market economy, the State and their communities have not only
failed to honour their obligation to support the elderly, but have also not taken seriously
their moral responsibility for the rural elderly.
All the male interviewees in the old age group that I interviewed stated that they
participated in constructing agricultural infrastructural projects in the village, the
commune, county and province. They participated in projects such as the Gangnan
reservoir and Yingang canal in their prime years from the 1950s to the 1970s. Most of
them claim that they have arthritis due to heavy physical work in cold weather. As one of
my aged interviewees, said, he is 79-years-old now and contributed to the commune
system during his young and middle-age in which their generation built up irrigation
systems such as reservoirs, dams and canals, at local and provincial levels. He told me
that there would be no increase in the outcome of farming in the HRS era if there were no
irrigation networks built in the commune period. In other words, the agriculture reform
starting at the end of the 1970s would not have been successful if there had been no
irrigation systems built by Chinese farmers under the previous commune system.
However, the government abandoned their generation when they became aged and lost
their labouring abilities in the reform period. He is very angry about the Deng‟s reforms.
He paid his respect to „Chairman Mao Zedong, President Jintao Hu and Premier Jiabao
Wen‟. He said to me that Deng represented the interests of the rich people, whereas Mao,
Hu and Wen represented the interests of ordinary people. Additionally, the new
generation of rural-urban migrant workers find it difficult to support the elderly due to
their low wages.
Intergenerational Understanding and Practice of Filial Piety
The traditional understanding and practice of filial piety in contemporary China has been
challenged by the younger generation. The younger and older generations have different
understandings and practices of filial piety in the village. Based on my observations and
interviews, the village elderly have been put in a vulnerable position. They are
disadvantaged in the context of intergenerational reciprocity. The rural elderly have little
in terms of viable bargaining chips in intergenerational reciprocity.
Studies of China‟s elderly such as that undertaken by Li and Tracy (1999), Wang
(2004), Chow (2006) and Yan (2003) have noted that people in Chinese communities
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continue to have some feeling of responsibility when it comes to taking care of their
elderly parents, although filial piety is clearly declining. None of my middle-aged and
younger interviewees argued over the idea of a filial obligation to their parents. All of
them recognised that providing support for elderly parents is the social, moral and legal
duty of adult children. When questioned over - Why some frail elderly were abused and
neglected? - Some of them responded that there is a big gap between the understanding
and the practice of filial piety between younger and older generations. Their answers
indicated that traditional filial piety was neither completely rejected nor totally accepted
by the young generation from the village. The majority of my younger and middle-aged
interviewees insisted that providing material support to satisfy elderly parents‟ physical
needs and comfort is enough to fulfil the requirements of filial piety. They cannot and
need not do any more for the elderly, even if their parents are not satisfied with material
provision alone. One of my interviewees, aged 75, said with tears, that one of his
daughter-in-laws had not talked to him since he began being rotated in 2004, although he
has been provided with food and shelter. He described himself as a pig even worse than a
raised pig in the family because the daughter in-law communicates with the pig when she
provides food for the pig. In the process of the interviews, many elderly admitted that they
do not worry about material provision, but they need emotional support and respect. The
most common complaint from elderly parents in the village is over a lack of respect and
concern expressed by their adult children. They unanimously condemned daughter-inlaws who did not practise filial piety. For most parents, the lack of respect and emotional
support was a far more serious problem than parent abuse in material terms. From the
viewpoint of the village elderly, material provision without emotional support and respect
is not the proper practice of filial piety. According to my fieldwork, around 70% of
interviewed parents regarded their adult children as unfilial. They complained that
children disagreed with this viewpoint. Almost all of the adult children insisted that they
had tried to do their best as they can to support their elderly parents and so they should be
praised as filial. The younger interviewees believed that as long as adult children fulfilled
their obligations in terms of material provision, they have been practising filial piety. As
Chow (2006) has concluded, the understanding and practice of filial piety for the younger
generation is now mainly confined to material provision for elderly parents. It is noted,
therefore, that the two generations have different perspectives on proper elderly support
and filial piety.
From the perspective of emotional support, elderly parents have insisted that parents
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have given much to their children and so the children should repay their parents when
their parents are old. This repayment is endless and limitless. This implies that children
must practise unconditionally and consistent filial piety. From the parents‟ point of view,
they are disappointed and disgraced if they do not receive their expected dues. In the
course of my interviews all the old and middle-aged interviewees agreed with the
traditional values that „bringing up sons [was] to provide for one's old age (yang er fang
lao)‟. For example, when asked - Who do you think should take responsibility for
supporting elderly parents? - My interviewees of all ages answered: the adult children.
However, in answer to the question - Do you support the view that it is necessary and
beneficial for children to discuss their big decisions with their parents? - Most old-aged
interviewees replied that their children should listen to what their parents say on important
matters such as marriage and career advancement. They further explained that it is not
important whether the children follow what the parents said as long as the adult children
afforded respect to their parents by asking for advice. What was the most important was
that the elderly should be treated with respect whenever important decisions are made.
This is commonly regarded as one of important criteria of filial piety in the village. On the
contrary, most young interviewees insisted that their parents should not intervene in the
personal matters of children and that personal decision and choices are not related to filial
piety. As Li and Tracy (1999) and Yan (2003) have concluded, filial piety has lost its
original meaning of subordination and submission to parents. Consequently, conflict
between the older and younger generations occurs often in the village. Few parents can
expect formal obedience and ritual respect from their children, whereas few younger
villagers regard unconditional obedience and submission to parents as moral norms. Thus,
adult children no longer regard the arguments with parents as bad behaviour. Members of
the older generation in Liujiahui complain that the younger generation has lost the
traditional values of filial piety. In answer to the question: Do you feel that there is a loss
of the culture of filial piety in the course of social transformation and how do you think
this affects your place and social status within society and family? - Most of my elderly
interviewees stated that the younger generation have been losing filial piety and that they
have had direct experience of unfilial behaviour both in the family and in the community.
The common complaints from the elderly are that younger villagers have afforded less
than expected respect to the elderly and have not been interested in communicating with
them. The elderly have felt abandoned. However, most of the adult children insist that the
elderly should have their own emotional world and join their age groups, and that they
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have no time and ability to provide emotional support. The old and new generations are
not on the same wavelength on this issue. As one young male villager said, providing
emotional comfort for the elderly is more difficult than providing material support for
them.
The intergenerational understanding and practice over provision for the elderly and
filial piety has had a significant impact on intergenerational relations and social harmony,
and particularly on the well being of elderly rural residents. The answers to the following
questions underline my above comment:
1. What are the differences between the way your children treat you and the
way you treated your parents with respect to the practice of filial piety?
2. Do you think that the improving intergenerational understanding over
provisioning the elderly and filial piety is a feasible way to improve relations
between the older and younger generations?
3. Is the improvement of intergenerational understanding and practice over
provisioning the elderly and filial piety benefitting elderly parents?

When answering the first question, all my elderly interviewees claimed that
they treated their parents with unconditional obedience and respect whereas their
adult children treated them in a manner that fell short of filial piety. However,
most of my younger interviewees stated that they were practicing filial piety.
This clearly demonstrates the different understandings of the practice of filial
piety between the two generations. For the second question, over 60% of my
elderly interviewees answered “Yes” whereas half of the middle-aged and 30%
of the younger participants answered, “Yes”. This suggests that elderly parents
are more likely to willingly maintain parent-child emotional bounds than their
children. For the third question, about 65% of my elderly interviewees replied
that a strategy of improving intergenerational understanding over the issue of
elderly provision and the practice of filial piety would increase the well-being of
elderly people. However, as Yan (2003) has recognised, wanting to win adult
children‟s hearts is likely to make the parents vulnerable to opportunistic
children. Without a national pension and health care system, providing material
and emotional support for the rural elderly is still the most important and
dominant values of filial piety.

59

Building a New Socialist Countryside and Its Impact on the Village
Elderly
The CCPCC&SC issued Several Opinions Concerning Promoting the Construction of a
New Socialist Countryside in 2006 called the „2006 Number 1 Document of the CCCPC‟
(CCPCC&SC, 2006). The intention was to accelerate the development of agriculture and
rural areas and to raise the living standard of farmers and to narrow the disparity between
urban and rural areas (CCPCC&SC, 2006; Chen 2006; Watts 2006). This is a national
initiative. This Number 1 Document stated that building a new socialist countryside
(NSC) is the foremost task facing China in the 2006-2010 five-year planning period (the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan) and is also a major historical mission in the context of China's
modernisation process. From a historical perspective, building a NSC is not a novel
concept in China‟s agricultural and rural development. The policies and goals have been
proposed repeatedly in the CPC‟s history, though the words may be different.
Nevertheless, the content of the NSC was only a long-term goal without any specific
work schedule before the 2006 Number 1 Document (Chen 2006).
Several significant studies of the policy of constructing a „new socialist countryside
including its goals and achievements have been published since the national policy
released the program in 2006. For example, Chen (2006) has clarified the goals, tasks,
principles, reasons and basic measures of the building a NSC program. Guo et al. (2009)
have evaluated the development of building a NSC through designing a comprehensive
framework. They conclude that success in the practice of building a NSC has at best been
moderate.
In summary, building a NSC aims to advance production development, better living
standards, rural civilisation, clean appearance, and democratic and efficient
administration. The goals and tasks of this policy can be summarised in a list of five key
components (Chen 2006; Guo et al. 2009):
1. enhancing

agricultural

productivity

through

improving

agricultural

restructuring, strengthening the agricultural service system and promoting the
system of rural distribution;
2. promoting the farmers‟ living standard by increasing their agricultural and
non-agricultural income;
3. strengthening the construction of a healthy rural culture through improving
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rural cultural development;
4. building a neat and clean village through investing in rural infrastructure,
environmental protection and sanitation;
5. promoting rural social undertakings and promoting grassroots political
democracy through promoting a public service system and the democratic
management of village governance.
The five requirements cannot be separated and simplified in the practice of building
the NSC. It is claimed that the policy will give full expressions to the requirements for
rural economic, political, cultural and social development. The World Bank regards the
policy as a significant shift from the economic development to a program that pays more
attention to social fairness and justice (Watts 2006; Chen 2006).
It is acknowledged that farmers including the elderly have significantly benefited
from the program of building the NSC since its implementation in 2006. However, the
practice of this program in the past five years has produced only moderate results. Studies
such as that undertaken by Guo et al. (2009) and my fieldwork in Liujiahui have
demonstrated this point. Important goals and objectives have not been achieved. In the
following section, I will discuss the practice of this program from a perspective of the key
components of building the NSC.
Raising Rural Residents’ Living Standard
Raising Chinese farmers‟ living standard has been regarded as a central goal of building a
NSC. However, it is hard to say that the villagers‟ income has increased significantly and
that their living standard has been dramatically improved under the campaign of building
the NSC based on my fieldwork and observation of the daily life of the villagers in
Liujiahui. The following could highlight this issue that have to be dealt with for the
Chinese government although some of the living index such as going to movies and using
hair conditioner do not always indicate quality of life and standards of living to some
extent.
In my fieldwork, when asked - How often do you bath with hair conditioner and body
washing gel? - Only two of my 18 elderly interviewees knew what hair conditioner and
body washing gel were. However, they did not often use them because they thought that
these items were too expensive and too much of a luxury to use on an ordinary rural
resident. Of course having access to these products does not so much represent a higher
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standard of living as access to modern, and arguably unnecessary consumer goods. In
answer to the question - Have you taken a train ride and which cities have you visited and
why? - About 90% of the elderly I interviewed had not taken a train to visit any big cities.
The majority of my elderly interviewees had only visited their county city by foot, bicycle
or bus. They had only ventured around 10 kilometres away from their village for
shopping. Just four of my elderly interviewees had visited other provinces by train for
work or travel. However, all of my middle-aged and younger interviewees had visited
Shijiazhuang (the provincial capital, around 50 kilometres away from Liujiahui Village)
for work or travel. In answer to the question - How often you have been to a restaurant? Only four of the elderly had been to a restaurant and it was less than five times. Their
adult children had invited them to the restaurant and paid for them.
For many of the village elderly their living standard only maintains their basic
physical survival. A decent living with dignity for the village elderly is, in many cases,
only a beautiful dream. The basic means for building the NSC including a long-term
funding mechanism based on the idea of „industries nurturing agriculture and cities
supporting the countryside (gongye fanbu nongye, chengshi zhichi nongcun)‟, and a
working system featuring concerted efforts by the Party and government to work together
on all-round economic and social development in rural areas has not worked well (Cheng
2006; Chen 2009). Nevertheless many Chinese media outlets including IOSC (2009) and
www.ncjianshe.com (the website of building a new socialist countryside 社会主义新农
村建设网) have reported that a great achievement in the construction of the NSC has
happened (The detailed information appears on http://news.sina.com.cn/z/newcountry/
and http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2009-09/04/content_1408903.htm). During my fieldwork,
many villagers had not known the policy of building a NSC existed until early 2010 when
it was announced that the central and provincial level government would invest in village
to develop a NSC (one of my relatives told me this news when I called her). There is still
a long way to go before China‟s rural residents and especially the village elderly become
well off and enjoy a reasonable standard of living.
Constructing a Civilised Rural Community
Constructing a healthy rural culture and a civilised social atmosphere is another objective
of the NSC program. However, it is hard to say that a civilised village has yet emerged
based on my fieldwork and on my observation of daily life of the villagers in Liujiahui.
There are no libraries or book rooms, recreation rooms, physical exercise facilities,
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cinemas or sports grounds in Liujiahui or in neighbouring villages. This situation has
stood for over half a century. As Wan and Liu (2006) have pointed out, the majority of
rural residents can only watch television programs in their own home or gather in the
centre of the village to chat or play either Chinese chess or majiang or poker (sometimes
with a little gambling) for leisure.
When asked - Have you subscribed newspapers and magazines, and how often do you
buy or read books? - Only one of my elderly interviewees subscribed to newspapers and
magazines and this is because he is a retired public school teacher. None of my elderly
interviewees bought books but two of them said they liked to read books. In answer to the
question - What do you do in your leisure time? - All my elderly interviewees replied that
they watched television at night and visited neighbours to chat each day, whereas the
majority of my male elderly interviewees played Chinese chess, majiang or poker and
gambled every day at night. One elderly male described his daily life in the slack season
to me. After breakfast he went to the village centre (where there is an open space in the
middle of the village without any facilities except for a discarded sofa and a stump for
sitting on). He did this to chat and play poker or Chinese chess, then he went home for his
lunch and had a nap and then he returned to the centre of the village in the afternoon and
did the same as in the morning. He went back home at sunset, after dinner he watched
television or visited his fellow villagers for a chat. I asked - What did you do in bad
weather such as when it was raining or snowing? He answered that he visited his
neighbours for a chat or to play poker. Were you bored with your leisurely life? - I asked
him. He said that he is accustomed to his life because people are satisfied with their life
when they cannot change the reality. They adapt to it, otherwise people would be
distressed. His case is common in the village. When asked - How often have you gone to
the movies in the past 10 years? - None of the elderly and middle-aged interviewees had
been to the movies. Many interviewees recalled that they could watch movies monthly in
the village during the commune period. As Li Zehou (1985) and Gao (1999) have
demonstrated, one of the achievements of the commune period was not only the
enrichment of the social and cultural lives of Chinese farmers, but also improvement in
their level of literacy and fundamental historical knowledge through showing movies and
performing arts events, including plays, in rural villages. These social events were
unusual in rural areas in the sense that they usually had not existed before and after the
commune system. Clearly, these social activities and entertainment enriched the cultural
life of villagers. They also provided a chance for social networking with younger villagers
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and help younger villagers find partners when taking advantage of cultural and
entertainment opportunities.
With the complete collapse of the commune system, nobody and no institutions have
actively supported the cultural activities and entertainment for rural residents. The
villagers have not had an opportunity to watch movies in their village or in neighbouring
villages. The villagers must go to the county city if they want to watch a movie. The
proposal for building a NSC decrees that at least one movie should be shown monthly in
every village (Chen 2009). Furthermore, less public television channels are provided to
rural areas compared with urban areas and the villagers must set up special costly
equipment for more channels if they want to receive more than three channels although at
least eight to ten channels should be available to residents of rural areas according to the
guideline for building a NSC program (Chen 2009). The villagers are very disappointed
with the cultural and entertainment desert they experience in rural areas while their
counterparts in cities enjoy movies and can select from over 100 television channels
(Wang 2009). Interestingly, rural residents‟ view of their cultural life during the commune
era differs from the view of many Chinese scholars and officials. Scholars and officials
claim that the Cultural Revolution made China into a cultural desert. This is possibly true
for urban residents, but is not true for rural residents (Gao 1999; 2002). It is quite clear
that there is a huge gap between the requirement and procedure of building a NSC, though
more cultural and entertainment facilities such as libraries and amenities have been
promised to rural areas (China Daily, 8 March 2006).
Since the 1980s non-government organisations (NGOs) and religious entities such as
Buddhists and Christians have increased their influence in China‟s rural areas including in
my home village Liujiahui. These organisations and religions were prohibited during the
commune period. Superstitions and some traditional customs like worshiping heaven and
earth to bring health and wealth were also banned in rural areas at that period, but they are
now being revived (Gao 1999; Zhang & Baum 2004; Wan & Liu 2006). The following
story illustrates this issue. A middle-aged woman married a neighbouring villager. She
told me when I conducted my fieldwork in 2009 that there had not been any religious
groups in her husband‟s village (Menbao Village, three kilometres away from Liujiahui)
until the 1980s. However, more recently some religious groups including Buddhist and
Christian groups have been working proactively in the village. I asked her why villagers
turned to religion. She told me that the believers could get help from their religious group
if they suffered health, financial and other living or family problems. She told me a story.
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Her neighbour, an elderly widow, aged 82 was often abused by her daughter-in-law and
had a hard life. She never received any help from any level of government or institution
and the village community. The members of a religious group always helped her. They
provided meals and looked after her when she was sick and so she has become a
dedicated Christian. This is an increasingly common case in rural areas, although the
Chinese government does not encourage its people to be religious believers. With the
further development of economic reform and social transformation in rural China where
there is no pension system covering rural residents, elderly people are more likely to
become religious believers. One of my parents‟ neighbour, aged 60 has become a devout
Buddhist. His daughter-in-law has often verbally abused him and step-son and he has
suffered financial problems. He used to be an ardent youth during the Cultural
Revolution. He told me that now he has been working as an accountant at a local temple.
He has been a volunteer. The temple is where his heart is peaceful and where he needn‟t
worry about verbal abuse from his daughter-in-law and step-son. This is where people
accept him and where he can get a free meal and pocket money.
Furthermore, in the course of my fieldwork, many villagers complained that burglary
and robbery in the village has increased recently. They do not feel safe anymore in the
village. They blamed some young villagers for doing nothing but fight, gamble and steal.
The burglaries and robberies have involved stealing vegetables, grain, money, and poultry
and farm animals including chickens, pigs, sheep and cows. The village elderly are more
likely to be vulnerably and to become a target of this type of attack. Over 50% of the
elderly had experienced their vegetables and chickens being stolen. I was also told that
one violent accident happened to a young villager in 2006. In this tragedy a high school
boy was crudely killed by his young village fellows using reaping hooks in the course of a
group fight. Some studies have shown that the rate of rural youth crime in rural areas has
increased since the 1990s (China Daily, 21 September 2007; CLB: China Labour
Bulletin, 2007) compared with the 1950s and 1960s when „no incidents of crime occurred
in some rural areas and the level of public security was generally good‟ (He 1992: 242). It
is clear that there is a long way to go before China has built a civilised rural community
based on a healthy rural culture.
Building a Neat and Clean Village
Building a neat and clean village is also an important component of carrying out the
policy of building a NSC and conforming to the annual No. 1 Documents of the CCPC
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from 2006 to 2010 (CCPCC&SC, 2006, 2010; NPC, 2011). A special fund has been
established by the central government for the development of rural infrastructure such as
road construction and the use of clean fuel (Cheng 2006). These funds are to be used for
projects such as speeding up the construction of biogas supply utilities and extending
clean energy technology, such as marsh gas from waste materials and straw and solar
energy.
A detailed work schedule has been proposed. According to the schedule about
330,000 hectares of biogas is to be developed annually and over 22.5 million of a total of
252 million rural households should start to use the marsh gas during the 11th Five-Year
Plan (2006-2010) period. It was expected that in 2010 fifty model counties would benefit
from green energy. They would account for more than half of the total energy consumed
in rural areas (China Daily, March 8 2006; Cheng 2006; Chen 2009). With the
construction of biogas utilities, rural residents could use clean recycled resources and thus
a clean and tidy countryside would be promoted. However, there is currently no sign in
my home village of Liujiahui that there is to be investment in constructing biogas,
environmental protection and sanitation projects. There are no flush toilets and there is no
sewage station, while coal and dried branches are the main resource for cooking and
heating in Liujiahui. Under these conditions the life of the village elderly especially those
who have suffered from the effects of a serious stroke and have been bedridden, is
extremely difficult. Their physical well-being is at great risk. Furthermore, according to
the Communiqué on Major Data of the Second National Agriculture Census in 2006,
about 86% of rural households use dried branches or firewood and raw coal for cooking
and heating, whereas mere 0.7% of them use biogas. 12.8% of rural households have
flushing toilets whereas over 44% have no toilets or have only temporary non-flushing
toilets (NBSC, 2008). As many villagers said, it is unlikely that flush toilets will be
provided and biogas used for cooking and lighting in the near future in Liujiahui. They
claim that it is difficult to develop biogas utilities in rural areas using present technology.
Their view is based on the experience of neighbouring villages where households have
built and then abandoned biogas utilities due to their high cost and relative inefficiency (I
have taken photographs displaying the current rudimentary toilets and kitchens of the
villagers).
According to the World Bank (2007), with garbage and sewage water exposed to the
open air, the two-thirds of China‟s rural population who are without piped water could
find themselves drinking polluted water. The general perception among my interviewees
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is that the incidence of serious illness in Liujiahui has risen since the 1980s, although
relevant recorded data is not available to support this claim.
China‟s top-level leaders continue to be aware of the urgent need to protect the rural
environment. In 2010 Premier Jiabao Wen reiterated the call to efficiently solve pollution
issues in rural areas and for the strengthening of rural hygiene work (Xinhua, 28 January
2010). The Chinese government has also proposed the program of environmental
protection in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) (NPC 2011). However, there is a big
gap between the objective and the procedure of these programs. Therefore, there is a long
way to go before the Chinese government has realised a clean and neat countryside that is
a component of a moderately prosperous society proposed by the Chinese government
(CCPCC&SC, 2010).
Rural Public Services and Democracy Management at Grassroots Level
Improving rural public services and promoting political democracy management at
grassroots level are the main tasks for building a NSC and for achieving social fairness
and justice. In line with this task the Chinese government is stating the importance of
coordinating harmonious development between urban and rural areas, industry and
agriculture. Improvement in basic public services in rural areas includes improvement in
education, health care, and social security provision. In what follows, I will examine the
issues arising from the education program that is in line with building a NSC.
In order to secure access for millions of rural children to public primary and junior
high schools, the central government has stipulated that free textbooks be provided to
low-income family students. A nine-year compulsory education in rural areas has been
guaranteed by the public financial system since 2006 and compulsory education with free
textbooks has also been adopted in some rural areas since 2007 (China Daily, 8 March
2006; Watts 2006). In fact, the policy of compulsory education with free textbooks began
to be implemented at the same time (2008) for both urban and rural areas. This means that
public schools in cities are still the focus of educational investment compared with rural
public schools. As one principal of a primary school in Shijiazhuang (this principal
worked in rural primary schools in Pingshan County as a teacher for over eight years after
graduating from a normal college and then he has worked in primary schools in
Shijiazhuang as a teacher, deputy principal and principal) said, generally, rural schools are
behind their urban counterparts in terms of educational resources and equipment such as
teaching equipment, learning resources, the qualification of teachers, teaching quality and
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investment by governments. Rural children lose at the starting line compared with their
urban counterparts in the fierce competition that marks human resource marketing in
China.
According to my fieldwork, teaching quality and the performance of public schools
has fallen in Pingshan County. This has resulted in private kindergartens, primary and
high schools being promoted. For example, with the collapse of the commune system in
the early 1980s and reform in rural areas, the public kindergarten, primary and junior high
schools established in Mao‟s era were closed in the period from the 1990s to the mid2000s in Liujiahui. Some professional and highly qualified teachers with rich teaching
experience in rural public schools were attracted to cities and private schools. These
schools paid higher salaries and offered better welfare packages (Li 2008). Many villagers
complained that the school built-up through the villagers‟ sweat and blood was abandoned
in the name of optimising the resource of education without any consultation with the
villagers in Liujiahui. Furthermore, an investigation into the situation of junior high
schools in rural areas conducted by the China Association for Promoting Democracy has
indicated that the average dropout rate of middle-school students has reached 40% in rural
areas (Xinhua, 16 November 2005).
There are now no public kindergartens or primary schools in Liujiahui. The nearest
public primary school is three kilometres away from the village, while the nearest public
high school is around 8 kilometres away. The public primary school nearest to the village
has become a boarding school in order to receive subsidies provided by the government.
This means that children aged 6-13-years-old must live in the school and take care of
themselves at least in their daily life. However, their parents or guardians can pick the
pupils up in the afternoon of Fridays and bring them back on Monday morning. Some
villagers have argued that their children have experienced not only basic daily life
problems such as problems with eating and sanitation, but also psychological and
emotional problems. This is beyond the reach of my research. However, it should be
recognised that rural children can gain real benefit from the rural education boarding
program funded by the central government. At the same time, many of my interviewees
claimed that they were worried about the safety and the welfare of their children in
primary school because they believed that educational funds were being embezzled. There
is no standard equipment such as bathrooms and toilets in the pupils‟ bedrooms and no
trained security staff at the school. There have been a few incidents of rape. The villagers
are also concerned about the quality of teaching which they know could widen the gap
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between rural and urban children. On the question of - Do you think that the policy of
optimizing the education resource has benefited children in rural areas? - Over 90% of
my interviewees opposed this policy. They stated that rural children must leave their
parents as six-year-olds if they want to go to school. They see this as cruel. When asked Which do you prefer: schooling with free textbooks far from the village or schooling
without free textbooks in the village? - Every interviewee chose the latter. This has
indicated that the villagers are more concerned about the health and general welfare of
their growing children than about paying for textbooks. The policy of optimizing the
educational resource is not particularly welcomed in the context of abolishing the village
primary school, though the villagers have accepted it. However, in answer to the question
- Do you favour the policy of compulsory education with free textbooks? - All
interviewees replied „Yes‟. This has indicated that rural children haven‟t chance and right
to select public schools if they want to enjoy compulsory education with free textbooks.
The situation is different than that reported by China‟s official media. Moreover, the
present education policy in rural areas is not narrowing, but increasing the gap between
rural and urban education.
In terms of efficient democratic administration at grassroots level, the Chinese
government promised that more effort would be made to solve the acute issue of farmers'
interests being damaged. These issues include the expropriation of farmland,
environmental pollution, the management of village assets and appropriated funding from
all levels of government. The goal is for rural residents to be able to represent their
interests through an unblocked channel in order to secure their rights in a rational and
legal fashion way. Furthermore, village democratic management must be improved
through the regulation of election procedures relating to village committees. Democratic
decision-making must be introduced and transparency facilitated, particularly in relation
to village-level asset management particularly cash income by selling farmland and the
appropriated funding from the central government (Xinhua, 1 February 2010; Chen 2006;
Watts 2006). However, and in spite of the central government‟s intention to attend to
issues concerning village-level administration and democracy, in recent years there have
been unwanted incidents and these have been in increasing significantly. In practice,
village democratic management including democratic decision-making and the
democratic election of village committees and the village Party branch members has not
been significantly improved in Liujiahui. All my interviewees stated that villagers have
not been allowed to vote for the election of the village committee according to the
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decision of the township government. Only the Party members of the village have the
right to vote. Thus the village committee is the village Party branch while the village
Party branch is the village committee. The Party head is also the village head. In fact, this
decision has violated the Village Elections Law of the PRC (cunmin xuanju fa) and the
Organisation Law of Village Committee Elections of the PRC (cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi
fa) (see Smith 2010). However, the majority of villagers have not argued with the
decision. When I questioned villagers over whether they were aware that their political
rights had been infringed, some said that they did not understand what political rights they
are entitled to, while others argued that they did not like to get into trouble by rejecting
decisions although they understand that they have the right to vote for the village
committee. The common complaint from villagers is a lack of transparency in terms of
village assets, cash income and appropriated funding from all levels of government. This
indicates that villagers are more concerned over their economic interests than their
political rights. Most interviewees claimed that they did not care whether their voting
rights were denied because most of the village cadres preferred to serve officials rather
than ordinary villagers in the context of the current institutional system and the same
services are provided for the ordinary villagers no matter who the village cadres are. In
answer to the question - Have your interests and rights been harmed? - About 30% of my
interviewees said they had. Obviously, there is a long way to go before China has an
efficient public service in rural areas coupled with grassroots democratic management.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the impact of socioeconomic changes on China‟s rural
elderly, particularly those living in Liujiahui village. Over past decades China has
undergone a demographic transformation with the implementation of the family planning
policy and socioeconomic reform. Demographic transformation has resulted in population
ageing and decreased family size. Both demographic and socioeconomic changes have
affected the life of the village elderly. The rural elderly are now more likely to be in poor
health compared with their urban counterparts and can easily take their family into
poverty. This situation is a direct result of a low level of economic development and the
absence of a mature and effective social security system covering rural China.
China‟s increasingly aged society has affected the psychological well-being of the
elderly in Liujiahui and this situation has been exacerbated by the government‟s negative
propaganda in relation to the ageing of their country‟s population. The majority of
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China‟s village elderly are pessimistic about their future. Increasing rural-urban
migration, another socio-demographic change, has challenged traditional household-based
elderly care in the village. The potential challenge for family-based elderly support has
been gradually appearing after over three decades of rural-urban migration, though the
out-migration of adult children has not caused the current crisis in elderly care per se.
In the face of significant socioeconomic transformation filial piety that is the core of
Chinese traditional culture and norms has been challenged and this has meant that
provision for the elderly based on traditional morals and values has been subject to stress
and crisis. When we compare the socioeconomic status of the elderly in the village in the
commune period (1950s to 1970s) and the reform period (1980s-onward) the difficulties
experienced by China‟s rural elderly are evident. The village elderly have made a
significantly contribution not only to their individual households, but also to their
communities as well as China‟s industrialisation and urbanisation and their contribution is
not now being recognised.
Intergenerational understanding is important for the well-being of the village elderly
although there are different perspectives on family-centred elderly support and filial piety
between the older and younger generations. In particular, with the collapse of the
commune system and implementation of a market economy, governments gave up their
obligation to the elderly and have not honoured their responsibility. The last resort for the
elderly is the moral obligation and generosity of their children. However, their children,
who are usually members of the second generation of rural-urban migrant workers, are
finding it difficult to meet their obligations toward the elderly. This situation can be due to
the relatively low wages of adult migrant worker children, but this is not always the case.
Some reject their moral obligations to the elderly for other reasons. Today, there are a
significant number of rural elderly who have been left to live in difficult circumstances.
We are left to reluctantly conclude that the campaign to building a NSC in the name of
social fairness and justice has, in reality, not significantly improved the life of China‟s
village elderly.
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Chapter 3
Transformation of the Social Security System in Rural China –
The Impact on the Elderly in Liujiahui

Introduction
The „life chances‟ of China‟s rural elderly are directly tied to China‟s social security
system. In this chapter I will examine China‟s discriminatory social security system and
then explore the transformation and reform of this system in rural China and its impact on
the life of the rural elderly. I focus on the transformation of the social security system in
rural China from Mao‟s era (1949-1983), through to Deng‟s reform period (1984-2002)
and on to the Hu and Wen period (from 2003 to the present-day) and the lives of the
elderly rural residents.
China‟s social security is a complex system. Xian (1992) who examined the
development of the rural medical and health care system in China since 1949 noted that
the rural cooperative medical care system (RCMS) established in the 1960s was replaced
with a „fee-for-service‟ system in the 1980s. The latter has led to medical care problems
for the rural poor. Xian concludes that the program of „Health for All‟ proposed by the
WHO would encounter problems if implemented in China in terms of investment,
population growth, and personnel training. Hillier and Shen (1996) review the
development of China‟s health care system and examine the impact of economic reform
on health status and health care delivery during the period 1978-1990. For his part Liu
(2004) looked at the development of rural health insurance system in China and explored
the underlying causes of the absence of rural health insurance, in particular in the Deng
period.
With regard to China‟s social security system, White (1998) explored institutional
change and social welfare provision in China‟s transformation from a planned economy to
a market integrated economy. Croll (1999) then examined the trends and tensions in
social welfare reform. She concluded that the country‟s social welfare system has played
an important role in maintaining economic growth, social stability and political authority.
Later, Li (2006) explored the social security system in rural China and concluded, as
many others have, that reform of the system is urgent. There is a pressing need to
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establish a fair system that would secure the basic livelihood of hundreds of millions of
rural citizens. For their part Chinese scholars Deng and Liu (2007) have discussed the
rural social security system in the context of „building a new socialist countryside‟. They
investigated the nexus between poverty and social relief, old age security, the present
medical care system and social protection in rural areas. They also examined the
employment of rural-urban migrant workers and their lack of access to social security.
On the more specific needs of the rural elderly Wang (2006) points out that not only
is reform of the social security system urgent, it is urgent for China to speed up reform of
its old age security system in order to provide institutional support for socioeconomic
transformation. Qin (2007) has then discussed the urgency associated with developing a
system that delivers old age insurance to the countryside. He advised that a new type of
old age insurance system should be established nationwide. Others including Yang et al.
(2009) have advised Chinese policy-makers to establish a non-contributory pension
system for the rural elderly as soon as possible.

A Discriminatory Social Security System
Social security is the public provision of economic security and social welfare for all
individuals and their families is vital, especially in the case of income loss due to
unemployment, work injuries, maternity leave, sickness, old age and death. It
encompasses not only social insurance, but also health and welfare services and various
income maintenance programs designed to improve recipient‟s welfare. China‟s social
security system (shehui baozhang zhidu) is based on the principle of priority for urban
areas and city citizens while rural areas and rural citizens are left in an inferior position.
More than a decade ago Hussain (1994) noted that social welfare provision in rural areas
was sparse and variable compared with the urban areas and he pointed out that the huge
rural-urban gap in social security provision clearly conflicts with the principle of equal
treatment for all citizens. Similarly, Gong (2007) has claimed that China‟s nongmin (rural
citizens) are entitled to the social welfare that shimin (city/urban citizens) have been
enjoying since the 1950s. Gong stressed that the present system blatantly discriminates
against China‟s nongmin.
China‟s multifaceted and dual (urban and rural) social security system consists of
three broad constituent categories: social insurance or protection (shehui baoxian or
shehui baohu), social welfare or provision (shehui fuli or shehui fuwu), and social
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assistance or relief (shehui jiuzhu or shehui jiuji) (Croll 1999; Chinese Government, 2004;
MlSS, 2007), as shown in Figure 3.1 (edited by the author). China's social security system
is a discriminatory, unfair and unequal system. In what follows, I will examine each of the
three broad categories of China‟s social security system.
Social security
(shehui baozhang)

Social insurance or

Social welfare or provision

Social relief or

protection

(shehui fuli or shehui fuwu)

assistance

(shehui baoxian )

(shehui jiuji)

Figure 3.1 Social security system in China

Discriminatory Social Insurance Provision
The core of China‟s social security system is social insurance (Chinese Government,
2004; Zheng 2000:51). China‟s social insurance, initiated in 1951 with the promulgation
of the Labour Insurance Regulation (Croll 1999; Li 2006:40; Zhu 2002), includes old-age
insurance, unemployment insurance, medical insurance, work-related injury insurance
and maternity insurance (Chinese Government, 2004). Unemployment insurance,
however, was not included in the social insurance scheme until the Deng government
introduced economic reform (Hussain 2000: 260).
Reform of China‟s social insurance or social protection (shehui baoxian or shehui
baohu) system began in the late 1970s and has had many policy guises. Recently, in 2009,
the government launched a new updated rural social pension project (Chen, L. 2009;
Xinhua, 25 June 2009; Li, X. 2009). Initially, China‟s old age care insurance, the most
important social insurance, covered only employees with a city hukou and who worked
for state-owned enterprises and collectively owned enterprises in urban areas. Then, in
1997, the Chinese government unified the basic old age insurance system for enterprises
employees in urban areas by carrying out a social-pool-plus-personal-account scheme.
This system allowed all urban based enterprise employees who reached the age of
retirement (60 and over) to enjoy a basic monthly old age pension. By 1999 the coverage
of old age insurance had been extended to foreign-invested enterprises, private enterprises
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and other types of enterprises in urban areas and their employees and in 2002 China
extended its basic old age insurance coverage to all those who are employed in a flexible
manner in urban areas (Chinese Government, 2004). However, it continues to be the case
that many rural-urban migrant workers and disadvantaged groups are excluded from the
benefits of their country‟s social insurance system.
The majority of China‟s rural population are not covered by the basic old age
insurance system and many rural elderly are facing pension problems and have to be
supported by their adult children (Yang et al. 2009; Biao 2007; OECD, 2007). The
problems faced by the rural elderly in terms of accessing a basic old age pension persists
today, even though leaders such as President Hu, Jintao and Premier Wen, Jiabao make
pronouncements on the importance of the provision of basic old age insurance for all,
including the rural elderly, and in spite of a new pension plan having been launched in
2009 (Xinhua, 25 June 2009; 25 May 2009; Li, X. 2009; Chen, L. 2009).
Throughout the Mao era urban residents who were employed by state-owned or
collectively owned enterprises enjoyed guaranteed employment, free housing, free health
care, free recreation activities, free child care and so on provided by their work units.
With the implementation of economic reform policies many enterprises were obliged to
withdraw their social insurance provisions for their workers. This left the government
responsible for social responsibilities such as unemployment insurance and medical
insurance. For example, the „three guarantees‟ system carried out in 1998 provides, as the
name indicates, for three guarantees: a basic livelihood guarantee for laid-off workers
from state-owned enterprises, an unemployment insurance guarantee, and a minimum
living standard guarantee for urban citizens (Chinese Government, 2004). However, this
social insurance has not covered the rural-urban migrant workers who are obliged to
continue to live with an agricultural hukou even though they have worked and lived in
cities for many years (Croll 1999; Biao 2007; Chen, L. 2009). The situation may change,
but to date it has been very slow to change. More policies favouring farmers-turnedworkers have recently been proposed by the central government (Li, S. 2008; MLSS,
2007; Chen, L. 2009). For example, the 2006 Number Five Document of the central
government put forward a law on protecting the rights and interests of migrant workers in
cities with regard to matters such as employment (wages, working conditions, etc.), social
security, medical care and education. This document also explicitly proposed the
establishment of a coordination organisation for migrant workers in cities nationwide and
decreed that each province/autonomous region or municipality must establish relevant
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corresponding institutions charged with solving the problems of rural-urban migrant
workers (Chen, L. 2009; Li, S. 2008). These problems include the entrenched practice of
delayed wage payments and problems associated with migrant children‟s schooling in
urban areas. However, local governments and employers have scarcely implemented
these policies. On the contrary, some local governments like the Beijing Municipal
Government have implemented a series of regulations to restrict urban enterprises
particularly stated-owned enterprises from employing rural migrants and have even forced
enterprises to lay-off migrant workers and employ more local urban workers instead.
Some government regulations explicitly specify that certain jobs be closed to rural
migrant workers and only filled by local urban workers. These policies have little impact
on promoting the social insurance of migrant workers such as old age insurance and
unemployment insurance. The coverage of social insurance provision for migrant workers
is still low (Li, S. 2008; MLSS, 2007).

A Discriminatory Social Welfare System
In a broad sense social welfare, or social services and provision, is the means of
protecting the population from deprivation (Hussain 2000). More specifically, social
welfare includes provision granted by household family members, relatives, neighbours,
self-help organizations and communal organizations, transfers of payments and benefits
and State subsidies and services (Hebel 2003). The State, communal organisations, selfhelp groups, social networks and families are the main institutions for the provision of
welfare. The primary objective of social welfare provision is to satisfy individual material,
psychological and social needs.
China‟s social welfare or social provisions/services (shehui fuli or shehui fuwu)
system consists of specialised support for the elderly, disabled and abandoned, and public
services for city citizens such as education, health care and housing through various
channels (Chinese Government, 2004). The Chinese people with a city hukou especially
officials, public servants and employees working in large state-owned enterprises have
enjoyed these social services since the 1950s. However, with economic reform some
people with a city hukou, including laid-off workers from the SOEs, have also
encountered difficulty in accessing the welfare provisions they had previously enjoyed.
Provisions including health care and housing were privatised. The majority of rural-urban
migrant workers were not entitled to these public services in the first place. For example,
the children of rural-urban migrant workers have not been entitled to attend public child76

care centres, kindergartens, primary and high schools in cities. Affordable and functional
government sponsored housing programs in cities have only been made available to those
people who are locally registered permanent residents with housing problems (Chinese
Government, 2004). The majority of migrant workers who are living in the worst
conditions in cities are not entitled to this welfare. The reality is that some advantaged
people have been able to own at least two houses in cities through corruption in the
practice of the policy on affordable and functional housing schemes, whereas many
migrants have had to live in factories or on construction sites without basic facilities such
as toilets and piped water (Li, S. 2008). Many Chinese media outlets have reported
corruption in relation to the distribution of affordable housing.
The Chinese people with an agricultural hukou enjoyed some access to social services
including education and health care in the 1960s and 1970s. This was during Mao‟s era.
However, the provision and quality of these services was at a low level compared with the
current provision of public services in cities (Gao 1999; Croll 1999; UN, 2009). In the
era of economic reform social welfare in general and aged care, education and health care
in particular have been dramatically reduced in rural areas while the priority of
government policies has centred on the cities. This situation has prevailed since the mid of
the 1980s. The collapse of the RCMS in the early 1980s promoted considerable problems
for the rural elderly. In many rural areas even the „five guarantees‟ had to be terminated
owing to the collapse of the collective commune system. In other words, rural people
found it very difficult to access basic public social services in the context of economic
reform.

Discriminatory Social Relief Provision
China‟s social relief or social assistance (shehui jiuji or shehui jiuzhu) system involves
assistance in cash and in kind that is intended to provide a minimum living standard for
urban and rural poor including natural disaster victims, urban vagrants and beggars, the
old, orphans and the disabled without income or other forms of family support (Chinese
Government, 2004; Zheng 2000). As in the case of social insurance and social welfare,
China‟s social relief provisions have been focused on urban rather than rural citizens. The
„Regulations on Guaranteeing Urban Residents‟ Minimum Standard of Living‟ were
promulgated in 1999 by the Chinese government, stipulating that urban residents with a
non-agriculture hukou could receive basic monthly subsistence assistance from the local
government if per capita household income is lower than the local minimum standard of
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living (Chinese Government, 2004). Rural-urban migrant workers in cities have been
excluded from this program. In other words, rural citizens are not entitled to basic
subsistence assistance when their family income is lower than the local minimum
standard of living.
A rural minimum livelihood allowance system called the rural subsistence allowance
system was not formally proposed and established nationwide until 2007, a decade after a
similar system was established in urban areas. Under the rural minimum livelihood
allowance system a qualifying household such as a household with disabled and/or elderly
members could receive an allowance (Xinhua, 5 March 2007). This allowance in rural
areas is significantly less than that in urban areas and in some rural areas the amount of
the allowance has decreased. For example, the average allowance for a rural household
was 33.2 yuan per month in 2006 and dropped to 27.6 yuan in 2007 according to statistics
from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The government claimed in 2007 that the average
allowance was 70 yuan (US$ 9) per person in rural areas each month, whereas the average
allowance per person in urban areas was around 182.4 yuan (US$ 25) per month
(People’s Daily Online, 24 January 2008; MLSS, 2007; Xinhua, 28 May 2007). The fund
for social relief is regularly activated in urban areas by the government and so the
minimum standard of living for urban citizens has been completely secured. However, the
fund for social assistance for rural citizens is irregularly accessed and the Chinese press
constantly and repeatedly reports charges of embezzlement. There is reason to doubt that
the fund to provide assistance to rural residents is effective.
It is quite clear that there is a huge gap in social insurance provision, social welfare
provision and social assistance provision between China‟s urban citizens and rural
citizens. This disparity conflicts with the principle of equal treatment for all citizens. The
basic human right of Chinese nongmin has been denied. There is still a long way to go
before China has established a national unified social security system that meets the
principle of equal treatment for all citizens. Fortunately, the current Chinese government
is attempting to address this situation through the establishment of a new rural cooperative
medical system, rural pension projects, and a rural subsistence allowance system. The
government is also providing more financial support for current social insurance, social
services and social relief schemes in rural areas (NPC, 2011; CCPCC&SC, 2009).
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Transformation of China’s Rural Social Security System – The Impact
on the Rural Elderly
China‟s rural social security system can be classified into three sequential phases. The
first phase was from the 1950s to the early 1980s. This was during Mao‟s era and before
the introduction of economic reform by the Deng Xiaoping leadership. The second phase
was from 1984 to 2002. This was during the period of Deng‟s leadership. The third phase
is the current social security period under the Hu and Wen regime.
During a period of industrialisation and urbanisation many industrialised countries
developed social security systems, including provisions for pensions for the elderly. Most
developed countries have established a comprehensive social security system, which has
replaced the function of families when caring for the elderly. China has also established a
comprehensive social security system for urban citizens in the 1950s and a rudimentary
collective-based social security system for rural citizens at the same time. However, in the
early 1980s with Deng‟s economic reform, the collective commune system collapsed and
so did the collective commune-based social security system in rural China. Then, in the
last few years China‟s rural social security system has experienced significant change
under the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao leaderships.
In the following section, I will examine the changes of China‟s rural social security
provisions and the impact on the lives of the rural elderly in the period from the commune
system of Mao‟s governments through to the Deng government‟s reform period and then
on to the current Hu-Wen period.
The Rural Social Security System during the Mao Era
With the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese government gradually established
social insurance, social welfare and social relief systems in rural areas. This rural social
security system was significantly different from the social security system practised in
cities. The systemic and successful policies of rural social security for rural citizens
during the Mao era were operationalised through the „five guarantees‟ and the RCMS.
During Mao‟s era childless and disabled elderly and orphans without lawful providers
living in rural areas were guaranteed food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial or
education expenses by the collectives (CCCPC, 1957; NPC, 1956; Wang 2006; Zhu 2002;
Croll 1999). This is called „five guarantees‟ (wu bao) system. The „five guarantees‟
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system was developed into a low-level and limited social relief system based on the three
levels within collectives (the people‟s commune and below the commune - the production
brigade and production team). This administrative system was adopted in 1958 (CCCPC,
1957; NPC, 1956; Chinese Government, 2004).
The „five guarantees‟ system with Chinese characteristics played a significant role in
sustaining the basic livelihood of vulnerable elderly in rural areas during the Mao period.
It also promoted the reputation of the Chinese government among the 80% of China‟s
total population who lived in rural areas. Though coverage and provision under this early
system based on collectives could be very limited, in the course of my interviews many
elderly residents of Liujiahui still praised the „five guarantees‟ system of the Mao era.
They also applauded the clean government of that period. I was told that it was the first
time that the basic livelihood of ordinary elderly rural citizens without children was
secure. Millions of poor rural citizens no longer needed to worry that their body would
not be buried with dignity. In addition to the „five-guarantees‟ the Chinese government
also adopted a series of government relief projects for villagers who had suffered from
natural disasters (Guan 2000).
Like the „five guarantees‟ the RCMS began in the 1950s. It was an initiative that
resulted in a significant improvement in rural people‟s health. When the CPC came to
power in 1949 China lacked adequate medical resources. There were no modern health
services in rural areas before the 1950s and many medical care and health services in
cities had also collapsed owing to a century of continuous foreign invasions and civil
wars. China had about 20-40 thousand physicians at that time. This small group had to
care for about 500 million Chinese while conducting teaching, research and other
professional services. More than 80 percent of health and medical professionals lived and
worked in urban areas, while urban residents were only about 20 percent of the total
population. In other words, neither medical professionals and medicine nor health and
medical services were available in rural areas. The consequence of this situation was that
Chinese residents had a life expectancy of only 35 years in 1949 (Li 1975; WHO, 2004;
Deng & Liu 2007: 191).
In rural areas the situation of „neither medical professionals nor medicine (que yi shao
yao)‟ had not changed during the 15 years (from 1949 to 1964) that followed the founding
of the PRC in 1949. Then, in 1965 (May 26), Mao launched a campaign to shift the focus
of medical and health work from the cities to the countryside. It was a policy that decreed
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that „in medical and health work, stress must be put on rural areas (ba yiliao weisheng
gongzuo de zhongdian fang dao nongcun qu)‟. The policy was called the „5.26 directive
(5.26 zhishi)‟ (Li 1975; Deng & Liu 2007: 190). The new Chinese government laid down
the following health and medical policy based on available limited resources under Mao‟s
leadership. Access to health care was to be made available to all and Chinese traditional
medicine and Western medicine were to be integrated (zhong xiyi jiehe) (Tubilewicz
2006: 213; Deng & Liu 2007: 163-166). Medical personnel were freely trained and the
number of professional doctors subsequently increased. By 1966 there were an estimated
180,000 physicians who had graduated from medical schools and 500,000 assistant
doctors, nurses and pharmacists who had completed secondary level medical education
(Li 1975). At the same time, great emphasis was placed on sanitation, inoculation,
eradicating of epidemics, immunisation programs, and establishing maternal and child
health centres (fu you baojian yuan). Prevention work received particular attention (Li
1975; Tubilewicz 2006:213). Health and medical services in rural China - the rural
cooperative medical system (RCMS) – were gradually built up nationwide and by 1965
this system had been established in most rural areas (Deng & Liu 2007: 192). The RCMS
went a considerable way to addressing the demand of rural people for a basic health and
medical service. It promoted the health and medical care of rural people and it improved
the physical condition of rural citizens (WHO, 2004; Deng & Liu, 2007: 191; Gong
2007:277). As many of the elderly I interviewed in Liujiahui noted, it was the first time in
China‟s history that disadvantaged rural citizens found that they could access a medical
doctor without charge and they were provided with medication supplied by the village
medical station (cun bao jian zhan).
The RCMS developed in four stages. There was the rudimentary stage (1940s-1955);
the emergence stage (1955-1959); the growth stage (1960-1979); and the disintegration
stage (1980-1985) (Liu & Cao 1992; Carri et al. 1999). The establishment of the people‟s
communes in 1958 and their stable development thereafter accelerated the development
of the RCMS in the 1960s and 1970s. The majority of rural citizens were covered by the
RCMS by the end of 1970s (World Bank 1984; Liu & Cao 1992; Zheng 2000:59; Liu
2004; Deng & Liu 2007:166, Gong 2007:274). The village health and medical care
clinics, called stations for protecting health (cun bao jian zhan), were administered by the
commune production brigade and were the principal providers of health and medical care
for rural citizens (Carri et al. 1999).
The RCMS were organised at village level and managed by the management
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committee of rural cooperation medical care (Liu & Cao 1992; Gao 1999; Deng & Liu
2007:191). Commune or production brigade members often paid a standard fee (premium
or prepayment) into a collective pool. Other payment methods were also used. My
interviewees in Liujiahui described the situation they experienced during the commune
period. They noted that villagers (commune members) paid 0.05 yuan for each medical
treatment and for tablets. The money collected was then used to pay to maintain and
develop the health and medical system (Tubilewicz 2006:213).
The amount of the premium paid by rural residents for their medical care changed
over time and depended on the production brigade‟s economic situation. Overall,
villagers‟ premium ranged from 0.5 to 2% of their annual income (Carri et al. 1999; Dib
et al. 2008), though there were cases where villagers were not required to contribute
anything to their medical costs. The total cost was met by the collective welfare fund or
collective accumulation fund of the production brigade or the commune. Under all the
systems it was often the case that a visit to a barefoot doctor (see below) and medicines
were free or there would be a free doctor‟s visit and a co-payment for medications. A copayment from the patient was also quite often required if hospitalisation at county level
was required. The cost of hospitalisation attracted a re-imbursement in the case of a
referred patient. The patient usually received 50-60 percent of total cost as a reimbursement.
The RCMS system placed emphasis on active prevention. It was a low cost system
that effectively provided local health care services, and promoted accessible primary
health care and medical services for all rural citizens (Hillier & Shen 1996; Xian 1992).
Almost all villages had at least one health and medical care clinic or station staffed by
barefoot doctors (Liu & Cao, 1992; Xian 1992). Every commune established a relatively
comprehensive health and medical centre staffed by rural medical professionals and
barefoot doctors. Every county established at least one comprehensive hospital staffed by
medical professionals. All these clinics, centres and hospitals were accessible for all rural
villagers with the financial support of the commune, production brigade and the
government. China thus realised the basic goal of health care for rural residents by this
health and medical care network. Many of the elderly I interviewed in Liujiahui
recognised that the RCMS that operated during Mao‟s era made common diseases such as
influenza and dysentery treatable at the village clinic, while modest diseases would be
treated at health care centres in communes and serious illnesses were treated by the
county hospital. The RCMS significantly improved the situation of health and medical
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care in rural China.
‘Barefoot Doctor’ System

The successful functioning of the RCMS owed much to the „barefoot doctor‟ system. This
system originated in 1958. At that time, a few „barefoot doctors‟ began to work in the
health sector in rural areas of southern China. The 5.26 directive of Mao Zedong
stimulated the significant increase in „barefoot doctors‟ in 1965. „Barefoot doctors‟ had
graduated from junior high school (WHO, 2004) and about half of them were female.
Most received training in basic Chinese traditional and Western medicine for a period
ranging from two months to one year (Li 1975; Zhu 2002) at commune or county level
medical centres or hospitals. They learned on the job and catered for the most common
and simple treatment for ailments in rural areas. They also provided birth control
information. Barefoot doctors were required to return every year for additional training of
about one month in the slack season to upgrade their skills and knowledge and to learn
new techniques and exchange information and experience with their peers. The „barefoot
doctor‟ stressed preventative work: sanitation, pest control, health education, familyplanning, immunisation, and so on while working door to door in every poor and rural
area (Li 1975; Wagstaff et al. 2009:3). They also carried out simple curative work
including first aid and distribution of various pills and medicines such as contraceptives
and condoms and they administered vaccines and undertook minor surgery. With
improvement in skill and knowledge they were able to take on diagnosis and treatment of
common diseases. Another important task for the barefoot doctor was referring their
patients to the commune-level medical centre whenever they found their patient could not
be diagnosed or treated with their own expertise and equipment. Therefore, the „barefoot
doctor‟ also acted as a bridge between the village and the commune in the health and
medical care.
As one of my interviewees noted, the barefoot doctor lived and worked in their local
area. They earned the same work points as other commune members undertaking farming.
At harvest time they worked together with other commune members in the field.
Therefore, the „barefoot doctor‟ was fully integrated into the community and this
benefited local residents (Li 1975; Gao 1999). The State did not pay the salaries of
barefoot doctors. The barefoot doctor received free training sponsored by the collectives
and the government. In addition, the „barefoot doctor‟ in the village was available 24
hours, seven days a week. Therefore, it was convenient for the villagers to consult them. I
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remember on one occasion in the 1970s when one of my family members suffered serious
stomach pains in the middle of the night the barefoot doctor in Liujiahui could not
diagnose my relative‟s complaint. The doctor immediately referred him to the commune
medical centre. The commune doctor diagnosed it as appendicitis and said that it would
have been dangerous for him if he delayed treatment. My relative always thanked the
RCMS. He later argued that he could not have imagined what would have happened to
him if he had suffered acute appendicitis with present- day medical provision for rural
residents.
It is obviously clear that the RCMS and the „barefoot doctor‟ delivered primary health
and medical care to rural populations in the context of low level economic development
(Valentine 2005; Deng & Liu 2007:189). The RCMS and the „barefoot doctor‟ system are
regarded as „health and medical care sector‟s revolution‟ in China (Deng & Liu
2007:190). The World Health Organisation (WHO) and leaders in some developing
countries praised the model of China‟s RCMS in the 1970s (Valentine 2005; Deng & Liu
2007:189). Life expectancy of Chinese people significantly increased from 35 before
1949 to 63 by the mid-1970s and 68 by 1982 (WHO, 2004; Deng & Liu 2007:186, 191;
Li 1975). A range of infectious and epidemic diseases such as pulmonary tuberculosis and
„Big Belly‟ or schistosomiasis were eradicated or controlled (Deng & Liu 2007:186, 191;
Tubilewicz 2006:215; Shi 1993). The physical health status of rural population was
dramatically improved under the RCMS and „barefoot doctor‟, which, in turn, increased
agricultural productivity. At the same time, these outcomes also raised the confidence and
trust of grass-roots residents in the new Chinese government. The majority of rural people
believed that the government represented and served their interests.
The „barefoot doctor‟ system reflects the importance of the principle of egalitarianism
asserted by Mao in his 5.26 directive (Li 1975; Deng & Liu 2007:166-173). The system
helped to bring sophisticated medical and health technology and knowledge to the
ordinary people of rural China. Moreover, a similar dissemination of complex matters and
training of para-professionals also occurred in disseminating agricultural technology to
increase agricultural output and the industrial technology that was vital for the
establishment of commune-level and village-level factories that later became TVEs (Gao
1999). The core of this dissemination lies in reducing the complexity of specialised
knowledge so that ordinary Chinese citizens in rural areas can use simple knowledge and
techniques in their daily life and work.
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The Elderly in Liujiahui in Mao’s Era

As members of a commune system, China‟s rural elderly would take part in activities
organised by all levels of the collective such as study groups and performing arts groups.
The collectives distributed work to the elderly according to their ability and they earned
work points. The elderly would receive resources such as grain and cash directly from the
collective (production brigade and production team) even if they lived with their adult
children (Lee & Xiao 1998; Oi 1989; Unger 2002). Only when they totally lost their
ability to work were they eligible to withdraw from production activities and then they
were looked after by family members (Wang 2006; Croll 1999). Otherwise, the elderly
would be cared for by the „five guarantees‟ system. It is the rather obvious point that the
basic livelihood of rural elderly was assured and secure under the commune system of the
Mao period.
The following case illustrates the life of the elderly under the collective system. My
grandfather passed away in 1980. He had suffered from serious asthma since he was 30
years old and could not do heavy physical work. Under the commune system he was
always given work that required less physical effort such as looking after collectively
owned vegetable and fruit farms and he earned the same work points as young and strong
labourers because farming vegetables and fruits are regarded as knowledgeable and
professional work in rural areas. He was able to support himself and his family was
catered for. His two sons, my father and my uncle, did not need to provide for their father
until he lost his ability to work. He always told me that I should study hard to contribute
to the country when I was in the primary school. He did not like Old Chinese government
before 1949 and totally supported Mao‟s post-revolution government. As well, Mao‟s
government had supported Chinese traditional filial piety and the elderly found they were
respected by family members and by their communities. A member of a commune could
be punished politically and economically if he/she did not take responsibility for his/her
parents. They were required to give pocket money to and look after and respect the
elderly.
My grassroots research indicated that the majority of the elderly and middle-aged
interviewees in Liujiahui were pleased with the social security provision during the Mao
period. In answer to the question: How did you evaluate the life quality of the villagers in
the commune period? - The majority of middle-aged and elderly interviewees
significantly recognised that they were happy at that period. When questioned over 85

Were you still happy when you were suffering the shortage of basic livelihood
particularly food and clothing? – Many of them replied „Yes‟. I can‟t explain why they
were happy though they were lack of access to adequate food and clothing.
The Rural Social Security System in the Deng Period
Though Deng‟s reform period began at the end of 1978 and ended in 2002, from the
perspective of the drastic transformation of rural social security, Deng‟s era is better dated
from 1984 to 2002. The official abolition of the people‟s commune was in 1984. It is at
this point that the cornerstone of the rural social security system based on the collective
collapsed. The end of Deng‟s era is dated as the October 2002 16th CCP congress when
Hu, Jintao took power as the new leader of China. The new rural cooperation medical
system (NRCMS) was then officially proposed by the current Hu-Wen regime.
Under Deng, China‟s economy was transformed from a state-planned economy to a
market integrated economy and agricultural production and rural organisation was
transformed from a collective system to the HRS. As a consequence, the social security
system was transformed from an integrated collective to an individual household-based
social security system (Selden 1997; Duckett, 2000; Hebel 2003, Liu 2004; Wang, 2006;
Deng & Liu 2007). The basic livelihood guarantees provided by the collective (by
communes), including employment security, income security, health care and old age
security, became the rural citizens‟ own responsibility at that time. Furthermore, rural
social security did not receive any priority in the State budget at least for the period from
the 1980s to the 1990s (Wong 1994). The government neglected the construction and
development of a rural social security system while it had withdrawn support for previous
rural social security measures (Zheng 2000:59; Deng & Liu 2007:194). When all levels of
Chinese government are combined they only distributed one cent (in China‟s renminbi
currency) to each rural citizen for health care purposes (WHO, 2004; Deng & Liu
2007:194). China was ranked number 144 for its health system‟s overall performance and
188 (fourth from the bottom) in terms of financial contribution among the 191 member
countries of the WHO according to the 2000 WHO Report (WHO, 2000). The majority of
rural citizens found themselves in a vulnerable situation. It was common for rural
households to find that illness resulted in poverty and, of course, poverty results in
vulnerability to illness and this can lead to greater poverty (yin bing zhi or fan pin, yin pin
zhi or fan bing, yin lao zhi bing or fan pin). This was the situation in Deng‟s era.
An improvement in indicators of human development was not forthcoming during the
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Deng era even as per capita income was substantially increased (Hussain 2000:248).
China‟s outstanding record in human development such as adult literacy and life
expectancy rates during the Mao era also lost its lustre during the Deng era and again this
was at a time when rural citizens‟ income rose substantially and economic opportunities
opened up with rural-to-urban migration resulting in wage-earning opportunities (UNDP,
1994).
The Chinese government in the Deng era largely ignored the need to build an
effective and viable rural social security system, and the gap in income and living
standard between urban and rural people accelerated. In order to mitigate the social
tension and increase rural citizens‟ confidence in the Party series of policies related to
rural social security such as the establishment of an old age insurance system and the reestablishment of the RCMS and rural social relief were introduced at the very end of the
Deng era (Chinese Government, 2004; Huang 2008). However, these proposals did not go
into practice nationwide and did not benefit the majority of rural people at that time. The
household continued to be the main provider of social security. As in the case of the rural
old age insurance system tried out in the 1990s, problems were associated with the
system. These problems included rural citizens withdrawing from the system. The system
was mainly funded by individual contributions (Chinese Government, 2004; Wang 2006;
MLSS; 2007; Chen, L. 2009). This indicated that the majority of rural citizens were de
facto excluded from the old age insurance program, which only favoured some rich
people in some rural areas (Wang 2006; MLSS, 2007; Yang et al. 2009).
It is very difficult to make an assessment of whether the Chinese nongmin really have
benefited from the reform process. There have often been trade-offs and new reforms
often introduce new benefits, but it is at the cost of removing previous programs, which
had also provided benefit. For instance when asked: How much do you favour the policies
of reform? - Almost all my interviewees criticized the policies on one hand because they
were still discriminated against and felt themselves to be second class citizens, on the
other hand, they admitted that they were now free from the day-to-day control of their
lives exercised by collectives (by the various administrative levels of communes) and they
recognised that their cash income had increased.
The aim of rural social security reform in Deng‟s era was to reduce or withdraw the
government‟s direct provision of social security services and to encourage more actors to
participate in developing a new rural social security system (Guan 2000). The
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consequence was that during Deng‟s era the „five guarantees‟ system no longer worked
effectively and the RCMS basically collapsed (Deng & Liu 2007). China‟s health and
medical care system changed from RCMS to a „fee-for-service‟ system based on market
forces. What this meant was that individual households in rural areas had to be
responsible for economic security and social provision for their family members,
including the elderly. The majority of rural citizens were not covered by any form of
social security and this led to a significant increase in inequality and in the disparity
between the living standard of rural and urban citizens.
Rural Health and Medical Care Based on ‘Fee-for-Service’

The RCMS was replaced by a FFS system, which is an individual household paid health
care system. The problem is that the FFS is not readily affordable for most rural
households. As the level of health cover dropped (even by 1989 it had dropped to the very
low figure of around 4.8%), the basic livelihood of rural households was put at risk. Some
poor elderly could not afford to pay for even basic medical care and had to wait to die and
the problems were not confined only to the elderly. A number of infectious and epidemic
diseases such as pulmonary tuberculosis and „Big Belly‟ or schistosomiasis that had been
eradicated in Mao‟s era revived in the Deng era (Deng & Liu 2007; Liu 2004; IDS, 1995;
Carrin et al. 1994; Liu & Cao 1992). It is telling that more than three million rural people
who could have been saved are estimated to have died from tuberculosis during the 1980s
(IDS, 1995). This is a heavy price to pay for economic reform.
With economic reform village public clinics built in Mao‟s era were transformed into
private clinics or they disappeared and almost all the medical professionals graduated
from the public medical schools and universities in the economic reform period have been
unwilling to service and work in rural areas. In 1992, the central government tried to reestablish RCMS in order to enable rural citizens to access basic health and medical care
and reduce the problems of poverty caused by disease and illness (Carri et al. 1999;
Chinese Government, 2004). However, progress in the government‟s bid to re-establish
RCMS was very slow and the coverage of the re-established RCMS was very low
(Wagstaff et al. 2009:28). For example, the re-established RCMS covered only 6.5% of
the rural population by 1998 and 17% of the total administrative villages by 1997 (Deng
&Liu 2007:169). This meant that a massive 90% (640 million) of China‟s rural population
were not covered by any form of health insurance according to information collected in
2003 (Wagstaff et al. 2009:28).
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The FFS used to be considered to be the reform direction for the health and medical
services in the Deng period. It was considered to be a better choice than the RCMS. The
basic philosophy behind the FFS was that instead of relying on the government and
collectives, individuals should take responsibility for as much as they can (Guan 2000). In
this context some argued that rural residents are now self-employed and so must insure
themselves against disease (Hussain 1994). The FFS lasted for about two decades (19842002). Apart from significantly reduced health care coverage, it also led to a lasting
increase in the price of health and medical services as well as medicines (Hebel 2003;
WHO, 2004; Deng & Liu 2007; Wagstaff et al. 2009:19-24). Many rural citizens in
general and the rural poor and elderly in particular cannot now access basic medical care
when needed. From 1989 to 2001 the average income of rural residents increased 393%,
but medical service fees for consultations, diagnosis and treatment increased 965%.
Hospitalisation fees increased 998% (Deng & Liu 2007:184). Mark-ups for prescription
medicines could be as high as 40% to 80% in village clinics and hospitals in rural areas.
About 90% of the profit from village health clinics and 60% of the profit from township
health centres/hospitals is from drug sales (WHO, 2004). Unsurprisingly, the rural poor
and elderly have become very vulnerable groups. In one sample of counties, 48% of rural
people referred to hospital did not go and 151 people died in one town in 1992. Only four
of them saw a licensed health worker before their death (IDS, 1995). At least 30% of
poverty-stricken households were facing poverty as a result of paying health costs
associated with the treatment of an illness of a family member (Deng & Liu 2007:187).
The deteriorating poverty resulted from illness had become a very common phenomenon
in rural areas. According to the World Bank, 30% of poor households resulted from health
care costs by 2003. Health costs had been regarded as the one of the top three public
concerns in official surveys since Deng‟s reform (Wagstaff et al. 2009: 4, 19; Liu 2004;
Liu & Cao 1992; Carrin et al. 1994).
By 2003, after two decades of the „fee-for-service‟ health and medical care system,
the Chinese government had not yet established a new type health and medical care
system that could provide high quality and affordable health and medical care services for
the majority of their country‟s rural citizens (UNDP, 2008).
Household-Based Old Age Provision

In rural China the household is currently the main provider of old age security. The 2000
census indicated that 86.2% of rural elders depended on their family for support and only
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1.5% of them lived on the government provided social old age insurance system (Wang
2006). However the family-based old age provision has been significantly challenged by
socio-economic transformation (Wang 2006). The family-based old age security system
cannot and does not always secure the basic livelihood needs of China‟s rural elderly. My
grassroots research shows that the elderly rural residents have the highest exposure to
poverty risk of any group. Many of the rural poor are elderly people. A survey conducted
by the China National Committee of Old People found that around 40% of the rural
elderly considered themselves poverty-stricken (MLSS, 2007:58).
Based on the experience of old age security provision in many developed countries, it
is inevitable that a united social security and insurance system with a high coverage rate,
fairness and justice will replace family-based old age provision. Socioeconomic
development and the government‟s need to sustain social stability and protect human
rights will promote the development of a national social security and insurance system (Li
1999; UNDP, 2008; Yang et al. 2010). This has not yet happened.
The current Hu-Wen government has been aware of the importance and urgency to
set up a rural social security with wide coverage, sustainable growth and meeting people‟s
basic needs for benefiting all citizens including rural elderly. The new policies for the
rural social security mainly include re-establishing a NRCMS (Chinese Government,
2004; Tubilewicz, 2006: 217; Dib et al. 2008; CCPCC&SC, 2008), setting up the rural
minimum livelihood allowance system implemented nationwide (MLSS, 2007; Xinhua, 5
March 2007; Wen 2007) and building a new rural social pension scheme (Xinhua, 25 June
2009; Chen, L. 2009; Li, X. 2009). In what follows, I will examine these three new
programs and the lives of the elderly rural residents.
The New Rural Social Pension Scheme in the Hu-Wen Era
Both academic commentators and policy-makers have drawn attention to the
shortcomings of China‟s rural old age insurance in recent years. For his part, Li (1999)
has analysed China‟s old age family insurance and social insurance from a
multidimensional perspective. He concluded that when a nation‟s average income is high
enough the social benefits of a properly designed social insurance program outweigh the
social costs. Wang (2006) has also reviewed China‟s reform of the country‟s rural old age
security systems. He discussed the process of constructing a sustainable rural old age
security system and then concluded the rather obvious point that it is important to build a
rural old age social security system to alleviate poverty among the rural elderly. The
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„Study on the Rural Social Security System in China‟ funded by the UNDP examines the
institutional framework for a rural social security system in China and concludes that the
institutional framework for this system has not been designed and put into practice at the
national level.
The No. 1 Document of the CCCPC of 2008 stated that a new rural social old age
insurance system should be established. Then, the No.1 Document of CCCPC of 2009
(under the title of „Major Suggestions on Issues Concerning the Advancement of
Agricultural Development and Sustainably Increasing Farmer‟s Income‟) proposed a new
rural social pension system based on individual payment, group allowances and
government subsidies (CCPCC&SC, 2009). This was followed by the State Council of
PRC announcement that a new rural social pension scheme would be carried out in 10%
of the country‟s counties in 2009.
Under the current system rural citizens, who are not students and do not take part in
elementary pension schemes in urban areas and are aged over 16 years, are entitled to join
a new pension program and those aged 60 years and over will be able to receive a
monthly endowment of varying amounts according to the income standard of particular
geographic areas (the basic monthly payment is 55 yuan ($8.3) per person) (Xinhua, 31
December 2010; 25 June 2009; Chen, L. 2009). A mixture of rural citizens‟ funds,
collective benefits, and government subsidy pays for these pension funds. The scheme is
totally different from the old one paid for by rural citizens without a subsidy from any
level of government. The new pension system currently under trial is to be subsidised by
State finances. No fees or administrative charges are to be levied on rural citizens. This
new scheme promises that the central government has undertaken to subsidise 80% of the
pensions for residents in the Western region, 60% for those in Central areas and 20% for
residents of Eastern provinces (Xinhua, 1 January 2011). The lowest pension standard is
higher than the country‟s average subsistence level of 1800 yuan. The preliminary scheme
will be adjusted in line with test results (Li, X. 2009). An overall social security system
covering both urban and rural citizens should be established by 2020 according to the
Report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party (NCCPC) by Hu Jintao (Hu
2007).
The current Hu-Wen government has undoubtedly been trying to solve the difficulties
faced by the rural elderly and has been attempting to narrow the economic gap between
urban and rural areas. This new scheme has the potential to have a significant impact on
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the life of the rural elderly. The next question will be how to put the trial rural pension
scheme I outline above into practice nationwide. Nevertheless the central government in
2010 expanded its new pension experiment to 23% of the counties (Xinhua, 1 January
2011). The rather obvious point is that the program must be implemented efficiently and
without corruption and the abuse of power. The need to sustain funding for the new
system will also present the government with a challenge. Embezzling pension funding
by all levels of government and government agencies must be urgently addressed. Much
of Chinese media outlets have reported the cases in relation to misusing the appropriated
funding.
In the past few years, the Chinese government has made significant progress in
planning to alleviate poverty among the rural elderly using the special pension program
being trialled. For example, more than three million rural elderly can now receive an
allowance when they are 80 years and over in some rural areas through the oldest of the
old scheme. The amount of allowance differs in different administrative areas (IOSC,
2006). For example, the oldest of the old in Pingshan County can receive 30 yuan per
person per month whereas a very old person in a neighbouring county will get 20 yuan
monthly or nothing the deputy head of the Pingshan County council told me. However,
the majority of the rural elderly still have a hard life due to the narrow coverage and limits
placed on this special program. The Chinese government has experimented with a system,
which supports and rewards rural elderly who practised family planning and had only one
child or had two girls in some rural areas like my home village, Liujiahui. Each of these
couples can receive a minimum of 600 yuan per year from the age of 60 until the end of
their lives. The central government and local government provide joint funding (Chinese
Government, 2004).
When compared with the absence of old age social insurance in rural China in the
Deng period, the experiment in the rural old age social insurance in the Hu-Wen era can
be seen to have improved the basic livelihood of the oldest of the old, although my
grassroots research shows that the majority of rural elderly still face difficulties and
challenges when accessing government funded payments.
A New Rural Cooperative Medical System in the Hu-Wen Era
The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in November 2002 exposed
weaknesses in China's ailing public health care system, especially in rural areas. China
had been experiencing sizable challenges in the provision of basic rural health care. The
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thening Rural Health‟ in 2002 and proposed that a new rural cooperative medical system
(NRCMS) would be established (CCPCC&SC, 2002). The NRCMS is based on the
principle of putting people first and promoting the overall, harmonized and sustainable
development of China announced by former President Jiang Zemin (Jiang 2002). The
goal of the NRCMS is to guarantee the basic health needs of rural citizens (Chinese
Government, 2004). Next, in 2003, the State Council announced „Opinions on the
Establishment of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme‟ (State Council, 2003). The
pilot scheme for the NRCMS started in a number of rural areas and then gradually
became a national scheme. At the same time, the Medical Financial Assistance Schemes
(MFAS) initiated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs was incorporated into the NRCMS
(Wagstaff et al. 2009: 38). This made the medical service affordable for destitute rural
households. It exempted them from co-payment for health services and made them
eligible for subsidised health insurance premiums (State Council, 2003; WHO, 2004).
However, it is hard for the ordinary rural residents to receive benefits from the scheme in
the practice I was told. When questioned over – Have you or your relatives benefited from
this medical financial assistance program? – Nobody of my interviewees had the
experience.
A basic objective of the NRCMS is to protect rural people who have catastrophic
diseases from financial risk and ruin. The significant difference between the NRCMS and
the RCMS is that the former focuses on catastrophic disease and hospitalisation services
for which a very small portion of the rural population receive benefits from the system,
whereas the latter focuses on the provision of basic health care. The latter includes disease
prevention and outpatient services. The NRCMS is organised, led and subsidised by the
government with funds coming from the central government, local governments and
county governments in combination with health service recipients, whereas the RCMS
was founded and grew from grassroots collectives. The former is top-down the latter
bottom-up. Although, it must be noted that the NRCMS is a voluntary health insurance
scheme and all rural citizens are eligible to participate in this scheme (State Council,
2003; WHO, 2004; Chinese Government, 2004). Rural citizens who join the NRCMS
receive reimbursement from the scheme if they are admitted to hospital for inpatient
services. The rate of reimbursement will vary between administrative regions, but most
reimbursement is about 20% to 60% of total cost of inpatient services (State Council,
2003; WHO, 2004). For the villagers in Liujiahui the highest reimbursement rate would
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be 50% for county and township level inpatient medical services while the lowest would
be approximately 20% for city and higher level hospital inpatient services. Prior to
Premier Wen‟s 2004 call for the NRCMS to be made a top health priority its membership
was static and in 2008 the Chinese government urged that efforts should be made to ensure
that all rural citizens join this basic health care funding system and that the system would
cover all rural citizens by 2011 (CCPCC&SC, 2008; Dib et al. 2008). Wen‟s call for
priority to be afforded the NRCMS and the central government‟s subsequent promotion
of the health funding system was quite successful. Based on the report from the China‟s
National Audit Office (NAO), by the end of 2009, around 833 million rural citizens,
accounting for 94% of the total rural population, had joined the NRCMS (Xinhua, 6 June
2010). The WHO (2004) considers the NRCMS to be a unique system because it means
that all levels of government must commit to contributing monetarily to the health care of
rural citizens.
Compared with over two decades of the Deng era when the Chinese government had
paid almost nothing to support medical services in rural China, the NRCMS system has
benefited a substantial number of rural households. However, the reach of the NRCMS is
still not wide enough. A significant shortcoming of the NRCMS is that it covers those
who suffer catastrophic illness leading to inpatient hospital care, but not those who need
medical care using outpatient services. Among those I interviewed in Liujiahui nobody
went to hospital for inpatient services and this means they did not receive any direct
benefit from the NRCMS. Only 3-4% of rural citizens are admitted to hospitals for
inpatient services annually according to surveys done by the national health services in
1998 and 2003 (WHO, 2004).
Furthermore, many serious illnesses requiring inpatient services are chronic and noncommunicable diseases such as cerebral-vascular and heart disease. Outpatient follow-up
treatments are vital for such diseases after hospitalisation, but most of these patients have
to give up their treatment due to a lack of financial reimbursement. Moreover, at current
premium collection levels the out-of-pocket payment for inpatient hospital bills under the
NRCMS is still a considerable sum of money for an ordinary rural household. This point
is supported by the surveys of national health services conducted in 1998 and 2003
(WHO, 2004). Most rural citizens, especially the elderly, have to forego any need for
inpatient hospital services even though they are participants in the NRCMS. This is a
shocking situation given that the central government requires local governments to give
appropriate preferential treatment to elderly residents over 70 who have joined the
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NRCMS (IOSC, 2006). As well, the government matching funds are conditional on the
individual who must pay the premium money to participate the NRCMS (State Council,
2003; WHO, 2004). Therefore, rural residents who are not able to pay the premium are
still out of the NRCMS system although a rural medical aid system has been built up.
Facing the challenges associated with implementing the NRCMS, the Central
Committee of the CPC and the State Council in 2009 jointly issued „Opinions on
Deepening the Health Care System Reform‟ (CCPCC&SC, 2009a; Blumenthal & Hsiao
2005). It is a blueprint for developing a health care system over the next decade (Xinhua,
6 April 2009). The major goal of this reform is to provide over 90% of the population
with basic health insurance by 2011 through building upon the previously established the
NRCMS with a new 850 billion yuan (US $124 billion) 3-year plan to completely
overhaul the current health care system and establish a basic health care system which
covers urban and rural residents by 2020 (CCPCC&SC, 2009a). This means that China‟s
expenditure on health care increased to 1.4 of China‟s 2009 GDP, which is close to a
WHO estimate. The WHO suggests that the government spending on health of 1.5-2.0%
of the country‟s GDP could meet primary health care for all Chinese citizens (WHO,
2007). Nevertheless this is still low compared with the expenditure on other public sectors
such as education (Brixi et al. 2011). This ambitious plan could provide safe, effective,
convenient and affordable health services through improving health insurance coverage,
drug supply and cost, public health services, hospital reform and health delivery in rural
areas (CCPCC&SC, 2009a; NPC, 2011). However, the announcement did not elaborate
on how the 850 billion funding would be used within three years. It is widely expected
that more funding should be spent on subsidising basic medical care programs and
improving grassroots-level health facilities.
The proposed reform has ambitious targets. However, major challenges such as
monitoring the procedure of these reforms remain. To date, there is no sign that villagers
in Liujiahui have been receiving benefits from this scheme. To some extent, villagers in
Liujiahui have lost their confidence in the reform of the NRCMS based on their past
experiences. The majority of the villagers have not received significant benefits from the
NRCMS based on my fieldwork. For example, the four elderly interviewed in 2008 died
of chronic diseases (one suffered oesophageal cancer and three suffered cerebra-vascular
and heart disease), one of them in 2009 and three in 2010. None of them went to hospitals
for inpatient treatment I was told. As Wagstaff et al. (2009:35) has stated, the „high cost
deterred people from seeking needed medical care‟.
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There is still a long way to go before China has established a basic healthcare system
for everyone. Nevertheless, the current government is attempting to provide every citizen
with primary medical care security and the current health care reform appears to have a
lot of potential to benefit China‟s rural residents. The question now is – Can an equitable
and universal access to essential health care for all be established in China in the near
future?
The Rural Minimum Livelihood Allowance System in the Hu-Wen Era
China had 23.65 million of the country‟s rural population (about 3% of the total rural
population) living below the official „absolute poverty‟ line (approximately $90 per year)
with annual per capita income lower than 683 yuan (US$87.6) by the end of 2006. This is
according to data from the State Council Leading Group of the Office of Poverty
Alleviation and Development (Xinhua, 5 March 2007; MLSS, 2007; CIA, 2010).
However, World Bank economists have estimated that there were about 208 million rural
poor, 16.6% of Chinese citizens, living on less than $1 per day in 2005, accounted for the
second largest national concentration of absolute poor in the world after India (Xinhua, 8
September 2010). These extreme rural poor are mainly the disabled, the elderly and others
who are unable to do physical labour. These people are not able to afford the most basic
necessities such as food and clothing to ensure their survival.
In 2004 the Asian Development Bank (ADB) advised the Chinese Government that
traditional social relief in rural areas is not able to secure the basic living expenditure of
the rural poor and a rural subsistence security system should be established (ADB, 2004).
In order to secure the basic livelihood of the rural poor, in 2006, the Chinese government
proposed the establishment of subsistence allowances for rural poor all around the country
(China Daily, 24 December 2006). In 2007 Premier Wen Jiabao announced in his
Government Report that a nationwide basic minimum cost of living allowance system for
rural citizens would be established. This was to be done in the name of achieving social
fairness and building a harmonious society and new socialist countryside (Wen 2007).
The rural minimum livelihood allowance system called the rural subsistence allowance
system was then formally established nationwide.
The target of this system is to alleviate the poverty of disadvantaged households in
rural areas. Under this system since 2009 a poverty-stricken rural household could obtain
an allowance of about 30 yuan (less $5) per month in Liujiahui, although the official
claim made in 2007 was that the average allowance is 70 yuan monthly per person
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(People’s Daily Online, 24 January 2008; MLSS, 2007; Xinhua, 28 May 2007). The
allowance varies by administrative region, but the basic requirement is to secure an
adequate and constant supply of basic necessities for poverty-stricken people. The
beneficiaries are the poverty-stricken people in rural areas who suffer lasting living
difficulties induced by illness, disability, and advanced age. According to the Ministry of
Civil Affairs, nearly 77% of the rural poor were covered by this system in 2007 and all
rural poor will be gradually covered under this system in coming years (Xinhua, 28 May
2007). The central government allocates subsidies to poor rural areas. The local
governments are responsible for the operation of the allowance scheme.
To some extent this system has made a significant difference when it comes to lifting
the poorest of the rural poor out of destitution and it has won the heart of some grassroots
people although the coverage of this program continues to be limited. During my
fieldwork, an elderly woman told me her story. She was bedridden for two years due to
arthritis and she showed her distorted knees to me. Her husband had to farm, do all the
housework and look after her and their disabled son although he is 77 years old. They
have a hard day-to-day life. Nevertheless, psychologically she and her husband have felt
safe in relation to their basic daily life since their family has been eligible to receive the
subsistence allowance monthly. She and her husband are also no longer worried that their
disabled bachelor son would die of hunger and cold. Thirty yuan is possibly too little for
rich people, but it can sustain poor people‟s survival. She and her husband hailed Hu and
Wen as the greatest leaders with tears during my visit. However, for a certain period in
the future, rural people will still face the poverty challenge induced by growing ageing,
illness and education because the system only goes as far as relieving the destitution of
the most vulnerable of vulnerable rural groups.
The majority of the extreme rural poor are covered by the rural minimum livelihood
allowance system. However, an additional 35.5 million rural people still live below the
official „low income‟ line (882 yuan, approximately $125 per year) and these people are
not entitled to enjoy basic livelihood security under the present system (NBSC, 2004;
MLSS, 2007; CIA, 2010). Furthermore, 219 million people accounting for 16.6% and 620
million people accounting for 47% of China‟s population still live on less than $1 and $2
a day respectively according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2010; BFMD, 2010).
About 99% of China‟s poor are rural citizens (China Real Time Report, 2009). It is at this
point that there is a long way to go before China has established a unified social security
system to cover all Chinese citizens. Nevertheless, the rural minimum livelihood
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allowance system has become one of the most important fundamental systems of the rural
security scheme.
It is worthwhile paying attention to the point that local governments often exercise
their own discretion and redefine their own poverty standard although China‟s central
government sets a standard poverty definition and stresses strengthening the management
of the funds. Some rural poor who meet the criteria for the allowance are excluded from
the system whereas some relatives of local officials whose income and living standard
don‟t match the criteria are enjoying the benefit of this scheme through power abuse in
such situations. The Chinese government has emphasised that the rural minimum
livelihood system must be improved with large subsidies from the central and provincial
budget to cover all legitimate claims and to improve benefits in order to solve the
problems encountered in the process of the system (CCPCC&SC, 2008). However, some
local officials purposely neglect those rural citizens living in poverty in the pursuit of
personal career gain. Some local officials, for example, are given promotion if the areas
they govern experience progress in their anti-poverty campaigns. Therefore, some local
officials falsify data when reporting the number of villagers living in poverty and the
number who have applied to receive a living allowance from social relief schemes.
It was in this context that many villagers in Liujiahui told me that they did not trust
the local government including village committees and township government due to
corruption and abuse of power. They did, however, trust the central government. I was
told a story. An elderly bachelor, aged 75, was entitled to the „five guarantees‟. He visited
the office of the village committee in 2007 when he heard that he could receive welfare
based on the „five guarantees‟ and could receive the rural subsistence allowance. He had
heard this from one of his relatives who is a cadre in a neighbouring village. The head of
the village committee told him with anger that the village committee had never received
the document related to what he described from the township government. This elderly
man had to ask for help from his relative. The relative invited the village head to have a
dinner with him. A few days later, the elderly man got his certificate that confirmed that
he would receive an allowance.
Compared with the absence of social security in the Deng era, the Hu-Wen regime
has paid increasing attention to establishing a rural social security system with a wider
coverage. A few new policies in relation to rural social security have also been carried
out in rural areas. These new policies have benefited the rural elderly to some extent. The
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basic livelihood needs (including food and clothing) of the rural elderly in Liujiahui have
been secured under the present-day situation, although the guarantees are very limited and
rudimentary.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the transformation of China‟s rural social security system
and the impact of this system on the life of the rural elderly, particularly those living in
Liujiahui. China‟s social security system has been based on the principle of industrialised
urban areas and city citizens having priority over agriculture-based rural areas and rural
citizens. In the context of this principle, China's social security system is a discriminatory,
unfair and unequal system.
The transformation of China‟s rural social security system can be usefully classified
into three phases. The first phase is the collective based rural social security system of
Mao‟s era. This is the system in place before economic reform. It dates from the 1950s to
the early 1980s. The second phase is the individual household based social security
system used in rural areas during the Deng era. This is the period of economic reform. It
dates from 1984 to 2002. The third phase is the individual household centred and
government subsidised rural social security system of the Hu-Wen era. This third phase
dates from 2002 to the present-day.
The successful rural social security system in place during Mao‟s era was
operationalised through the „five guarantees‟ and the RCMS. With the „five guarantees‟
and RCMS system in place, the collectives (communes, production brigades and
production teams) guaranteed the basic livelihood of the rural elderly, although this
security was limited and rudimentary. Provision was at a very low level. Nevertheless, the
rural elderly did not have to worry about their basic livelihood in later life. Many felt they
were truly the masters of the new China. With economic transformation from a stateplanned economy to a market integrated economy and implementation of the household
responsibility system in rural areas in the Deng era the social security system was
transformed from an integrated collective-supported and family-supported social security
system to a family-based social security system. The „five guarantees‟ system and the
RCMS established in Mao‟s time collapsed in the Deng era. The health and medical care
system changed from the RCMS to a „fee-for-service‟ system based on market forces. The
rural elderly found they were a particularly vulnerable group with the majority of them
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unable to afford to pay for even basic medical care. The individual household had become
the main source of old age security in rural areas once again. The basic livelihood
guarantees provided by the collective including employment, income, health care and old
age security were no longer available. Provision became the responsibility of each
household. The government withdrew support for rural social security. The majority of
Chinese farmers were no longer covered by any form of social security system. The basic
livelihood of the majority of rural elderly had not been insured and many of the elderly
found they faced hard times during the Deng era.
The Hu-Wen regime has been increasingly aware of the importance and urgency
associated with establishing a rural social security system affording wide coverage and
sustainable growth. Some new policies relating to the provision of rural social security
have been adopted and implemented in rural areas. These new policies have benefited the
rural elderly. Under these new programs the basic livelihood needs (including food and
clothing) for the majority of the rural elderly have been secured. Many rural elderly hail
Hu and Wen as the best leaders in Chinese history. However, the provision of basic
medical services needed by the rural elderly has not been secured. Many rural elderly will
continue to face difficulties as they age primarily because the NRCMS and the rural
minimum livelihood allowance aim only to relieve destitution for a relatively narrow band
consisting of those who are considered to be the most vulnerable of the vulnerable. In the
long run, based on the rural minimum livelihood allowance system, rural pension scheme
and the NRCMS, a basic rural social security system covering all elderly rural residents
must be established.
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Chapter 4
The Elderly in Liujiahui

Introduction
There has been significant progress in the economic reform of rural China. Rural residents
have acquired a large number of benefits and their quality of life has been greatly
improved compared with their life during the period of Old China (before 1949) and
during Mao‟s era (before the end of the 1970s). The inequality in income between rural
and urban residents has dramatically increased during the post-Mao period. In this chapter
I will examine the living standard and life quality of rural residents in general and the
rural elderly in particular. The rural elderly are a disadvantaged group in my home village
of Liujiahui.
I concentrate on five dimensions when looking at the life of the elderly in Liujiahui:
living arrangements, living conditions, social status, health status and economic status. I
have organised my chapter as follows. First, I will examine the living arrangements of the
village elderly. I will also explore the question of who should provide basic living
conditions for the elderly in rural China. In the next section I discuss the social status of
the elderly, their power in their family compared with their status and their power before
the introduction of economic reform under the Deng Xiaoping government. I will also
investigate the health status of the elderly taking into account present policies and the
rural social security provision. Finally, I will study the economic status of the elderly by
focusing on their basic consumption.

Living Arrangements: A Lack of Support for the Elderly
Simmons states that „throughout human history the family has been the safest haven of
the aged‟ (1945: 177). This conclusion is reflected in Chinese culture, customs and law.
The family is the root of aged care and support of the elderly in rural China. Taking care
of the elderly physically, emotionally and financially is the responsibility of adult
children. This approach is not only culturally, traditionally, morally and historically
recognised, but also stipulated in Chinese law (Zeng 1991; NPC, 1996; IOSC, 2006;
Chinese Government, 2004). Traditionally, it has been common for adult children to live
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with their aged parents in rural areas. This has now been challenged by the transformation
of rural communities (Goldstein & Ku 1993; Yan 2003). Today, middle-aged couples do
not want to live with their elderly parents. Generally speaking, like other rural communities
in China, the living arrangements of the elderly in Liujiahui can be classified into three
types: living by themselves (danguo/ alone), living with a married son or daughter (gen
erzi guo/gen guini guo) and living „by turns (rotating between son‟s/daughter‟s
residences)‟ which means that the elderly rotate eating and sleeping at their married
son‟s/daughter‟s home (Goldstein & Ku 1993; Yan 2003). The „by turns‟ living
arrangement requires the elderly to have at least two sons. The elderly who have
functional limitations and cannot look after themselves have to have the support of their
adult children both physically and economically. These three types of living arrangements
are traditional and often represent a passive choice by the elderly. Today young couples in
my home village actively move out of the family home to look for paid jobs in urban
areas. Their middle-aged parents then have to live by themselves in the village and they
often have to provide assistance to the young couple. The form of this assistance is
various and often includes free childcare and even the provision of groceries such as rice
and flour. The latter two types of arrangement mean the parents often have to follow a
married son or daughter to live with the children‟s nuclear families. This results in the
elderly not only being powerless and submissive, but also being in a vulnerable dependent
position. As Yan (2003) and I have argued, many of the rural elderly don‟t like their
present living arrangement.
Based on my fieldwork, five of 18 elderly persons I interviewed on the issue of living
arrangements live by themselves. Three live „by turns‟, and ten live with their adult
children‟s family. All of my seven middle aged interviewees live with their adult children
because they have to help their children do free house-work and provide free food and
child care for the adult children who work as migrants. Three of my five younger
interviewees live by themselves because they work in the provincial city, which is far
from the village, and it is not realistic for them to live with their middle-aged parents. The
rest of my five young interviewees live with their middle-aged parents because they work
in towns near the village. All my young interviewees work in a city or town as migrants.
They are not traditional Chinese nongmin (rural residents/farmers). However, in answer to
the question – Are you willing to live with your elderly parents? – The majority of the
middle-aged interviewees are not willing to do this although many of them live with their
elderly parents. This indicates that adult children live together with elderly parents despite
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being unwilling. In this situation, the elderly could easily find themselves in a vulnerable
position.
The following case illustrates the vulnerable situation of the elderly in Liujiahui who
live with their adult children. An elderly widow had lived with her daughter‟s family
since her daughter was married. She helped her daughter with farming and housework
until she suffered a stroke in 2007. When I arrived in Liujiahui to undertake my fieldwork
in December 2008, she had become the major topic of the villagers‟ talk. Many villagers
predicted that she would die in a few days because her daughter didn‟t look after her.
They believed that her daughter had not honoured her filial responsibilities since her
mother suffered from a serious stroke a year earlier. Her daughter did not ask a doctor to
help her mother (in Liujiahui a doctor normally needs to visit a patient‟s home if villagers
suffer from a serious illness such as a stroke). The doctor was not asked to visit even
though the daughter‟s house is close to the clinic. (It is only 20 metres away). The elderly
woman had to lie down on the bed and couldn‟t look after herself. The daughter only gave
her one small bowl of soup for her three meals. She sometimes had to cry out loudly „I am
hungry and please give me food‟. Sometimes her neighbours fed her and changed her
nappy for her. Her neighbours blamed her daughter saying „your mother is hungry and in
a painful state. You should take care of her. Basically you should change her nappy to
keep her body clean and have enough food for her‟. The daughter neglected all the advice
and ignored the comment. The elderly woman got worse and worse. She died a few days
later.
The question arises from the above-mentioned case: Who will take responsibility for
elderly citizens with the transformation of China‟s rural communities if adult children do
not take responsibility for supporting the elderly and governments are not caring for
them?
The following case illustrates the vulnerable situation of a „by turns‟ living
arrangement in Liujiahui. An elderly widower, aged 75 has four sons. He has had to live
in a „by turns‟ arrangement after his wife died because he is too frail to farm and do
housework or even take care of himself. He had been a powerful parent in his extended
family before he was 60 years old. He was a carpenter and this is a skilful occupation in
rural areas. Undoubtedly, the main income for his family came from his work. At that
time he not only built new houses for every son, but also paid for each son‟s wedding and
other marriage related costs. It was said that he still had a lump of savings after that and
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so each son‟s nuclear family had a close relationship with him and his wife. This lasted
even after his sons separated from their original family. He always supported his son‟s
families financially and helped them to farm. Members of his sons‟ nuclear families often
visited him and afforded him dignity. However, he told me that they seldom visited him
after his wife suffered from a stroke and became bedridden. He had to look after his wife
and couldn‟t do any paid work. He had been in financial trouble since then although every
son was required to support him with 200 yuan annually according to his family‟s
contract (it is a local custom that a group of highly reputed elderly members of a clan
make a decision called a family contract setting out how much each son needs to pay to
their parents according to the situation of their parents such as their income and health
after the sons have separated from their original family). The adoption of a family
contract is not compulsory, but when the conditions of the contract are not met villagers
often blame sons on moral grounds. This is common when a clan contract is not followed
or carried out. His wife died after being bedridden for two years and it was then he was
required to live in a „by turns‟ arrangement. He told me that he liked to live at his
youngest son‟s home because his youngest daughter-in-law respected him and looked
after him while his other daughter-in-laws didn‟t speak to him and even didn‟t allow him
to eat in the dining room. They insisted that he would eat in his bedroom. Sometimes he
was hungry because he was provided with insufficient food. He told me that he had no
choice, even though he was treated without dignity by two daughter-in-laws. He cried and
said that he would have become well if he had had enough savings. He couldn‟t believe
that he had contributed significantly to his sons‟ families, but he had to live like a beggar.
It is common for the elderly who live in a „by turns‟ arrangement to be denied a
social life because a daughter-in-law doesn‟t like people to visit the elderly person in
her/his bedroom when the room is without furniture and decoration compared to her
comfortable bedroom.
The elderly man had to go to live in another son‟s home taking his basic necessities
such as clothes after his living arrangement period was over in one son‟s house. When I
visited him in his bedroom in early 2008, he stayed in bed with a quilt to keep his body
warm because it was cold (the outside temperature was -100C) and the heating radiator
was cool. There was only one single bed in his bedroom. The temperature was about 20 C
in his bedroom. Compared to his bedroom, his son and daughter-in-law‟s bedroom looks
fashionable according to the local standard. There was fashionable furniture and a hot
heating radiator there. A middle-aged villager, one of my interviewees, told me that the
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son‟s family was one of the richer families in the village, but his father‟s living standard
was below average for the village. He could possibly be living better if he had only one
son or a daughter.
Faced with the hard living conditions often experienced in villagers‟ later life many
middle-aged and younger villagers support the “one child policy”. The old traditional way
of thinking such as „more children, more happiness (duo zi, duo fu)‟ has been challenged
by the transformation of rural communities, which can be reflected in Table 4.1. The
villagers believe that it does not matter whether children are daughters or sons, as long as
they fulfil their obligation of filial piety and the parents are happy in their later life. In
answer to the question in my interview - How many children would you like to have? Four of five younger interviewees replied that one child is enough. In fact, only one of the
four young married interviewees has two children while the rest had only one child. It is
very hard to conclude that this situation is purely a result of family planning. It seems that
the younger generation is willingly having less than two children. This differs from the
attitude of members of their parent‟s generation. In other words, rural residents were
forced to follow the one child policy before 1990s, but during the 2000s they have wanted
to follow this policy.
Table 4.1 Family planning among villagers in Liujiahui
Interviewed groups

Married

Average children per family

Elderly

18/18

3

Middle-aged

6/7

2.17

Younger residents

4/5

1.5

Living Conditions: Who Should Provide Basic Living Conditions for
the Rural Elderly?
Many Chinese media reports in newspapers and on television and radio maintain that the
living conditions of the Chinese farmers, particularly the rural elderly, have been
improving and that rural citizens are satisfied with their present living conditions. These
arguments are often based on „official surveys‟. For example, China Daily (19 November
2002) reported that „survey tells basic conditions of senior citizens‟. The paper goes on to
argue that „in rural areas 45 per cent of pensioners are satisfied with their lives, 44.8 per
cent think that they are good‟. China View (19 December 2003) has reported that „China:
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elderly enjoy higher living standards: survey‟ and that „according to a survey of the status
of Chinese urban and rural elderly people, they have enjoyed higher living standards in
the past 10 years‟. On the other hand, in order to praise the care of the Chinese
government for the rural poor and elderly and to encourage Chinese traditional culture
including filial piety, Xinhua (3 December 2006) reports that „poor rural elderly deserve
attention‟. The newspaper provides pictures in which „1,000 poor elderly in Chongqing
received quilts and allowances in January 21, 2005 for the traditional Chinese New Year‟.
Another picture depicts „a child giving some coins to an elderly woman in a street in
Nanjing, Jiangsu Province‟. It is not hard to infer from the report and photographs that
some rural elderly have a hard life. Many do not even have basic living items like quilts
for sleeping in winter. The report and photos demonstrate that the real living standard of
China‟s rural elderly is not as good as depicted in much of the media and by government
sources. This is consistent with what I found in my fieldwork.
It is widely recognised that living conditions in rural China have been improving at
least to some degree in recent times, but some elderly have not seen any improvement.
Their lives have often worsened after they are over 60 and they have lost their ability to
work. The majority of the rural elderly in villages can tell their own story and it is often a
story of day-to-day hardship and poverty.
There are no indoor flushing toilets or running water and bathrooms and there is no
central heating in Liujiahui, which is a big issue for the daily life of the majority of
villagers and the village elderly in particular. They are quite often bedridden after they
suffer from a stroke, arthritis, and other joint and muscle problems. An elderly woman,
aged 75, lived with her husband, aged 78, and their bachelor son who is disabled with an
intelligence problem. She had suffered from serious arthritis for more than eight years. In
the initial years she could look after herself and do housework slowly such as cooking and
washing although she felt pain in her legs and knees. In recent years she could not do
basic housework nor look after herself. She had to stay in bed so that her daily life had run
into trouble. For example, in the busy seasons such as summer and autumn sometimes she
didn‟t wash her face and hands daily because her husband and her son had to farm and
could not help her to maintain her basic daily life. The worst embarrassment was that she
could not go to the toilet without help so that she had to do it in bed and sometimes got
her trousers wet when she could not hold on. There was a bad smell when I sat down on
her bed. I also saw her deformed legs and knees. Nevertheless, because she got help from
her husband and son she was better off compared to those living by themselves. She
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never went to hospital and died due to a sudden brain haemorrhage in 2009. I was told
about this in a telephone call after I came back to Australia.
Heating is a major issue for the elderly in Luijiahui. It is critical and yet dangerous for
the villagers to burn raw coal in their bedroom for warmth in the winter season. The
villagers in Liujiahui call the raw coal the „killer‟. The majority of households in the
village have to burn the raw coal for heating and cooking in winter so that some families
are usually poisoned by coal-burning fluorine during the night every year. Some villagers
are killed and some are brain damaged and some lose their ability to control themselves
physically and mentally, which in turn exacerbates their poverty. This situation is
common in the majority of rural areas of Hebei Province where raw coal is used as fuel
for bedroom heating in the winter season. There are crowds of patients poisoned by coalburning fluorine in the hospitals of Pingshan County every winter season and special
machines have had to be purchased to treat the poisoned patients. The machines are
expensive. This is what a local doctor told me when I looked after my father in the county
hospital. At least one accident happens every winter in Liujiahui which involves
villager(s) killed or permanently disabled by coal-burning fluorine poisoning in their
bedroom. The majority of the victims are elderly, disabled and children. The worst
tragedy was when two young cousins aged 12 and 10 were killed by the coal gas on the
eve of Chinese New Year a few years ago. During my fieldwork from January to
February 2008 there were two bachelor men aged 48 and 49 and one elderly widow who
died in the winter due to coal-burning fluorine poisoning.
I was told another tragic story. A widow, aged 81 lived by herself. She had three sons.
One was a stepson and died a few years ago. Another suffered a mental disorder and died
in 2007. It was expected that the remaining son should take his responsibility to support
her seriously. Her daughter-in-law has not followed the values of filialness that would
allow her mother-in-law to live with her nuclear family. The elderly woman had to live
alone. In the winter of 2007-2008 it was very cold and she died of coal gas poisoning just
before the Chinese New Year (early February 2008). Nobody knew she had died until her
step-grandson visited her room some time later.
In the current economic situation the majority of villagers in Liujiahui couldn‟t afford
to install a central heating system and they still burn raw coal to keep their rooms warm.
Only three of 18 elderly people have a radiator to heat their bedroom. The dangerous
heating situation has not changed in the village although in 2009 the central government
107

launched a project to eliminate the risks from coal-burning fluorine poisoning in rural
areas (Xinhua, 7 April 2009).
Given the risks associated with burning coal in winter, it is safer for the majority of
the elderly in the village to not bathe from autumn to spring. This is nearly seven months
(October to April). When questioned over - How often do you have a bath? - The majority
of elderly I interviewed had not had a bath for over two months.

Vulnerable Social Status: A Lack of Protection for the Elderly
Not surprisingly, the living arrangement for the elderly in Liujiahui has become a
contentious issue. At the same time, it is worthwhile paying attention not only to the basic
material needs of elderly residents‟ lives, but also to the inner world of the elderly. In
other words, the way the elderly are treated, their day-to-day needs, feelings and status is
important when considering the wellbeing of China‟s rural elderly. As I have argued in
chapter 2, Chinese traditional culture including filial piety and respect for the elderly has
been challenged by the socioeconomic transformation that began under the Deng
Xiaoping government in the early 1980s. Compared to the time before „reform and
opening–up‟, the social status of the rural elderly in Liujiahui has fallen. The economic
means of many of the elderly has declined and their status has also been reduced.
Generally, the older an elderly person is the more likely they will be described as useless
by both their family and the wider community and it is then more likely the elderly person
will be abused by adult children and by service people and policymakers. This is
happening even though the „Law of the PRC on Protection of the Rights and Interests of
the Elderly‟ stipulates that family members have primary responsibility for providing
support for elderly family members, including providing food, housing and medical
expenses, and that the whole Chinese nation should keep their excellent custom of
supporting and respecting the elderly (NPC, 1996; IOSC, 2006).
There are a significant number of rural elderly who are not treated properly in terms
of the provision of food, housing, clothing and pocket money, but this is not the end of the
matter. Some are even abused physically and/or verbally. Members of the younger
generation, the public and family members openly look down on the elderly. When asked:
Have you experienced abuse from your adult children or service people physically or
verbally and how often? - 7 out of 18 elderly people were abused by their adult children
physically or verbally and two out of the seven were often abused by their daughter-in108

law verbally when living in a „by turns‟ arrangement. One out of the seven was often
abused by her bachelor son physically and verbally. Two out of the seven were abused
verbally by their daughter-in-laws when they were living alone (danguo). One out of the
seven was abused verbally by her married son and one was abused physically or verbally
by his son and daughter-in-law. All the elderly I interviewed were abused by cadres or
service people such as bank tellers, nurses and receptionists, at least to some extent as
shown in Table 4.2.
The following case illustrates the vulnerable social status situation of the elderly in
Liujiahui in relation to service personnel.
An elderly woman, aged 65, walked to the Yangxiye branch of the Rural Credit
Cooperative (nong cun xin yong he zuo she), about 2.5 kilometres away from her house to
withdraw money in December 2007. It was cold. There is only one bank branch for eight
or nine administrative villages (there is an average of about 5 kilometres for villagers to
travel for bank service). There were no customers in the bank branch except the elderly
woman that day. There were two young female bank tellers who were chatting. They kept
chatting when they saw the elderly woman waiting for service and they deliberately
neglected her. The elderly woman had to wait for over one hour in the cold bank office.
She said she suffered from a cold as a result. During the time she waited she asked the
tellers for service, but one of the tellers yelled at her: Why are you shouting? You are a
„lao bu si de dongxi‟ (old good for nothing/waste of space). The teller did this in an
insulting manner. As Table 4.2 shows, ten of the 18 elderly I interviewed were abused
verbally by bank tellers in the only bank branch provided to the community by the
government. There is neither an ATM in the countryside or EFTPOS machines accessible
in shops or rural markets where only cash is accepted. It means that over half the elderly
have had to accept the abusive service of the local bank staff.
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Table 4.2 A change in the social status of the rural elderly in Liujiahui
Elderly

Abused Married/

interviewees

bachelor

Daughter-

Both

Cadres/

in-law

of

Officials

them

son
No.1 male

Yes

No.2 male

Yes

No.1 female

Yes

No.2 female

Yes

Service people

Cadres, v

Bank teller,v

Cadres,v
Cadres, v
Yes, v

Receptionist,v

(often)
No.3 male

Yes

Receptionist,v

No.3 female

Yes

Receptionist,v

No.4 male

Yes

Yes, v

Receptionist,v

(often)
No.5 male

Yes

Yes, v

Yes, pv

Yes,

Bank teller,v

pv
No.4 female

Yes

Cadres, v

No.6 male

Yes

Nurse, v

No.7 male

Yes

Bank teller,v

No.5 female

Yes

Bank teller, v
& Nurse, v

No.6 female

Yes

Yes, pv

Cadres, v

(often)

Bank teller,
v& Nurse, v

No.7 female

Yes

Receptionist,v

No.8 male

Yes

No.8 female

Yes

Bank teller,v

No.9 female

Yes

Bank, teller

Yes, v

Bank teller,v

v& Nurse, v
No.10 female
Total: 18

Yes

Yes, v

Yes, v

100%

11%

27%
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Bank teller,v
6%

27%

78%

Note: verbally = v, physically = p, physically and verbally = pv.

It is widely documented that rural residents in general and the rural elderly in
particular are recognized as second-class citizens not only by some government or
institution staff but also by some urban citizens. They do not dare speak out even when
they are treated as second-class citizens. Their social status has changed from „the active
builder of a new world‟ in the process of the foundation of New China (Hinton 1966: 609)
and master of New China in Mao‟s era to second class citizens in the process of „reform
and opening‟ (Jethani 2005; Gao 2008). Not only are individual elderly rural citizens
treated improperly by some service people, but also by whole communities. And, as I
have discussed in Chapter 3, the rural elderly are also treated unfairly by discriminatory
policies in relation to social welfare and public provision. As in the case of creative
centres and institutions for the elderly, there are a great number of creative centres and
institutions for the elderly called „homes for the elderly (lao nian zhi jia)‟ in urban
communities. These lao nian zhi jia belong to local governments and represent the
interests of the elderly. However, there is not an agent or a government organization in
rural areas that represents the interests of the rural elderly and services them. This is partly
the reason why the social status of the rural elderly has been decreasing.

Health Status: Where Is the Reform of Rural Health and Medical Care
Going?
The average health status of Chinese people in general and rural people in particular,
improved during the period between the 1950s and the 1970s. The improvement came
with the implementation of the RCMS and „barefoot doctors‟. However, with the collapse
of the RCMS in the 1980s, the health care and medical situation in rural China
deteriorated. In spite of often citing surveys that paint a rosy picture of improved rural
life, People’s Daily has revealed that the top social problem for ordinary Chinese is
„difficult and costly medical care‟. The paper reports that this finding is in accord with a
survey conducted by a research institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS) and a university expert in China in 2006 (People’s Daily Online, 27 December
2006). The most concerning event for the rural elderly is illness (Jia 1988). This situation
persists even though the NRCMS has been adopted and improved since the mid-2000s
and a new rural pension and rural minimum livelihood allowance scheme have been put
in place in rural areas in a bid to guarantee the basic livelihood of elderly people (Hu
2007; Wen 2007). I was told that the „old three big mountains of feudalism, bureaucrat111

capitalism, and imperialism (san zuo da shan)‟ pressing on the head of the Chinese people
had been overthrown with the founding of New China under the leadership of Mao
Zedong, but that „new three big mountains‟ which are housing, seeing a doctor and
hospitalisation, and schooling are now pressing on the backs of the ordinary people.
In my fieldwork, in answer to the question: What is the most difficult problem that
you have encountered as an elderly person? - Fifteen of my 18 elderly interviewees
recognised no financial capacity for treating illness as the most difficult matter. Only 3 of
them did not recognize it as the most difficult matter. Two of these three are retired
official teachers with medical insurance provided by the government and the third is a
businessman. When asked: How do you respond to sicknesses and other medical
conditions that you cannot afford to treat? - The majority of the interviewees replied that
they did not know what they should do except to wait to die while some of them have
chosen suicide. Only three of them thought that they could possibly borrow money.
There was a village-owned clinic called the village health post with a barefoot doctor
and pharmacist in Liujiahui under the RCMS during Mao‟s era. Like other rural
collectively owned clinics in China, every villager enjoyed free treatment and medicine at
that time. The clinic was available for 24 hours every day and villagers could directly
knock on the door of the clinic to seek help even at midnight if a member of their family,
particularly a child or an elderly person, had an emergency such as a high fever and
vomiting. The pharmacist or barefoot doctor slept at the clinic although the clinic could
only provide basic health and medical services such as an injection or a very small
operation. When I was a child I played with other children in the front yard of the clinic
every night around 6pm - 9pm in the winter because there was no television or
playgrounds until I was 14 years old. I also remember that the barefoot doctor did a small
operation for me in a very simple way when my left arm had a pustule. I would have had
to go to the county-level hospital and the cost would be at least 500 yuan (the poverty line
in China was 680 yuan in 2006) if it happened to me in the FFS of the Deng era (Xinhua,
24 August 2006).
Currently in Liujiahui there are three small private clinics where there is basic
medicine on the shelf such as flu and cough medicine, antibiotics, and heart and blood
pressure medication. There is still not any basic technical equipment such as a blood
testing machine and an eye-testing instrument although the Chinese government promised
to support grassroots-level health facilities in the three year plan 2009-2011 and the
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Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2011-2015 (Xinhua, 7 April 2009; NPC, 2011). The three doctors
at the private clinics are not graduates from authorised or public medical schools; colleges
or universities although they have taken part in paid training programs in past years and
have gained certificates. A free training programme for village doctors has been put
forward and financed by the government but has not yet gone into practice in Pinshan
County although the government proposed in 2009 that millions of rural doctors should
be trained in the health reform plan for 2009-2011 (Xinhua, 7 April 2009). Many of the
elderly in Liujiahui cannot afford their medical costs and have to forego medical care or
treatment. The following is a horrible story that happened in Liujiahui in 2007.
An elderly woman, aged 70, committed suicide in 2007. She had suffered from
cataracts for a few years, which is a common disease among China‟s rural elderly (Li &
Tracy 1999). Her husband had suffered from the consequences of a stroke for over a year.
Both of them had to stay at home lonely because members of their son‟s family had to
work and farm every day. Their son and grandson had to work as rural-to-city migrants
and their daughter-in-law had to look after their farmland in order to survive and increase
the family income. The elderly woman was very sad with her cataract affliction due to not
only the affliction going uncured owing to a lack of money, she was also neglecting
herself. One day she asked her husband whether she should drink DDVP (Dichlorvos) in
order to die. The husband replied that you should do it in order to end your miserable life
and to alleviate the burden on the children (the majority of households in the village keep
DDVP in their bedroom to kill bugs in the summer although it is dangerous for human
beings. A few accidents caused by DDVP had happened in Liujiahui). In this context she
did not hesitate to drink DDVP and her husband was too scared to do anything until his
daughter-in-law came back from her farming. However, it was too late to call an
ambulance. The elderly woman was dead.
If elderly people in Liujiahui are able to work, then they can enjoy food, clothing and
shelter. However once they lose their ability to work they rely on their families for
support and usually feel guilty about placing this responsibility onto their family. The
majority of the elderly interviewed claim that they are useless and a heavy burden on their
adult children. The situation is reflected in Chinese proverb that states that there is no
filial piety required of a son if parents suffer from re-curing disease (jiu bing chuang qian
wu xiao zi). Sixteen of 18 interviewed elderly people in my fieldwork have claimed that
they have suffered from serious disease or chronic diseases (serious diseases include
cancer, stroke, heart attack and diabetes. Chronic diseases include high blood pressure,
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heart disease, cataracts, arthritis, asthma, and respiratory problems). However, nobody
among them has seen a doctor regularly for their illness. When asked: Would you like to
see a doctor if medication was free? - All the interviewees replied that they would like to
see a doctor and to have regular medication. This reply again indicates that China‟s rural
elderly face serious problems if they suffer from disease.
From my interviews with the elderly, the most threatening challenge for them is their
health status. This is because the ordinary family in Liujiahui cannot afford the cost of
over 10,000 yuan when an elderly person suffers fatal and serious diseases such as cancer
and diabetes, although the NRCMS has been implemented in Liujiahui since 2007. It
decrees that 50% of the total cost of hospital care can be rebated, but service fees such as
an injection and diagnostic tests and rent for equipment fees such as a bed and bedside
extras are not included. These roughly equal the cost of hospital care. Over half the
elderly I interviewed do not know how to access benefits from the NRCMS and none of
them went to hospital to attempt to access the benefits available to them. Only one of
them went to hospital and this was because he does not have an agricultural hukou
(nongcun hukou) but a city hukou (chengshi hukou) and so enjoys medical insurance
provided by the government. Normally, the elderly who are without a cash income cannot
afford to see a doctor to have regular health examinations. It is common for the elderly to
take medicines if they do not feel well such as having a fever, cough or flu (patients do
not need prescriptions to buy medicine in rural China even in a city medicine shop). This
is one of the reasons why illegal and fake medicines can get into the rural market. Some
poor villagers cannot even afford to buy general medicines such as cough medicine and
painkillers. The following illustrates a real health care situation with respect to the elderly
in Liujiahui.
An elderly woman, aged 64, had suffered from serious arthritis for a few years. She
had painfully swollen knees and deformed legs. Her affliction was especial bad during the
winter time. Sometimes she could not sleep at night due to the pain, but she did not take
medicine or pain killers because she could not afford them. This situation is consistent
with a survey report in which 67% of the surveyed rural elderly could not afford to buy
medicine if they suffered even common diseases such as the flu and/or a cough, while
86% of them would not go to hospital if they suffered serious diseases such as cancer or a
heart attack (Xinhua, 3 December 2006).
It is obviously clear that the health status of elderly people in rural China has faced
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challenges. In Liujiahui there are four common diseases: respiratory disease, arthritis,
cataracts, and heart and vascular diseases I was told. This is roughly consistent with what
Li and Tracy (1999), Pang, de Brauw and Rozelle (2004) have found in their studies. The
majority of the elderly interviewees suffered from diseases and did not see doctors
regularly for surgery or for medication except when strokes or heart attacks were acute.
The majority of them had not gone to a city level hospital for their medical care. In other
words, they have not received any advice from any professional doctor. The majority of
the elderly have not known why they have suffered from these diseases or how to reduce
the risk and prevent their illnesses. They also do not think that toothache is a disease. It is
well known in rural areas that toothache is not a disease, but it might cause one‟s death if
it happens (ya tong bu shi bing, tong qi lai yao ren de ming). Villagers over 50 years old
in Liujiahui have not got a daily tooth-brushing habit and the majority of them have no
toothbrushes or toothpaste in their homes.
It is urgent for the Chinese government to put health education programs into practice
in rural areas, even though the health reform plan of 2009 proposed improving disease
prevention and control through health education nationwide (Xinhua, 7 April 2009) there
is much ignorance. For example, the villagers think that a toothache will be over soon and
people cannot die of tooth problems although they may have to suffer terrible pain. This is
quite possibly the reason why the majority of the rural elderly do not believe that seeing a
dentist is very important. Furthermore, there is no dental clinic in many villages or even a
township level clinic. There is no public dental clinic in Pingshan County. There are only
private dental clinics. Normally, villagers have to go to the ji (rural markets that are held
weekly or fortnightly or monthly) where an untrained and mobile dentist provides basic
services such as pulling teeth out and fillings. Basic tools are used that are different from
the automatic or electrical equipment used in public city hospitals. These dental clinics
located in China‟s rural areas or a mobile dentist operating in rural areas and markets
would not be recognized as a dental clinician. Compared to the cost of other diseases,
seeing a mobile dentist in a rural market is relatively cheap. Dentures normally cost 50
yuan, a filling 10 yuan, an extraction 10 yuan. Generally, many rural people over 50 years
old have to have dentures made from plastic that are relatively low cost. They need these
in order to eat food. Local water contains high levels of fluoride. There are no water
purifying systems in the village I was told. The teeth of the majority of villagers are a
yellow on the surface. For example, I did not know what a fluorided tooth was until I
entered university when a doctor told me that it was “fu ban ya (a fluorided tooth)”.
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My parent‟s generation (my father is aged 73 and my mother 67 and they have lived
in Liujiahui) are luckier than my grandparent‟s generation because the former, with
China‟s economic development, can afford dentures although they are low quality,
whereas the latter couldn't afford dentures after their teeth worsened with age. I can still
remember that there were few teeth in my grandparents‟ mouths when they were old and
that they had to chew their food for a long time.
The following case illustrates the vulnerable situation of elderly rural residents in
terms of the provision of health care. An elderly woman, aged 76, had suffered cataracts
for a number of years. She did not see a doctor for her eye problem, but her family could
afford medical care for her condition. She insisted that her eyes only couldn't see things
clearly which would not cause her death and so she would not place an economic burden
on her son. Furthermore, she was aged and would not live very long. It was therefore not
worthwhile for her family to spend money curing her cataracts. Her view is typical. It
represents the majority opinion among the elderly in Liujiahui. Undoubtedly, she would
see a doctor and have appropriate surgery if she did not need to pay.
Parents in rural areas have finished their rearing task and the task of their life cycle
when their adult children are married and have had their nuclear family. This is the view
based on Chinese traditional culture and custom. This means that they can go to heaven to
meet their ancestors without regret if they pass away. However, their children have
responsibility for passing on the family name to the next generation and so they must live
until they have had their families. In a relatively poor economic situation rural residents
have to choose the way to continue their family tree and this makes it hard to make a
social or moral judgment of members of China‟s rural community.
With the huge profits from selling drugs, illegal, unqualified and fake medicines have
entered rural areas through swindlers who pretend to be a group of doctors calling
themselves specialists in order to sell medicines and get huge profits from the ignorance
of rural residents. One of my interviewees told me his story.
An elderly man had suffered from serious arthritis for a number of years. His family
was very poor compared to his village fellows due to a family tragedy in which his elder
son (who had worked in Guangzhou as a rural-to-urban migrant) had disappeared in 2003
while his younger son had been disabled and bedridden since birth and died some years
ago. His wife suffers from a chronic disease. The elderly man did not see a doctor due to
his poor economic situation although he was sometimes very sick. In 2007 a group of
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people wearing professional clothing (a white coat symbolizes a doctor in China) and
calling themselves “specialists” stated that they were from the provincial capital city and
that they specialized in arthritis. They said they had brought special medicines, which are
effective in treating arthritis because the medicines are from their patents and they are not
available in shops or hospitals. The price of the medicine, which they sold, was 50 yuan
per single piece. The whole pack included 5 pieces. It means that villagers needed to pay
250 yuan per pack. Actually, the retail price of the similar medicine is around 3 yuan per
whole pack in hospitals and pharmacies. In other words, these “specialists” visiting the
village could get around an 8300 percent profit per pack. The elderly man borrowed
money from other people in his village to buy the medicine and found that it was fake
medicine and didn‟t relieve or cure his arthritis. The false specialists had gone when the
truth came out. They only stayed for a few hours and then said they were busy with their
official hospital work and that they had met their aim of serving rural people.
This elderly man is not the only person to be deceived in the village. His was not a
unique deception case in Liujiahui. The swindlers always change the way they deceive
rural residents so that villagers don‟t easily recognize their approach. Many of the elderly
suffer from arthritis and have been easily deceived partly because they trust professional
doctors especially those from provincial level hospitals and partly because it is cheaper to
see a mobile specialist compared to going to a county or city level hospital where they
need to pay at least 300 yuan to see a specialist plus the cost of their transport and other
expenses. This is the reason why illegal medicine has entered rural areas and why
swindlers can deceive rural residents. Undoubtedly, the economic interests and health of
rural residents in general and the rural elderly in particular, have been threatened by
illegal medicines and illegal or unlicensed doctors. The government‟s absence in this
context has played its part in the deception that takes place in rural areas.

Economic Status: the Dilemma of Rural Policies
It is widely reported that the level and amount of consumption in China has significantly
increased since the end of the 1970s. According to the official 2009-2010 annual global
report from the World Luxury Association (WLA), China‟s total consumption of luxury
goods in 2009 reached US$9.4 billion accounting for 27.5% of the total luxury
consumption worldwide. China has replaced the US to become the world‟s second largest
luxury goods consumer, only second to Japan (WLA, 2009). On the other hand, for the
majority of rural elderly, the amount of their consumption (not including their basic
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meals) is approximately zero (Zhang et al. 2008). With the global financial crisis the
Chinese government proposed a series of beneficial policies on rural residents and
promised a doubling of the income of rural residents in 12 years (CCCPCSC, 2008). This
would encourage rural consumption and would promote domestic demand and stimulate
the rural market. However, in practice rural residents (who account for over half the
population) don't have money for increasing consumption and certainly not for the
consumption of luxury items (Xinhua, 18 March 2009).
According to the current poverty line for rural residents in China in 2008 the annual
per capita income poverty line was set at an amount less than 786 yuan (Xinhua, 27
December 2008). The majority of the elderly in Liujiahui who have lost their ability to
labour and have suffered from serious diseases would be unlikely to have an income of
786 yuan and some of them even have no income. For example, seven out of 18 elderly
people I interviewed have no cash income. Five of them are female and two suffered from
serious illness. In fact, nearly half of the elderly could not buy their own basic living
items. They relied on their children to support them. The average per capita net income of
the elderly in Liujiahui is around 650 yuan. It is below the poverty line. In answer to the
question in the interview: How often do you buy basic living items such as clothes,
shampoo, toothpaste etc.? - Only three of the elderly purchased these items and 15 of
them had never bought shampoo and toothpaste. Most the elderly think that it is enough if
they have food for eating and clothing for warmth. What this situation means is that it is
not possible to encourage a significant increase in the consumption of Chinese farmers in
order to stimulate the development of the national economy without reforming the social
welfare system for rural residents. In addition to the lack of cash needed for increased
consumption by the elderly coupled with the prevalent view that food and clothing are
enough for the elderly, middle-aged villagers are all too aware that the situation of today‟s
elderly may be their situation tomorrow. They have plenty of incentive to save rather than
consume.
The issue farmland being used to secure the basic livelihood of the elderly raises
several problems. The key issue is the question of how the land is used. Clearly, with
advancing age many rural elderly cease to be efficient farmers. Furthermore, the rural
minimum livelihood allowance is very limited and only the oldest of the old receive a
pension allowance under the most recent pension scheme. The cash income of the village
elderly comes mostly from their adult children‟s support. This is consistent with the
findings of a number of researchers (Li & Tracy, 1999; Goldstein & Ku, 1993). The
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following story is from one of my interviewees.
An elderly widower, aged 76, has two sons and three daughters. His wife died of
cancer in 2006. His two sons have not financially supported him and he had to do casual
paid work at a construction site to survive. His original family separated into three nuclear
families in the 1990s. He, however, had to stop doing a casual work in the construction
industry in 2007. This was due to his poor health. He did not like spending his savings
except for necessities such as relief for flu or physical pain. He wore his trousers with two
patches when I visited his home. His three daughters sometimes provided him with gifts
of clothing or meat and with some physical help such as cooking and washing. However,
he had to be satisfied with the minimal role played by his two sons at least he had to be
satisfied in public in order to sustain his family‟s face although they did not provide
adequate financial support. He would also not take his two sons to court because this
would damage his family‟s face. Like most of his fellow elderly, he could not regularly
buy meat and eggs even at the time of traditional festivals when such purchases provide
not only luxuries, but also economic status (see Table 4.3).
My table below shows that the elderly cannot afford eggs and meat weekly while only
one of them was able to eat 0.5kg meat and two of them could consume 0.5 kg eggs
fortnightly. It indicates that the majority of elderly in the village do not have enough
money to consume eggs and meat and the percentage share of animal and dairy products
in the daily diet of the elderly is still very low. In other words, meat and dairy products
have never been a part of their daily meal for the majority of the rural elderly. This
suggests that there are high rates of undernourishment among these elderly people (Parka
& Wang 2001). This could put elderly rural people at even higher risk of ill health, which
in turn means that they would require more health care.
Table 4.3 Consumption of meat and eggs among the elderly in Liujiahui
Weight (KG) Period:

Rate of meat consumption Rate egg consumption

0.25

Weekly

0/18

0/18

0.5

Fortnightly 1/18

2/18

0.5-1

Monthly

2/18

3/18

3 or over

Yearly

4/18

5/18
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My findings are consistent with a survey done by Yuhe Zhai. He conducted a selffunded survey of the living standard of the rural elderly. He surveyed 10401 elderly
people aged 60 and over in 72 administrative villages, 46 counties, and 31 provinces. The
survey reported an average income for an elderly person of 650 yuan annually. Eighty
five percent of the elderly he surveyed still toiled on their farm and 97% of them managed
household chores while 5% did not have three guaranteed meals each day. Ninety three
percent of them could not afford to buy new clothing annually, while 69% of them did not
have even one piece of clothing replaced during the space of a year (Xinhua, 3 Dec 2006).
It is quite clear that the income and living standard of many of China‟s village elderly
are below the international poverty line. They are also below the nutrition-based poverty
line of approximately 875 yuan (Gile et al. 2010). There is an urgent need to design and
adopt a nutrition-based rural poverty line directly linked to welfare provision. After all, it
is well known that having a reasonable meal including a certain quantity of meat and
dairy product is essential for basic health and it is a basic human right. It is not enough for
the Chinese government to say that the Communist Party has created a miracle where
China has successfully solved the problem of feeding 1.3 billion people (UNDP, 2008).

Conclusion
With the collapse of the commune system the majority of the elderly in Liujiahui were not
covered by any national social security system, although, a series of beneficial policies for
rural residents and a new rural social security scheme have been promulgated since Hu
Jintao and Wen Jiabao took office. Some of the village elderly rely on their own labour to
support themselves and some depend on their children for support and some have
suffered, particularly when illness and chronic health problems are involved. Based on my
fieldwork, the elderly are not inclined to seek health care when sick. My fieldwork
demonstrates that the living conditions and the social, health and economic status of the
rural elderly are currently at risk. Some have resorted to committing suicide due to their
poor health and their economic and social situation. The rural elderly are much more
likely than other rural residents to be bullied or abused physically or verbally by a
member of their family and/or by a member of the public such as service personnel and
public servants. My study shows that the living conditions and social, health and
economic status of China‟s rural elderly have deteriorated since the 1980s. It is obvious
that it is critical to secure the basic living standard of the rural elderly in the context of
socio-economic reform. In light of the living conditions and the current economic, social
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and health status of the rural elderly there is an urgent need for an effective system of
social security for this group of Chinese citizens. The Chinese government must provide
for the basic needs of the country‟s citizens regardless of their household registration that
decrees whether they are urban or rural citizens and regardless of legislation passed and
the propaganda used. It is not enough for governments to hide behind Chinese traditional
culture. There are only a small number of China‟s rural elderly who do not need to worry
about their basic needs, including when they can seek medical or dental assistance.
Answering the needs of the people must be a basic component of the harmonious society
proposed by the Chinese government (Hu 2007).

121

Chapter 5
Taxation and Social Security in Rural China

Introduction
Taxes provide one of the most important revenue sources for a government. Taxation
plays a pivotal role in social and economic development of a country and taxation and
social security provision, or its lack, are directly associated with the problems facing rural
elderly. In this chapter I will discuss China‟s taxation system in relation to the provision
of a social security system for the country‟s rural residents. I have classified China‟s
contemporary taxation history into three phases: rural taxation in Mao‟s era, rural taxation
in the Deng era, and rural taxation in the Hu-Wen era. I have then offered suggestions for
improving China‟s taxation system to achieve social fairness and justice, arguing that paid
work in both the urban and rural sectors should be taxable rather than tax-free. An
important point that I have stressed in this chapter is that in 2006 the agricultural tax was
removed from rural households, leaving them free from any direct agricultural taxation.

A Brief Literature Review
Interaction between China‟s taxation and social security has drawn attention from both
the research community and policy makers. The valuable work that has been done
includes theses by Bernstein and Lü (2000) who examined the excessive financial burden
placed on China‟s peasants, the mode of tax collection in rural China, and the impact of
taxation (formal and informal) on peasants‟ income and on deepening the poverty of rural
residents. They also discussed the necessity of establishing a fair rural taxation system. In
their follow-up research (2003) they elaborated on the point that there is taxation without
formal representation in rural China. They have highlighted the funds extracted from
peasants, informal tax burden placed on peasants and the resistance of the peasants.
Aubert et al. (2002) discussed the burden imposed on Chinese farmers by all levels of
government and their agencies by using available official data and evaluating the real
scope of the burden placed on farmers. They identified a gap in the peasants‟ burden
between the official data and the real level of taxation. They concluded that reforming
rural taxation should be combined with significant administrative reform.
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With regard to China‟s rural taxation reform Shen (2006) summarises the situation
township cadres encountered after rural taxation reform and demonstrates that there are a
number of issues to be addressed in rural China. Shen, however, addresses the difficulties
of township officials nationwide rather than the difficulties of peasants in the context of
rural taxation reform. For his part Li, L.C. (2006) explores the different actors in centrallocal politics in relation to China‟s rural tax reform. His observations are based on
archival research and interviews. He addresses the issue of excessive state extraction from
peasants and state-society relations in rural areas and argues that central and local actors
are active participants in reform decisions and implementation processes. Lin and Liu
(2007) examine the historical evolution of the taxation system in rural China and on-going
taxation reform sponsored by the central government. They note that the success of the
household responsibility system (HRS) that began in the early 1980s lasted only to the
second half of 1990s. Many agriculture-based provinces such as Anhui, Hebei, Henan and
Sichuan then witnessed economic stagnation in rural areas. At the same time, the peasants
faced an excessive tax burden. The actual tax burden placed on peasants reached more
than 30% of their incomes. This excessive tax and fees burden led to political tension
between rural people and local governments. Others have argued that rural tax reform has
helped to alleviate the burden on peasants, but they also recognize that it is hard to reduce
the heavy burden on farmers if coordinated institutional reforms are not in place.
Hussain (1994) argued that a useful combination between social security and taxes is
needed in China in order to develop social security schemes. Then, in 2003 Chen Xiwen,
Former Vice-Director of State Council Development Research Center and Director of the
Office of Central Rural Work Leading Group said in a press interview that he did not
support the idea that rural citizens should be totally exempt from agricultural tax. He
argued that every citizen in China should be responsible for contributing to national fiscal
revenue. This means that a total exemption from agricultural tax is inequitable as a matter
of principle (Chen 2003; Li, L.C. 2006). He suggested that it is necessary to design an
effective tax system specifically for the countryside instead of a simple exemption of
agriculture from direct taxation. Nevertheless, in 2006, direct government taxation of
agricultural households was abolished. For their part Bahl and Bird (2008) demonstrated
that different tax policies are pivotal for the development of a nation. In 2009 the Ministry
of Finance (MOF) released „Basic Situation of China's Personal Income Tax‟ in order to
increase taxpayer understanding of China's taxation system.
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Personal Income Tax and its Impact on the Chinese People
Taxation in general and the personal income tax in particular is not only an important
means for collecting national financial revenue, but is also a major tool to be used by
governments to control the economy (MOF, 2009). In many countries, especially
developed countries, personal income tax is recognized as a key tax category and has
become a major contributor to the nation‟s financial revenue. However, personal income
tax still only accounts for a small share of Chinese government revenue. For example, it
contributed only 4.7% of the total tax revenue in China, whereas it was 34.7% in the USA
and 24.6% on average in the OECD countries in 2009 (China-Briefing, 2010).
Nevertheless, the personal income tax system in China has undergone some gradual
development (MOF, 2009).
China was an agrarian economy for most of its recorded history and land taxes were
the major source of financial revenue for the imperial government. There was no personal
income tax until 1909 when the „Income Tax Regulations‟ were drafted by the
government of Qing Dynasty. By contrast, Britain already levied a tax on the taxable
income attained by individuals in 1799. The implementation of personal income tax in
China is 110 years behind Britain. After the founding of the People‟s Republic of China
in 1949, the central government tried to establish a new taxation system taking into
account taxation systems used in other countries. In 1950, the Chinese government
promulgated the „Key Points for National Taxation Implementation‟ in which the
personal income tax was mainly levied on salaries and interest on deposits. However,
these two taxes were not actually levied until 1978. Between 1978 and 1994, personal
income tax was levied on the income of foreign individuals who worked in China and
individual businessmen (geti hu) while the individual income adjustment tax was levied
on incomes of domestic residents. A new personal income tax law was promulgated and
implemented in 1994. This meant that a personal income tax system had been initiated.
Since then, China‟s taxation system has gradually targeted individual Chinese residents.
The tax levied on individual income significantly increased from 7.3 billion yuan in 1994
to 372.2 billion yuan in 2008. The proportion of revenue from personal income tax in
China's GDP increased from 0.15% in 1994 to 1.24% in 2008 and the proportion of
revenue from personal income tax in total tax revenue increased from 1.4% in 1994 to
6.4% 2008. The tax levied on individual income has become one of the main financial
sources of central and local governments in China (MOF, 2009).
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Taxation can be classified into three categories: a comprehensive taxation system, a
categorized tax system, and a compound tax system. The comprehensive tax system is
implemented to levy tax on an annual basis. The categorized tax system classifies the
various incomes of an individual into different categories. The different categories of
income will be levied based on different tax rates. The compound tax system is the
combination of a comprehensive tax system and categorized tax system. China adopts a
categorized tax system. China‟s individual income tax consists of eleven categories
including wages and awards. The majority of Chinese residents‟ individual taxation
belongs to this category. The income from production and business in family-owned
small enterprises does not belong to this category (MOF, 2009).
Based on the current „Personal Income Tax Law of the PRC‟, individual income tax is
levied based on „nine level income accumulation tax levy method‟ (NPC, 2007). The
starting levy point of the individual taxable income is 2,001 yuan monthly. Taxable
income mainly consists of wage, salary, allowances and subsidies etc. after deduction of a
national unified reduction of about 500 yuan for the „three insurances (san xian) and one
fund (yi jin)‟ - superannuation, medical insurance and unemployment insurance (three
insurances) as well as housing common accumulation fund (one fund) (MOF, 2009). In
other words, in China, taxable income (yuan) = gross income (yuan) – 500 yuan.
This system does not apply to rural residents because they are not wage earners and
do not pay san xian and yi jin at the moment. According to these regulations individuals
with monthly wages or salaries below 2,500 yuan are actually free from personal income
tax whereas individuals with monthly wages or salaries equalling 3,000 yuan, 5,000 yuan,
8,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan respectively are taxed on a monthly basis of around 20, 175,
535 and 825 yuan respectively. This accounts for 0.7%, 3.5%, 6.7% and 8.3% of salaries
or wages respectively, all of which are below 10% (MOF, 2009). According to statistics
from the NBSC (2009), annual per capita net income of urban households and rural
households was around 15,780 yuan and 4,761 yuan respectively in 2008. They are far
below the starting point for personal income tax to be levied. The starting point for
personal income tax is so high that the majority of Chinese residents do not pay personal
income tax. However, any employee or any Chinese resident with an annual income of
more than 120,001 yuan must declare a personal income tax report to the taxation office
directly from 2007 onward (The Economist, 2007; MOF, 2009). In 2008, there were 2.4
million Chinese residents with an annual income of more than 120,000 who declared their
income taxes directly to the taxation office and paid a total tax of 129.4 billion yuan,
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which is 35% of total tax on individual income in China in 2008 (MOF, 2009). However,
these people are only about 3% of total Chinese residents who have paid tax (MOF, 2009).
Clearly, China‟s personal income tax is significantly different from many countries,
especially developed countries. More than 94% of Chinese residents need not submit a tax
return at the end of the financial year (MOF, 2009). Nevertheless, the central government
approved an amendment to the individual income tax law in 2011. This taxation
amendment increases the monthly personal income tax exemption threshold from 2000
yuan to 3,500 yuan and took effect September 2011 (Xinhua, 30 June 2011). This means
that China‟s personal income taxpayers will decrease from 6 percent (84 million) of the
total population to 2 percent (26 million) (Xinhua, 30 June 2011).
Statistics of the MOF (2009) have showed that the average per capita monthly
consumption expenditure of Chinese urban residents in 2008 was 937 yuan. This is far
below the tax deduction threshold of 2,000 yuan monthly and the average monthly wage
of urban employees in services was 2,435 yuan, which is free from personal income tax
payment after the deduction of 2,501 yuan per month. In terms of the minimum wage
standard of different localities in China in 2008, as shown in Table 5.1, minimum
monthly wages are all far below the tax deduction threshold of 2,000 yuan monthly. If the
current tax deduction threshold is substantially increased high-income earners will benefit
most whereas the low and middle-income earners will have less benefit and vulnerable
groups will be harmed (Hua 2011; Jia & Liang 2011).
Table 5.1 Monthly minimum salary in a number of Chinese cities in 2008*
Cities

Monthly minimum salary income

Shenzhen

(yuan)
1000

Shanghai

960

Beijing,

800

Dalian
Xi‟an,

600

Zhengzhou
Shijiazhuang

750

* Taken from the MOF (2009).
Since personal income tax is a central means for funding income distribution
adjustments and tax revenues are mainly used to subsidize disadvantaged groups, a
relatively high tax deduction threshold significantly decreases tax payment receipts and
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hampers re-distribution of national funds. Furthermore, China‟s officials have estimated
that around 1.6 million „rich‟ people haven‟t declared their personal taxable incomes. The
widely reported number of those required to declare a taxable income is around 6-7
million people and could be much higher (The Economist, 2007). Those who have
declared are mostly wage-earners (MOF, 2009) because they have to declare
automatically in the context of their files already being in the tax authorities' records,
whereas few officials pay tax, even though many have big incomes from corruption
including shady dealings and rent-seeking (quanli xunzu) (The Economist, 2007).
Consequently, the subsidy granted by the government to low-income groups and public
services such as social insurance together with education and medical expenditure must
be affected. It is unlikely that an increase in the tax deduction threshold would bring
additional benefits to China‟s disadvantaged groups and low-income earners. One major
goal of taxation is to effectively redistribute income among residents to relieve the
difficulties of the poor. However, if over 94% of Chinese citizens are not individual
income tax payers, how can the Chinese government effectively adjust the distribution of
income among Chinese residents? One of the most important aspects of national taxation
that the Chinese government has so far ignored is the relatively widespread use of
individual income tax. This situation suggests a basis for designing future policies related
to equality, social development, social insurance and security, pricing and minimum wage
rates.

Taxation and Social Security
There are four main types of formal financing systems for social security: government
financing (usually tax-based), social insurance, private insurance and community
financing (Liu 2004). Currently social security provision in China is not related to
individual income tax, but is separately based on a compulsory levy of san xian and yi jin:
superannuation, medical insurance and unemployment insurance as well as a housing
common accumulation fund deducted from the wage and salary income of the majority of
Chinese workers. An employer is responsible for deducting tax on a monthly basis from a
salaried employee and making additional contributions to the employee‟s social security
account automatically (The Economist, 2007; MOF, 2009). However, according to the
statistics of the MOF, only a small proportion of the population pay xian xian and yi jin
and rural citizens who account for the largest proportion of total population only pay if
they are in the wage system if they are rural-to-urban migrant workers (MOF, 2009) and
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rural-urban migrants do NOT receive benefits through „three insurances and one fund‟.
Thus rural citizens are not entitled to social security benefits although they have
contributed a large portion of their income to the nation‟s revenue through formal,
informal and implicit taxes and fees from 1950s to 2005. Their urban counterparts, city
citizens, are entitled to social security benefits although they did not pay direct taxation
from 1950 to 1994 and even after 1994 the majority of city citizens still have not needed
to pay personal income tax based on the starting point for levying tax on individual
incomes.
Since the 1950s when the hukou system divided Chinese citizens into urban residents
and rural residents, national policies have favoured urban areas and urban citizens. In
addition to these urban-biased policies China‟s current taxation system has hampered the
development of a modern social security system. Without an effective taxation system
(from 1950 on) the government cannot establish an effective social security provision
system that covers every citizen and includes rural residents.
Rural residents have not been entitled to be covered by the social security scheme in
the same way urban citizens have been covered, even if they have paid san xian and yi jin.
It is a significant venture for both policy-makers and researchers to explore the question
of how to initiate a combination of social security provision, wage employment and
taxation for China‟s rural citizens.

Rural Taxation, the Contribution of Rural People and Rural Social
Security
Although rural residents are not current tax-payers, from the perspective of individual
income tax, or as direct agricultural tax-payers until 2006, they contributed a
disproportionate amount to the national coffers (Bernstein & Lü 2003:20). With the
founding of the PRC, the agricultural tax was continuously levied on peasants through a
mandatory grain procurement system in which peasants were required to sell most of their
agricultural output to the State at below market price. From a historical perspective, rural
taxation can also be classified into three periods: the Mao era or the collective/commune
period (1949-1983), the Deng era or reform era (1984-2002) and the Hu-Wen era/post-tax
and fee era (2003 onward).
China‟s rural taxation system consists of a formal tax, informal tax and implicit tax, as
shown in Figure 5.1. The formal tax consists of an agricultural tax and village and
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township or xiang levies and fees, which were established by law and regulations
(Bernstein & Lü 2000). The agricultural tax was formally introduced in the early 1950s
and based on agricultural production. This tax was fixed at 15.5% of normal grain yield
for several decades regardless of the growth of grain output (Lin & Liu 2007). However,
actual agricultural tax is only a small part of the real tax burden placed on rural people.
Village and township or xiang levies were used by the local governments in particular by
county and township/xiang governments for funding public services including the primary
and middle schools they govern, infrastructure construction, improving water supply,
public security, and personnel costs. Informal tax includes local informal fees and charges
as well as a number of illegal charges.
Implicit tax has been the largest proportion of the real tax burden placed on rural
people. The government levied implicit tax through the compulsory delivery of
agricultural products and the operation of a price scissors from the mid-1950s to 1990s,
especially in the state-planned economy period. The Chinese government extracted a
substantial financial income from rural China annually through the implicit tax during that
period (Bernstein & Lü 2003:36-37; Cheng 2006). The compulsory delivery of
agricultural products using administratively set quota prices that were much lower than
the market price amounted to a price scissors. This price scissors between industrial
products and agricultural products meant that the price of agricultural inputs was much
higher than market price; conversely, the price of agricultural outputs was much lower
than market price (Bernstein & Lü 2003: 36; Lin & Liu 2007). More specifically, the
price scissors is based on the following principles. The price of urban products (UP)
selling to rural China is higher than market price (MP) and the price of agricultural
products (AP) selling to urban China is lower than MP which created a price scissors,
Price scissors = (UP - MP) + (MP - AP). The State profited greatly from the use of a price
scissors for half a century and China‟s peasants made a great contribution to the country‟s
urbanisation and industrialisation though the majority of them suffered from poverty even
food shortages from the 1950s to 1980s. For example, China‟s rural citizens contributed
an accumulated fund of around 1,000 billion yuan through use of the price scissors from
1956 to 1980 (Chen & Chun 2004:96; Li, C.G 2010). The benefit rural people gained
from the arrangements in place during the 1950-80 period was that they had security of
services through the commune system and, this was particularly advantageous to elderly
rural residents.
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Tax in rural China
Formal tax

Implicit tax

Informal tax

Price scissors
Agricultural tax
Village and township

Collective

Labour

Local fees

or xiang levels

funds

services

and sanluan

Figure 5.1 Classification of tax in rural China

Rural Taxation and Rural Social Security Provision in Mao’s Era
The central administrative feature of Mao‟s period in rural areas was the establishment of
the people‟s commune system. The benefit rural residents received was the rural cooperation medical care and „five guarantees‟ relied on the collectives/the communes.
During Mao‟s era China remained an agricultural society and taxes in relation to farmland
were the major source of financial revenue for the government (Fei 2006). The collectives
(production teams) collected grain and then transported the grain to the commune grain
collection stations. This grain collection was based on mandatory grain quotas and sold at
the state-set price. The formal state agricultural tax actually took only 10-14% of grain
output in the 1950s. With increasing output the grain tax gradually dropped in the period
from the 1950s to the 1970s and the tax declined to about 4.5% by the end of the 1970s
(Bernstein & Lü 2003: 39; Lin & Liu 2007). Proposals to increase the tax were rejected
by the top leaders including Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai. Rural citizens were not
allowed to have an extra burden imposed on them. Mao (1956) was critical of Stalin‟s
excesses in exploiting peasants in his „On the Ten Major Relationships‟. He described this
over-extraction from the peasantry as „draining the pond to catch the fish (jie ze er yu)‟.
Clearly, formal agricultural tax in Mao‟s era was only a small part of the real tax
burden placed on rural people. It was an implicit tax that was a large proportion of the real
tax burden placed on rural people. In the period of the planned economy, especially under
the commune system, the Chinese government could control the resources of the rural
people through indirect tax or an implicit tax and the revenue raised was used to subsidise
urban areas and industrial sectors such as heavy and light industry. Implicit tax in the Mao
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era mainly resulted from the price scissors used to provide financial support for the rapid
development of industry and urban areas. Every sector was obliged to support the
development of the industrial sector at that time. The mass movement/campaign for
„melting steel and iron (dalian gangtie)‟ in 1958 is an example.
It has been estimated that the implicit tax through the price scissors was as high as
280 billion yuan between 1953 and 1978, accounting for 17 % of the total grain output in
the same period, which significantly exceeded the formal agricultural tax (90 billion yuan)
in the same period (Lin & Liu 2007). From the 1950s to 1970s, Chinese peasants
contributed more than 600 billion yuan to China‟s industrialisation through the State‟s
compulsory grain procurement and the price scissors. This means that the central
government each year took nearly 30 billion yuan from agriculture (Bernstein & Lü 2003:
36-37; Qiao 2005). The implicit tax rate was estimated to average 12% and to be as high
as 18-24% in some grain-producing areas (Wen 2000:175). Rural residents, the producers
of the agricultural output, became residual claimants to the harvest after the state and
collectives had taken their share. About 150 million rural residents lived below
subsistence level in the 1970s (Bernstein & Lü 2003). The investment in agriculture
fluctuated between 8% and 13%, and the development of the agricultural sector was
delayed (Bernstein & Lü 2003:37).
In addition to formal agricultural tax and implicit tax in rural areas, there was
informal tax/collective retention levied by the collectives in the Mao era. The collective
retention mainly included the collective accumulation fund, welfare fund and cadre
compensation. The production teams and production brigades as well as communes
deducted their collective retention monies before rural households received their income
portion in kind and partly in cash (Lin & Liu 2007; Unger 2002). The distribution of inkind payment such as grain and vegetables was based on the number in a family to secure
the basic livelihood of rural people whereas the distribution of cash was based on the total
work points of family members. Generally, production teams and brigades had a
significant share of the harvest and earnings from sales to the state. However, if the
rations in a village were below a monthly minimum level of 26-30 jin (one jin = half a kg)
per capita, there was no formal state agricultural tax to be paid and the production brigade
was entitled to „fan xiao liang (the purchased grain)‟. This meant that the central
government returned the purchased grain to the village to provide for the basic needs of
villagers. The collective accumulation fund could not exceed 5% of total income. The
distribution ratio between the central government, collectives and individual farmers
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fluctuated in that period as shown in Table 5.2. The collective accumulation fund and the
welfare fund were pivotal for developing the collective economy and maintaining the
commune system. They were also pivotal to the successful RCMS and „five guarantees‟
in the Mao era. They were also essential to the emergence of township and village
enterprises (TVEs) in the late of 1960s and early 1970s, which in turn increased the
collective accumulation fund and welfare fund.
Collective retention in general and the collective accumulation funds and welfare
funds in particular were the backbone of rural social security measures. The ultimate goal
of that time for the collective was to strengthen the collective economy in order to build a
new socialist countryside. The RCMS and „five guarantees‟ demonstrated the advantages
of China‟s socialist system to the rural people.
Table 5.2 The distribution rate of agricultural output between government,
collectives and peasants in the 1950s-1960s*
Year

Central

Collectives

Individuall

Total

1955

government
9.4%

32%
retention

peasants
58.6%

(%)
100%

1958

10.0%
(agricultural

34%

56%
Income

100%

1965

tax)
5.7%

40.0

54.3%

100%

*The data in Table 5.2, based on Bernstein and Lü (2003:41-42), do not include implicit tax.
This table shows that in the Mao era, the direct and explicit tax (Agricultural tax)
levied on peasants by the central government was only a small part of their income. The
implicit tax drawn by the central government and the informal tax/collective retention
monies accumulated by collectives were a huge portion of the real tax burden placed on
rural people. The amount of agricultural tax and collective retention accounted for around
45% of their income. The economic benefit that Chinese peasants should have received
was denied.
Undoubtedly in many rural areas the residents were without adequate rations and
clothing before reform. . In my memory, for example, I was very happy if I could have
Chinese bread for my three meals until 1980. When I asked my interviewees: What is the
worst suffering you had experienced before reform? - The majority of the elderly
responded that their worst suffering was hunger during the „Three Years of Natural
Disasters (sannian ziran zaihai) (1959-1961)‟. However, most of them did not complain
or criticise the policies of that time or the leadership. One elderly interviewee told me that
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nobody could control natural disasters and that Chairman Mao was the best emperor in
Chinese history.
Another means by which the rural residents contributed to the government was
through the corvee labour required during the Mao era and indeed throughout China‟s
history. In Mao‟s era, faced with a collapsed agricultural infrastructure, there was a need
to undertake large-scale water/land conservation irrigation systems such as dams and
canals and reclamation projects. To achieve this, a heavy corvee labour burden was
demanded of rural residents (Aubert et al. 2002; Li, X.D 2004).
Based on my above discussion, we can see that the formal agricultural tax, implicit
tax, informal tax/collective retention and a significant corvee labour requirement were
levied on peasants during Mao‟s era. The largest burden placed on peasants did not come
in the form of formal state taxes, but in the form of the implicit taxes and the collectives‟
retention of funds. The benefit of this system was that all members of rural collectives
were secure and peasants and rural households did not feel pressured by financial burdens
such as those created by an illness or accident among family members. At the same time,
peasants did not need to directly pay informal fees to any cadres or any level of
government. There was a good relationship between the residents and local officials. This
is one of the most important reasons why there were neither complaints nor tensions
between local officials and farmers. Furthermore, the peasants understood the difficulties
of New China after many years of deprivation due to the Japanese invasion and on-going
civil war. They thus willingly cooperated closely with the local government and the
central government when it came to proposed public projects. They were intending to
share their hard working spirit together with others in that period. Taxes and the overall
financial burden placed on peasants was not a contentious issue.
Table 5.3 Characteristics of rural taxation in the Mao era:
Tax

Components

Proportion

of

Levied by

Relations

income/real tax

(gov.-people)

Formal tax

State
tax

agricultural

Small

Centre government

Good

Implicit tax

Compulsory grain
procurement

Large

Use
of
scissors

Good

Informal tax and fees

Collective
retention

Large

Collectives
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price

Good

Rural Taxation and Rural Social Security in the Deng Era
The milestone for the start of the Deng era was the official collapse of the people‟s
commune system and collective economy nationwide by the early 1980s. Then, from the
end of 1990s to 2002 there was a transition phase from the Deng era to the Hu-Wen era.
In this period the excessive burden placed on peasants led to widespread discontent and
resistance in some rural areas (Bernstein & Lü 2000; Aubert et al. 2002; Li, X.D. 2004).
This situation forced the central government to resolve issues concerning agriculture,
rural areas and farmers („three rurals‟/sannong) and to build „a new socialist countryside‟
without changing the HRS. In 2003, the new Hu-Wen leadership marked the end of the
Deng era. The government began to look into the problem of agricultural tax and informal
fees levied on peasants. The situation was not only causing rural unrest, it was delaying
the development of rural China.
Rural taxation arrangements between 1979 and 1983 can only be considered to be
transition arrangements. This is because the commune system and collective economy
were still running at that time. The RCMS and „five guarantees‟ were still serving rural
residents. However, with the collapse of the people‟s commune system and the collective
economy and implementation of the HRS nationwide in 1984, rural taxation was
dramatically changed from a collective liability for various taxes and fees to individual
households made liable for various taxes and fees (Bernstein & Lü 2000; Tao & Liu
2005). The main characteristics of rural taxation during the Deng period were the gradual
changes in agricultural tax instruments and the emergence of excessive informal taxes
levied on peasants in rural areas.
With economic reform, rural taxation during the Deng period became even more
regressive (Tao & Qin 2007; Bernstein & Lü 2003:48-66; Aubert et al. 2002). For
example, the per capita income of urban residents was much higher than that of rural
residents. Nevertheless, before 2006 every agricultural household was obliged to pay
direct tax, in-kind tax in the form of crops acquired at government prices, and informal
taxes and fees levied locally whereas many urban residents have not needed to pay
personal income tax. The main content of rural tax in the Deng period was, as in Mao‟s
era, a formal state tax, implicit tax and informal tax and levies. However, the real content
and degree of taxation is significantly different as shown in Table 5.4. Formal state tax
included state agricultural tax, township and village levies. As in Mao‟s era, the state
agricultural tax was imposed by the central government through compulsory grain
134

procurement. The mandatory grain quota was, however, replaced by grain procurement
contracts with an individual household in which a rural household must sell a certain
amount of its harvest at a state set price that was much lower than the market price. The
remainder of the harvest could be sold on the open market. Grain procurement in the
Deng era was directly from an individual household rather than from a production team of
the collective/commune. In other words, with the collapse of the collective system and the
implementation of the HRS in rural China in 1984, rural taxation was shifted from the
collective that had been liable for taxes to individual household liability for various taxes
and fees. Therefore, the individual household knew how much tax and fees were levied on
them.
With the collapse of the collective system and the implementation of the HRS, the
central government introduced township and village levies (san ti wu tong), which
included „three village levies‟ and „five township-pooling funds‟. „Three village levies
(san ti)‟ were used to provide collective welfare funds and cadres‟ salaries. „Five
township-pooling funds (wu tong)‟ were used to provide basic public services (such as
education and public security) by the township governments. These two categories were
approved by regulations of the central government and they belonged to the formal
taxation system – see Figure 5.1. The regulations stipulated that the combined village and
township taxes could not exceed 5% of the preceding year‟s average net per capita
income of village households (Bernstein & Lü 2000; Aubert et al. 2002; Li, X.D 2004).
However, in practice, this tax significantly exceeded this level in the late 1980s and 1990s
in the majority of rural areas (Aubert et al. 2002; Li, X.D 2004). At the same time, local
public services such as education and rural co-operation medical care were significantly
deteriorating, leaving rural residents wondering where their taxes and fees had gone.
Table 5.4 Characteristics of rural taxation in the Deng era
Tax

Components

Proportion of Levied on
income/real tax
burden

Formal
tax

State agricultural Large
tax, san ti wu
tong

Individual
households

Good with the central
govt. Tension with
local govt.

Implicit
tax

Compulsory
grain
procurement

Individual
households

Good with the central
govt. Tension with
local govts.

Large
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Relations
(people- govt.)

Informal
tax

Informal charges

Large

Individual
households

Tension with govts.

Illegal
fees

sanluan

Very large

Individual
households

Tension with govts.

In addition to the two categories of taxes and fees, local governments also collected
revenue by illegally adding a margin for household grain procurement above the state
quota (Lin & Liu 2007). They were able to do this because the peasants usually did not
know how much compulsory grain output their household had been allocated for
procurement. This revenue can be considered to be an implicit or informal tax (as shown
in Figure 5.1) and it was usually used to add to the salary and bonus of local officials.
Township and village governments were exploiting rather than serving the villagers
through various implicit and illegal fees levied on farmers. The implicit tax that existed in
this period through the compulsory grain procurement and a price scissors and the
disparity between rural and urban households produced an extremely regressive tax
system.
Informal taxation in the Deng era mainly included miscellaneous local fees and
government agents‟ charges through illegal fundraising (luan shoufei), fines (luan fakuan)
and apportionments (luan tanpai) (sanluan) without explicit government regulation and
legislation. In contrast to the informal tax specifically benefiting rural people in the long
run in Mao‟s era, in the Deng era the local governments and agents representing the
higher level government intentionally extracted as much as possible from rural people for
their benefit using various informal taxes legally and illegally (Bernstein & Lü 2000;
Chen & Chun 2004).
Studies on peasants‟ excessive burden, Lin and Liu (2007) have investigated China‟s
rural informal taxation by examining why rural informal tax emerged and became a social
issue in the late 1990s. They concluded that the upper-level policy mandates were
responsible for this troubling phenomenon. Tao and Liu (2005) have explored urban and
rural household taxation through measuring the tax burden of both urban and rural
households in the 1990s. They stated that the uneven tax system was biased against
poorer households and informal tax promoted social dissatisfaction in rural areas. For his
part Li, X.D. (2004) has reviewed the peasants‟ burden based on a village survey. He
demonstrated that measures and regulations adopted by the central government to reduce
the burden largely failed. He has concluded that a solution to the peasants‟ taxation
burden lay in the participation of farmers in the management of public affairs and
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democracy at grassroots level.
With a substantial growth in local bureaucracies, especially township governments,
informal tax in general and sanluan in particular dramatically increased and became the
main financial burden placed on peasants. Illegal fees and levies might consist of a few
dozen or about one hundred items, ranging from charges for road and school construction
to purchase of insurance, to a charge for marriage certificates and housing construction
permission. However, township governments were not the only predators. The agencies
of the central government were even worse than the local ones (Chen & Chun 2004,
Aubert et al. 2002). For example, the Ministry of Agriculture identified that 148
documents issued by 48 ministries and commissions authorised the collection of informal
fees, fundraising and apportionments, in which, for instance, the State Education
Commission fundraised money for compulsory education while the Ministry of Public
Health funded subsidies to rural doctors (Bernstein & Lü 2003).
During this period, there were no professional doctors in the village clinics and, rural
patients had to pay dearly for professional doctors if they wanted to see a specialist. As
many interviewees said to me: We paid the public education fees, but the village primary
school disappeared. We paid road construction fees, but there was no standard road built
to the village. We paid the public health care fees, but the RCMS and „barefoot doctor‟
system collapsed and we must now pay full price to see a doctor.
Informal tax and fees increased faster than peasant incomes during the Deng era. For
example, the income of peasants increased 6.5% whereas their financial burden went up
19.6% in 1997 (Bernstein & Lü 2003: 67). In some rural areas informal tax and fees
accounted for 20-30% of the poor households‟ incomes in 1990s (Lin & Liu 2007).
Township cadres were the leaders when it came to enforcing the collection of
informal levies and fees. The village cadres often acted as the agents of township
governments when it came to collection. Some of the levies and fees were used to realize
the so-called initiatives of the township, usually named „leader projects (lingdao xiangmu)‟
or „leader engineering (lingdao gongcheng)‟. The success of such projects and
engineering could lead to the promotion of the local officials based on the essential
criteria of promotion in the Deng era. These „leader projects‟ and „leader engineering‟
schemes led to that more extra charges were levied on peasants. Such an institutional
system generated both organisational and individual incentives to extract as much money
as possible from rural people regardless of rural residents‟ basic livelihood. Attempts by
villages to oppose the system were met with violence. For example, some villagers died
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after being brutally stabbed by local cadres and police when they resisted or petitioned
against informal taxation (Chen & Chun 2004). Under these circumstances peasants could
not sustain their lives only through farming. Young and middle-aged rural people had to
leave the countryside for the cities.
On one hand, all levels of government extracted excessive money from peasants using
various taxes, on the other hand, social security provision such as education and health
care deteriorated or collapsed in rural areas. The heavy taxes and informal fees combined
with brutal collection methods created a social crisis in rural areas. This crisis threatened
social stability and the Party‟s legitimacy in rural areas in the late Deng era (Bernstein &
Lü 2000, 2003:116; Chen & Chun 2004; Tao et al. 2004).
Facing increasing discontent, frustration, protest and mass incidents (qunti shijian) in
rural areas, in 2002 the central government implemented a program of rural taxation
reform called „tax-for-fee‟ reform /„tax-fee-swap‟ (shui fei gaige/ fei gai shui). The aim
was to remove all local informal charges, fines, fundraising and apportionments by
increasing the rates of formal state agricultural taxes and so preventing arbitrary charges
and alleviating the heavy burden placed on rural citizens. However, as Tao et al. (2004),
Aubert et al. (2002) and Bernstein and Lü (2003:22, 242, 252) have stated, the „fee-fortax‟ reform should be regarded as a part of a recurrent historical pattern. In the longer
term this rural taxation reform increased rather than decreased the tax burden placed on
peasants, which means that „fee-for-tax‟ reform led by the Party did not also break the
„Huang Zongxi law (Huang Zongxi dinglü)‟. This law is that initial taxation reduction
after absorption of miscellaneous fees rebounds and the previous situation returns and is
repeated in Chinese history. The „fee-for-tax‟ reform neither decreased the burden on
rural households nor increased their income, but aggravated their burden and poverty in
the Deng era. At the same time, social provision such as health care and aged care, and
the provision of the public services in rural areas were much worse at that time.
Clearly, in the context of the separation between taxation and social welfare, China‟s
peasants contributed more revenue to the country but received less social benefit and
welfare compared to their urban counterparts. This indicates that China‟s taxation system
is not connected with its social security system. The disparity in income between poor and
rich, rural and urban households widened significantly. During the Deng era taxes and the
financial burden placed on rural people became a serious social problem that brought
social and political instability in some rural areas.
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The Post-Tax and Fee Era and Rural Social Security in the Hu-Wen Era
Since 2003, the Hu-Wen government introduced a series of policies designed to benefit
Chinese peasants in order to sustain the legitimacy of the Party. The Chinese government
has been shifting its policies from rural areas, rural citizens and an embedded policy of
agriculture supporting urban and industrial development to urban and industrial sectors
being required to foster rural and agricultural development. In the Hu-Wen era this is to
be done in order to build a harmonious society under the principle of „taking less, giving
more and liberation to rural China (duo yu, shao qu, fang huo)‟ (CCPCC&SC, 2004; Qiao
2005; He 2006; Cheng 2006). Since 2004 the Chinese government has started to readjust
its rural agricultural tax policy to effectively reduce the tax burden placed on peasants and
increase rural citizens‟ income (CCPCC&SC, 2004; Wen 2004). Pilot schemes for fully
exempting rural households from agricultural tax were carried out in Jilin Province in
2004. At the same time, 11 agriculture-based provinces started to reduce the agricultural
tax by 3% and the rest by at least 1% yearly. In 2005, the Chinese government announced
that the agricultural tax levied on rural citizens would be abolished nationwide in 2006.
By the end of 2005, 28 of 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities had
exempted peasants from agricultural tax. By the beginning of 2006, all agricultural tax
had been phased out nationwide (Wen 2005). The policy of rural taxation has been
fundamentally changed in the Hu-Wen era. Furthermore, the central government has
increased transfers to not only subsidise local financial shortages and agriculture, rural
areas and farmers, but also to improve public services and rural social security provisions
(CCPCC&SC, 2004).
A milestone in the Hu-Wen era was reached when the central government
fundamentally changed its rural taxation policy. The Hu-Wen era is marked by the state‟s
reduction in the level of formal and informal taxes levied on peasants. The central
government‟s formal agricultural tax was reduced gradually and finally abolished, while
informal and illegal fees were reduced to nil by 2006. Furthermore, the central
government has also tried to provide financial support for the development of agriculture
and rural areas. Success in this policy would reduce the disparity between rural and urban
areas. For example, the central government has been supporting the development of
agriculture and rural areas by investing rural infrastructure and by financing rural social
welfare projects. This has been happening since 2004. Unsurprisingly, social security
provisions for rural citizens have been improved recently, though some public services
such as education and health care have not significantly changed in rural areas. As many
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of my interviewees said, the peasants have felt that they have really found a bright future
under the Hu-Wen leadership (Shen 2006; Zhao, X. F. 2010).
The abolition of agricultural tax has apparently alleviated peasants‟ burden, at least in
the short term. However, implicit informal taxation and some price scissors effect still
exist although the market economy has alleviated price distortions. For example, the price
of agricultural machinery and other materials used for agricultural production has
increased 20-30% whereas the price of grain in the market has decreased 10%. Therefore,
the majority of subsidies the government has provided to peasants have been instantly
transferred to the merchants and new government agents (Shen 2006). Most importantly,
mere tax exemption cannot fully increase the income of peasants and lift the rural
people‟s living standards, reduce the disparity between rural and urban households and
ease political instability in rural areas if coordinated institutional reforms nationwide are
not put in place (Tao & Qin 2007; Chen & Chun 2004; Chang 2002). For example,
embezzling and misuse of funds transferred from the central government has meant that
funding has failed to reach peasants in need in some rural areas. Protests, petitions,
conflicts and violence have increased and persisted in recent years in some rural areas.
Rural social security provision such as NRCMS and old aged insurance has been
improving under the Hu-Wen leadership. This has benefited vulnerable groups such as
poor households and the elderly people in rural areas. Compared with the Deng era, rural
people have received more benefit.

A Tax-Based Unified Social Security System
Based on the experiences of developed countries in general and Australia in particular,
one possible remedy is to establish a taxation-based unified social security system through
the redistribution of national resources with the aim of achieving increased social fairness
and justice. This approach would improve the basic human rights of China‟s rural
citizens.
There is no doubt that the Hu-Wen government‟s abolition of agricultural taxation has
benefited rural people in the short term, however, in the longer term it has potential
problems in relation to the government‟s provision of public goods. This may further
exacerbate the contractual relationship between rural residents and all levels of
government. The link could be completely broken and rural people would become
unwilling to cooperate with all levels of government in general and local government in
particular (Shen 2006; Zhao, X.F. 2010). As Bernstein and Lü (2003:235) have
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demonstrated, unorganised peasants are more dangerous to social and political stability
than organised ones because political extremists can more easily prey upon them. Chinese
history should not be forgotten: the non-cooperation of peasants with the Jiang Jieshi‟s
government is a critical factor in the loss of the National Party‟s government in mainland
China in 1949. Furthermore, local cadres have appeared to be unwilling to provide public
services for local residents due to a changed relationship between rural citizens and local
officials in the post-tax and fee period. Many local cadres follow the practice of „doing
less rather than serving the public more (duo yi shi bu ru shao yi shi)‟, which has not only
caused discontent of local residents, but has decreased the provision of local public goods.
For instance, one village cadre told me that before 2006, he felt that he must service the
villagers because they paid his salary. Now that the township government pays his salary
he doesn‟t feel the need to serve the villagers.
There are over 800 million people holding rural hukou in China, there will be 80
billion yuan drawn from financial budgets given one rural resident requires 100 yuan for
social services. In the long run government financial expenditure will become larger and
larger, exponentially increasing, and finally, there will be a dangerous budget gap. This
means that taxes or other named fees will be levied on the peasants again, which in turn
could cause the disaffection of the peasants (Shen 2006). Some taxes and fees have been
levied on rural residents again in some rural areas. For instance, raising one pig could pay
around 60 yuan in taxes (a pig earning the household 80 yuan in 2008 in Qijiang county,
Chongqing Municipality) (Zhou 2011). Furthermore, the disparity of income and living
standard between rural and urban households has not been narrowed but has increased in
the recent period. It is difficult to decrease the gap between urban and rural households by
only exempting rural residents from agricultural tax if the current economic and political
system and institutions and incentives are not changed.
My fieldwork indicates that villagers have strong ideas on issues related to taxation
and the legality, or otherwise, of taxation and fee demands. Many of the villagers I
interviewed told me that it is the obligation of every rural household to hand over
agricultural tax to the government (jiao huangliang, na guoshui, tianjin diyi). However,
they have strongly opposed the unreasonable and illegal charges and fees that have been
levied such as fundraising education fees and paying for the construction of a power
station. The majority of Chinese peasants paid formal agricultural taxes on time even
though there were tensions between cadres and local residents. Most cases of resistance
and violence resulted from illegal extraction accompanied by brutal collection practices
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(Chen & Chun 2004). Most importantly, there are many public services at the village and
township level. Every social service requires a certain amount of money from the budget.
Therefore, there are more and more local fees that are required to be levied on Chinese
peasants. It is already evident that the situation of „levy of too many illegal or legal fees‟
in the period from the 1990s to 2003 will recur again. For example, fees such as a road
construction fee and a water tower fee have been levied in Liujiahui.
The regressive tax system has contributed a great deal to rural poverty and the
disparity between rural and urban areas. Eyferth et al (2003) also concluded that this has
hindered not only the redistribution of funds and investments but also social resources
such as developing a rural social security system and provision of public goods. It is
necessary to establish a progressive, reasonable and feasible tax system in China in which
every citizen must pay tax whenever you receive payment (PTWYP) for services or a
wage salary. This should be advocated as a national tax policy.
The policy of PTWYP would be a feasible means for taxing the over 200 million
rural-to-urban migrants, because they are paid wages or salaries in cities. This could also
be feasible for traditional peasants who sell their agricultural output in the market not in
the form of imposed procurement but in the form of a cash payment. Income from selling
should also be taxable. In other words, the income of every citizen in China should be
taxable.
The Constitution of the PRC (Chapter Three: Fundamental Rights and Duties of
Citizens: Article 102) adopted in 1954 stated that paying taxes was the duty of every
Chinese citizen (Constitution of the PRC, 1954). However, this article was cancelled by
the Constitutions of 1975 and 1978. It was not until 1982 that this article was restored in
the Constitution (Chapter Two: Article 56) (Zhou 2011; Constitution of the PRC, 1982).
However a systematic and regular taxation system has not worked until 1994.
My interviewees were unclear as to which taxes were levied on them or which taxes
were compulsory and which were illegal. Since the abolition of the agricultural tax a total
of 15 taxes and fees must be paid for raising one pig in some rural areas. But the tax
collectors haven‟t shown rural residents the formal documents associated with these taxes
and fees (Zhou 2011). They also have less knowledge about the current complex tax
system that is levied on the general public and includes direct taxation of consumer goods
such as clothes and drinks. Moreover, uncollected and evaded individual income taxes are
believed to amount to billions of yuan. The situation is even worse if cash-based
transactions are taken into account. These are common not only in the private and self142

employed sectors, but also in the state-owned sector such as institutions, schools and
hospitals and all levels of government particularly local governments and government
agencies. People have not been fined due to loopholes in current laws and regulations.
Tax evasion has become a common cultural practice (Hu & Cao 2011) leaving the present
Chinese taxation system weak.
Increasing the proportion of public services such as education and health care in the
distribution of revenue is a big challenge for the Chinese government in coming years.
The total amount of the education, health care and social insurance distributed accounted
for only 14.9% of national financial revenue in 2009, but it accounted for 61% in the USA
(Pang 2010). China should learn from other developed countries‟ experiences and link tax
revenue and the provision of public goods together. A call for institutional reform is
needed, not only by politicians and researchers but also by ordinary Chinese citizens
(Zhou 2011).
In China, personal income tax accounted for only a small portion of China‟s GDP and
of the total taxation revenue. Currently, less than 20% of population possess over 80% of
bank deposits, whereas their personal income tax accounted for less than 10% of total
national personal income tax (China Daily, 3 September 2005). About 63 percent of
China‟s personal income tax in 2008 was paid by wage earners (MOF, 2009). It is quite
clear that salaried people are the main contributors to China‟s personal income tax. In a
number of industrialised countries, however, rich people accounting for less than 20% of
the population contribute more than 90% of the personal income tax (Zhou 2011). The
current taxation system and the amendment to the individual income tax law approved by
the National People‟s Congress in 2011 in China hardly collects taxes from the rich at all
(Hu & Cao 2011; Hua 2011). In this sense, the existing taxation system including newly
adopted the amendment to the individual income tax law has widened the gap between
the rich and the poor. It is ironic, therefore, that one of the stated ultimate goals of levying
personal tax is to narrow economic disparity and promote social equity according to the
Ministry of Finance (Jia & Liang 2011; Hua 2011).
The Chinese government has implemented an identification (ID) card (shen fen zheng)
system that feeds into public affairs such as public security (gonggong anquan). It enables
the government to identify spending practices, such as who is using air transport, bank
transactions and hotel accommodation. Chinese government should use a national unified
ID or tax file number (TFN) system. Then a social security number (SSN) associated with
a TFN system could be put in place. The SSN would be related to the provision of
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medical care, allowances, pensions and superannuation. The Chinese government would
be in a position to implement these two IDs for every Chinese resident. The Chinese
government could process their tax and corresponding social security through the two
IDs, as shown in Figure 5.2.
ID

TFN

SSN

Figure 5.2 A tax-based unified social security system
A well established and smoothly functioning social security system funded by a
comprehensive taxation system that includes personal income-tax widely levied in a
progressive manner would diminish the present necessary function of families in
supporting China‟s elderly and reduce the increasing disparity between rural and urban
housholds.

Conclusion
A nation‟s taxation and social security systems directly influence the day-to-day life of
ordinary people. A nation‟s social security provisions should be connected to its system
of taxation and particularly to personal income tax. Taxation should be used by
governments to promote social fairness and justice. In China, however, social security
provision is not associated with a reasonable taxation system and in particular to
individual income tax. Unfair taxation measures and a lack of social security provision
for rural citizens is responsible for chronic poverty and an ever widening disparity
between the income and living standards of urban and rural housholds.
Personal income tax is recognized as a key tax category and has become the major
contributor to national financial revenue in developed countries. However, personal
income tax was not levied in China until 1994 when the new personal income tax law was
promulgated and implemented. According to the new law, the majority of Chinese
residents still do not need to declare tax annually because their incomes are below the
thresh-hold for levying individual taxable income. Rural citizens have not been required
to pay direct taxation since 2006.
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The high starting point for individual taxation might speed up economic development
by increasing personal consumption on one hand, but it increases the disparity in income
between rich and poor. China currently has a regressive taxation system and this is
hampering the development of a modern social security system that would be available to
all citizens. Therefore, the taxation system should be reformed in order to establish a new
redistributive mechanism for reducing inequality between urban and rural areas and
between rich and poor households. In this system every citizen should pay tax as long as
their income reaches the starting point for levying tax and in turn every citizen is entitled
to social security provisions as long as he/she meets the criteria.
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Chapter 6
Subsidy Policy, the ‘Three Rurals’ and Their Impact on the
Rural Elderly

Introduction
From a historical perspective, the urban-oriented or urban-biased policies that lasted half a
century in China have not only resulted in the large disparity in the income, education,
health-care and public services afforded urban and rural citizens, but have also
strengthened a way of thinking. It has strengthened the view that priority should be given
to the needs and interests of urban citizens. However, there are now signs of change. The
current Chinese government is implementing a subsidy policy. Gale, Lohmar and Tuan
(2005) have examined the background of this subsidy policy and argued that the policy
demonstrates a new attitude adopted by the Chinese government toward its rural
residents, rural areas and agriculture („three rurals‟/sannong). The aim of the subsidy
policy is to increase the income of rural residents, to increase grain production and to
maintain social stability. Chen (2009) has reviewed the government‟s major policies
related to agriculture and rural development and emphasised that the achievements of the
new rural and agricultural policy reforms of the central government such as abolishing
agricultural tax and improving social undertakings in rural areas (including rural
compulsory education with free textbooks) have increased rural residents‟ income and
grain production. However, he has also noted that there continue to be big challenges for
the Chinese government in this area. This is in part due to the outflow of rural resources
and the constraint of limits on natural resources especially land and water. It is the first
time that a scholar like Chen from the central government has summarised and reviewed
major government policy relating to agriculture and rural development since a series of
subsidy policies focusing on sannong were announced and implemented by the Hu-Wen
regime in 2004.
In this chapter I begin with a literature review focusing on China‟s subsidy policies
for sannong, considering how these policies have the potential to improve the life of the
rural elderly. I then examine the agricultural and rural development policies and the
widening inequality between urban and rural, rich and poor residents in China from a
historical perspective. I have also investigated subsidy policies, the disparity between
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urban and rural income and living standards and the discontent among rural residents.

Comment and Assessment
Chang (2002) has explored the cause and cure of China‟s widening income inequality
between rural and urban households. He concludes that the large disparity between urban
and rural incomes and living standards could either increase or decrease in following
years taking into account the dynamic change in China‟s Gini coefficients from 1978 to
2001. He argues that there is no effective way to reduce inequality using distribution
measures in the short run and that transfer payments to rural residents through a reformed
tax systems could do more harm than good. He has proposed that what the Chinese
government could do to narrow the rural-urban income gap is to accelerate urbanisation.
For his part Xiong (2006) has recognised that China can be classified into several
developmental categories. The first category presumes that China is a developed country
because China has modern cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, with a fairly high living
standard and income. The second category is predicated on the argument that China is a
country with a mid-level income. Provinces such as Henan and the Northeast region are
cited. The third category presumes that China is still a developing country. Provinces such
as Guizhou and Gansu are cited. These different categories reflect the large gap between
regions and between urban and rural areas. Based on the “growth pole theory” and the
“unbalanced development theory”, Xiong has argued that the huge gap between urban and
rural areas exists in all industrialised countries on one hand, and on the other hand, the
gap could be associated with political and social conflicts in China. This is consistent with
the World Development Report 2006 (World Bank, 2005). The real income gap between
urban and rural residents becomes even larger if we take into account rural residents‟
expenditure on expanding production and city residents‟ social welfare.
Jian (2010) has demonstrated that China‟s macroeconomic policies contribute to the
widening income gap. For their part Bezemer and Headey (2008) argue that urban biased
policies are still responsible for the economic situation and poverty in developing
countries while neglecting the pivotal role of agriculture growth in reducing poverty.
Writing in the 1970s, Lipton (1977) similarly pointed out that the conflict between the
rural and urban classes was most serious in developing countries and that rural poverty in
developing countries largely results from policies with an urban bias.
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China’s Rural and Agricultural Policy Reform and Widening Urbanrural Inequality: A Historical Perspective
In this section I examine the reform of China‟s agricultural and rural policies and the
ever-increasing rural-urban disparity in the period from the early 1980s to 2003. In
particular, I have explored the impact of the „tax-for-fee‟ reform on the income of rural
residents.
There is a large and growing literature on public policy and China‟s increased
inequality between urban and rural areas and between rich and poor households both
urban and rural areas. Gustafsson, Shi and Sicular (2008) provide an overview of the
association between income inequality and public policy. They argue that during reform
periods the highest priority of China‟ economic policy-makers has been economic growth
and that policy-makers have tolerated inequality between urban and rural residents. Urban
industrialisation and development, seen to underpin political stability, also has the
potential to threaten this stability.
The government‟s subsidies for urban residents, including housing and health care
subsidies, have increased the disparity between urban and rural residents. López et al.
(2008) demonstrated that fiscal policies are strongly associated with the quality of
economic growth, poverty and inequality reduction; however, China‟s fiscal policies have
done little to redistribute income. Fan et al. (2002) argue that the policy of government
production-enhancing investment, including investment in agricultural research and
development, irrigation systems, rural education and infrastructure such as roads and
electricity has increased agricultural production and reduced rural poverty and the
disparity between urban and rural areas. They concluded that China‟s economic growth
and development in rural areas would have been impossible without the past several
decades of government investment. China‟s agricultural and rural policies have been a
vital component of the development of agriculture and rural areas and increasing farmers‟
income. But, are these same policies responsible for the poverty in rural areas and urbanrural disparity?
HRS and Urban-rural Inequality
Li Changping (2008), a prestigious Chinese expert on sannong, recognizes that China‟s
agricultural sector, rural areas, and rural residents were the main contributors to rapid
economic growth and development in the period from 1979 to 1988. At the same time, a
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great achievement had also been made in farmers‟ income and agricultural production. In
that period a series of rural and agricultural policy reforms were promulgated in rural
China such as the adoption of the household responsibility system (HRS) and increases in
procurement prices for agricultural products. These increases had not only reduced the
rural poverty and greatly increased Chinese farmers‟ income, but also narrowed the
disparity and inequality between urban and rural areas (Eyferth et al. 2003; Li. C.P. 2008;
Gustafsson, Shi & Sicular 2008). Table 6.3 has also demonstrated that the income ratio
between urban and rural residents was reduced from 2.56 in 1978 to 1.83 in 1984. This
was the lowest level since the 1970s. The urban-rural disparity in both income and
consumption had significantly narrowed at the beginning of the HRS (Tao & Liu 2005;
OECD, 2005). Indeed, at this time the urban-rural disparity was at the lowest recorded
level.
Deng Xiaoping was eager to demonstrate the political legitimacy of his regime
through economic reform. He believed that rural and agricultural reform could lead to the
success of China‟s economy just as the strategy of rural areas surrounding urban areas led
to the victory of China‟s revolution in 1949 (Li & Ye 1995). Therefore the central
government‟s policies favoured rural areas in the early stage of reform in which the HRS
provided rural residents with an autonomous right to their contracted land on one hand,
while implementing grain procurement contracts with a dramatic increase in the price of
the grain procurement. At the same time, individual rural households were allowed to
market their surplus agricultural products after they had fulfilled the state grain quota at
state-set procurement prices. Generally, the market price of agricultural products was
higher than the state procurement price at that time. The good market price encouraged
farmers to farm efficiently compared to the previous commune system. In that period
agricultural production dramatically increased and millions of rural residents became
wealthier than average urban residents. In my fieldwork, many middle-aged and elderly
interviewees recognized and appreciated the significantly improving basic living
standards of that period. They had enough food to eat whereas they had not necessarily
had sufficient food in the commune period. One of my elderly interviewees proudly stated
that he could have three meals with enough Chinese bread while his sister living in a city
had to use rationing tickets during the early stage of the Deng Xiaoping government‟s
reform. However, this phenomenon was only temporary. Urban-rural inequality has
consistently increased since the late 1980s (Eyferth et al. 2003; OCED, 2007), as shown
in Table 6.3.
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“Five Township-Pooling Funds” and “Three Village Levies”: Excessive Burden
and Urban-rural Inequality
The remarkable achievement of the HRS indicates that the Party has the ability to increase
rural people‟s living standards and incomes while at the same time enhancing social
stability in rural areas. This provides a sound basis for economic and political reform. In
1985 the Chinese government moved the focus of reform from rural areas and agriculture
to urban areas and industry. Fiscal policy reform in the mid-1990s and rural
administrative changes in general and policies associated with marketing agricultural
products in particular enlarged the urban-rural disparity in the late 1980s and the 1990s
(Weersink & Rozelle 1997).
The power of township governments and village committees over the distribution of
income and wealth was drawn from control over grain procurement contracts in the late
1980s. Then the central government introduced two major categories of fees as the
formal state tax in rural areas in order to sustain the operation of township governments
and village committees. The two fees consisted of “five township-pooling funds” and
“three village levies”. As noted in my previous chapter, the “five township-pooling funds
(wu tong)” consisted of education fees and a supplement, social help, one-child policy,
militia training, and collective transportation such as road and bridge construction levies.
These funds were managed and collected by township governments. A township
government was expected to use these pooled funds to provide public services such as
education, public security and executing directives from upper level governments such as
family planning and grain procurement. The “three village levies (san ti)” consisted of a
village accumulation fund, a public welfare fund and expenditure on village
administration. These funds were managed and collected by a village committee. The
village committee could also use these funds to provide for village administration
expenses such as cadre‟s salaries and administrative expenses and was, as I note above,
expected to accumulate funds for improving the village economy such as investment in
agriculture and TVEs and welfare funds for village-based public provision such as the
„five guarantees‟ and rural cooperative medical care (Aubert & Li 2002; Lin & Liu 2007;
Gustafsson, Shi & Sicular 2008).
Funds collected at local level were subject to the practice of adding a margin to rural
household grain procurements above the state quota and taking advantage of the price
margin between the market price of grain and the state procurement price of that period.
Farmers had no way of knowing how much grain procurement they should shoulder and
150

thus they didn‟t know there was a margin added and how big that margin was.
Furthermore, due to the continuing increase in grain output since 1980s, selling grain
became harder and harder for rural residents. Agricultural output has therefore gradually
decreased in the period since. In order to sustain the stability of agricultural production
and secure the country‟s food security, the central government had to introduce a state
grain-reserve and a protected grain pricing system. This meant that the grain bureau
received subsidies for grain procurement, storage and export (USDA: United States
Department of Agriculture, 2009). The agents of agricultural input and output from all
levels of government recognised and took advantage of loopholes of these policies and
monopolized the supply of agricultural input and the collection of agricultural output
through controlling transaction channels and prices. They increased the prices of input
and decreased the prices of output. They also dictated farmers‟ farming operations such as
decreeing the planting certain cash crops in response to their selling price (Li, C.P. 2008;
Lin & Liu 2007). Thus the farmers‟ net income did not increase. It decreased under these
policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This happened even though their agricultural
output increased (zeng chan bu zeng shou).
In the process of the HRS and economic reform‟s success the revenue of local
governments had dramatically increased, but the central government‟s revenue was only
sustained at the 1978 level (Wang, S.G. 1997). Facing a massive decrease in their share
of revenue in relation to local governments, the central government introduced a new
fiscal reform in 1994. This was done in the name of the macro-control. It was called the
tax-assignment system (fen shui zhi) (Wang, S.G. 1997). The new tax system was divided
into central, local and shared taxes. The central and local governments „eat in separate
kitchens‟ and thus a separated tax administration was created. In the meantime, a
governors‟ responsibility system was introduced (USDA, 2009; Douglass 2009), but there
was no expenditure assignment for all levels of government (Wang, S.G. 1997). Under
these policies all levels of government and institutions tried to extract as much money as
possible from rural people.
In this regard, the tax reform of 1994 was associated with the emergence of excessive
taxes and fees in the late 1990s in rural areas (Li, X.D. 2004; Aubert & Li 2002). The
situation exacerbated and enlarged existing rural-urban disparity. For example, when the
tax-assignment scheme came into effect in 1994, it divided all revenue into central and
local entitlements. A standard formula was imposed on all localities and in this context in
many rural areas at that time local governments illegally raised funds to complement their
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legal taxation revenue. There were arbitrary charges, fines and apportionment of fees (san
luan in Chinese which are luan shou fei, luan fa kuan, luan tan pai). At the same time,
local governments also conducted „grey‟ fund-raising to increase their own
„administration‟ expenditure and living standards (Li, X.D. 2004; Yep 2004; Sato, Li &
Yue 2008). In other words, chaotic, illegal fund-raising and excessive charges, levies,
apportionments and fines were common in rural China in the 1990s. Local governments
tried to raise funds and levy fees and charges from rural residents even to the point of
inviting grass-roots uprisings and mass peasant unrest. It was in this situation that rural
residents not only had to take responsibility for education and healthcare, but also suffered
under a heavy taxation and fee burden. In my fieldwork in Liujiahui the majority of my
elderly and middle-aged interviewees stated that there was not enough money to pay
increasing taxes, charges, apportionments and fees to local officials. Excessive taxes and
fees were levied on individual rural households without explicit government regulations
or documents. Some fees, apportionments and charges were levied based on the amount
of cultivated land whereas other fees, apportionments and charges were based on the
number of household members no matter whether they were a baby, a productive member
of the household, or an elderly person. In the name of legal and government permitted
taxes and fees, some local governments unscrupulously levied farmers even though some
poor households suffered a difficult day-to-day life. This resulted in protests and social
unrest from disgruntled farmers in that period (Li, X.D. 2004; Chen & Chun 2004).
Clearly, it was difficult for farmers to increase their income through farming from the
late 1980s to the 1990s. At the same time, the urban-rural disparity continued to widen in
both income and living standards except for the period between 1994 and 1997 when
many workers in state-owned enterprises were laid-off nationwide (Wang & Piesse 2009).
Table 6.3 shows that the ratio of urban-rural per capita income increased from 1.89 in
1985 to 2.20 in 1990 when the focus of policies moved from rural and agricultural
development to the development of urban areas and industrial sectors, and further
increased to 2.65 in 1999 when excessive taxes and fees had been imposed on rural
people. This ratio was over the figure of 2.56 recorded in 1978 when rural reform began.
In some rural areas informal fees accounted for over 20% of local households‟ income
(Aubert & Li 2002). As Li, C.P. (2008) has concluded, China‟s rural and agricultural
policy reform in the 1990s was basically wrong. In that period China‟s economy made
great progress whereas the majority of rural residents suffered from a difficult day-to-day
life and the majority of rural areas were stagnant. Unsurprisingly, increasing complaints,
protests and social unrest in rural areas had become a crucial issue for the central
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government by the late 1990s.
“Tax-for-Fee” Reform and Urban-rural Inequality
In the late 1990s increasing discontent and social unrest resulted from the excessive
financial burden placed on rural residents challenged the political legitimacy of China‟s
ruling party, the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Kennedy 2007; Chen & Chen 2004;
Yep 2004; Bernstein & Lü 2000). From 2000 to 2003 the central government tried to
reform the rural taxation and fee system in order to reduce the excessive burden placed on
rural residents. This reform was called the „tax-for-fee‟/ „fee-tax-swap‟ reform (shui fei
gaige/fei gai shui) in which the central government regulated a series of policies in
relation to reforming rural taxation and fees and tried to set a limit on the ever-increasing
taxes and fees levied on rural citizens. The „tax-for-fee‟ reform (TFR) was first
implemented in Anhui province in 2000 and then was introduced in most of the provinces
and autonomous regions at the end of 2002 (Sato, Li & Yue 2008; Kennedy 2007). This
reform tried to substitute local fees and levies with a formal taxation system as a means of
relieving the farmers‟ excessive economic burden. This was needed if political and social
stability was to be maintained (Zhu 2002). Chen (2009) has summarized this taxation
reform in three key words: reduction, stabilization and standardization. Reduction related
to the need to decrease the heavy burden levied on farmers. Stabilization referred to
keeping a certain level of rural resident taxation at a consistent level for a long time.
Standardization meant that the policy of „tax-for-fee‟ would be carried out as a long-term
standard agricultural taxation system. The goal of this taxation reform was to abolish the
„five township-pooling funds‟ and „three village levies‟. They were to be replaced by a
single agricultural tax that was intended to prevent the imposition of arbitrary and illegal
levies and charges. Thus in order to compensate for the decrease in fiscal revenue of a
local government due to the cancellation of local funds and levies, the central government
regulated raising the tax rate from three to seven percent and employed an additional levy
on agricultural taxes and special agricultural taxes as a substitute for the village
administrative levy. The standard rate of the additional levy was 20% of the amount of
agricultural taxes (Aubert & Li 2002; Chen 2009). In 2003 the central government
decreed that agricultural taxes should be less than five percent of rural per capita annual
net income of the previous year while the additional tax was reduced from 1.4 to 1 percent
(Aubert & Li 2002; Chen 2009). However, local governments didn‟t want to carry out
these directives from the central government. The result was that the overburdening of
rural residents‟ taxes, levies and informal fees remained an acute issue in rural areas
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during this period. In many rural areas the taxation burden placed on agricultural
households didn‟t dramatically reduce, but increased with the implementation of the „taxfor-fee‟ reform (Shi 2009: 278, 282; Lu & Wiemer 2005; Chen & Chun 2004). The
original purpose of these policies and regulations in relation to this taxation reform was
limited to some extent. In other words, it is hard to say that the real burden placed on the
peasants was reduced under the TFR.
Furthermore, from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, China‟s agricultural market
changed from a shortage of supply through balanced supply to oversupply in harvest
years. In this situation, grain prices decreased and consecutive agricultural output reduced
during this period (OCED, 2005). In 2003, agricultural output decreased to the lowest
point recorded (Cheng 2006). The growth rate of rural residents‟ income declined and the
urban-rural income disparity widened in this period (OCED, 2005). By 2003 the ratio of
urban-rural income per capita had increased to 3.23 from 1.83 in 1984 (NBSC, 1997,
2010, as shown in Table 6.3). It is not arguable that the „tax-for-fee‟ reform didn‟t reduce,
but the excessive burden of rural citizens and rural-urban inequality did increase.
Moreover, under the new fiscal system local governments were responsible for public
provision. Therefore, the direct consequence of the TFR was a decrease in education and
health care services in poor rural areas (Li, X.D. 2004; Kennedy 2007). The urban-rural
inequality was increased rather than narrowed by this reform. In this regard this reform
hurt rather than helped the poorest villagers (Yep 2004). The result of this reform was
significantly different from its initial aim. In my fieldwork, in answer to the question: Has
your heavy taxation burden, levies and fees situation been relieved by the “tax-for-fee”
reform? - 19 out of my 25 elderly and middle-aged interviewees didn‟t think that their
burden had been reduced. I was told that only the name of the financial burden had
changed from fees and levies to taxes accompanied by an increased price for public
services such as health care and education. The amount of their net income had not
increased but decreased.
The experiment of the TFR had relied on financial sponsorship from the central
government. There was a consequent deficit for rural local governments. At the same time
the official media was motivated by their own political interests to claim that there had
been a great achievement in terms of relieving the excessive burden on rural residents.
Many academics suspected that the statistical or survey data in relation to the reduction of
the excessive burden borne by rural citizens released by the National Bureau of Statistics
of China (NBSC) and the Ministry of Agriculture was unreliable. The NBSC had not
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published documents in relation to the details of sampling, fieldwork, coding and editing
of the data. Some pointed to the flaws in evaluating the TFR (Aubert & Li 2002). The
research findings relied on this data and surveys are questioned (Yep 2004; Lin & Liu
2007). In relation to the major interest of peasants the „tax-for-fee‟ program had not
resolved the heavy financial burden placed on peasants. The majority of peasants had not
supported the practice of this policy.
Facing increasing instability in rural communities, in 2004, the Hu-Wen regime had
to change the government‟s urban-biased policy. They needed to introduce a series of new
rural and agricultural policies including subsidies and abolition of agricultural tax.

Government Subsidies, Abolition of Agricultural Tax and the Elderly
in Liujiahui
The first formal document of the New Year issued by the central government is dubbed
the “No. 1 Document (yihao wenjian)”. It is usually a guideline published by the Chinese
government to address „three rurals‟ in the coming year. The “No. 1 Document” of 2004
made sannong the top priority for central government work. The document indicated that
the Chinese government would implement a set of new policies to resolve sannong issues
in coming years. The new policies reflected the Chinese government's new vision for rural
areas, agriculture and rural citizens. This is a segment of Chinese society that needed
support and help. The central government proposed prioritizing and tackling the „three
rurals‟ through increasing farmers' income (2004), improving agricultural production
capacity (2005), pushing forward the "new socialist countryside" scheme (2006),
developing modern agriculture (2007), consolidating the foundation of agriculture (2008),
advancing agricultural development and sustainably increasing in farmer‟s income
(2009), stimulating the agricultural development and narrowing urban-rural disparity
(2010), and investing in water conservation projects (2011).
These new policies were intended to benefit Chinese farmers by subsidising rather
than taxing them since being put into practice in 2004. These new rural and agricultural
policies mainly consist of direct subsidies and indirect subsidies as well as the allocation
of more resources to rural areas. The subsidies cover grain and seeds, agricultural
machinery and tool purchase, and increased investment in rural infrastructure. At the
same time, in 2006, the Chinese government removed the centuries-old agricultural tax
nationwide (Wen 2005; Gale, Lohmar & Tuan 2005; CBR: The China Business Review,
2010). The goal of the policy was to increase the income of farmers and agricultural
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production as a means to maintaining social stability and food security (Wen 2004; Lu &
Wiemer 2005; OCED, 2007). With the global financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese
government implemented indirect subsidy policies that included the rural subsidy
program for home appliances (jia dian xia xiang) and agricultural vehicles implemented
in 2009 (CCCPC&SC, 2009; CBR, 2010).
Overall, the new rural subsidy policies have included five approaches to increase rural
residents‟ incomes: direct agricultural subsidies system, rural subsidy program, the
elimination of agricultural tax, increase investment on rural infrastructure, fiscal and
policy support for rural areas (CBR, 2010; Xinhua, 1 February 2010; Gale, Lohmar &
Tuan 2005, Wen 2004, 2005). In what follows, I will examine each of these five
approaches and their impact on the elderly in Liujiahui village.
Direct Subsidies and the Impact on the Village Elderly
In 2004, the Chinese government introduced its first nationwide direct subsidies policy in
rural areas (OECD, 2007; Gale Lohmar & Tuan 2005; Wen 2004). These subsidies
included the “three kinds of subsidies” and comprehensive direct subsidies. The subsidy
policy initially consisted of direct grain subsidies, grain seed subsidies and purchasing
agricultural machinery and tool subsidies called “three kinds of subsidies (san bu)” (Wen
2005, CCCPC&SC, 2009). With the increasing price of industrial products such as
fertilizer and pesticides, agricultural production material subsidies have been provided
since 2004. In the following years another ten policies have come into effect to stimulate
agricultural production. These are comprehensive direct subsidies. Subsidising the „three
rurals‟ rather than taxing them is a unique policy for the Chinese government in Chinese
history. All these subsidies have been called “four subsidies (si bu)” and “one premium
(yi tie)” (si bu yi tie). The four subsidies are: grain crops with a direct subsidy; a quality
seed subsidy; an agricultural machinery and tools purchasing subsidy; and a farming
materials subsidy. The one premium is providing an allowance and subsidy for the main
grain-producing counties and townships facing financial difficulties (Shi 2009:330; Wen
2005). Much of the Chinese official media and newspapers such as Xinhua and the
People’s Daily have reported that the subsidy policies have increased farmers‟ income.
However, some scholars such as Gale Lohmar & Tuan (2005) and Shi (2009:335-355)
have argued that these policies have only had a minor impact on the increase in farmers‟
income. They have claimed that off-farm incomes of farmers mainly contribute to the
increase in farmers‟ incomes.
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In my fieldwork in Liujiahui, in answer to the question: How do subsidies increase
your income and how much do subsidies contribute to your income? - The majority of my
participants claimed that their income has not been significantly increased by subsidies.
Over 60% of my interviewees stated that doing paid jobs was the main source of their
cash income and subsidies contributed little to their net income. This has indicates that it
is hard to increase rural household income using only subsidies. However, when
questioned over: How do you evaluate subsidy policies? - Over 85% of interviewees
favour these policies. The grain subsidies are the most favoured type of subsidy and this is
consistent with a survey conducted by Shi (2009:340). They also complained about
subsidy policies due to issues arising in the practice and implementation of the policy.
They have received low subsidies for seed and agricultural material purchases and
minimal subsidies for agricultural machinery and tools purchase. For example, they must
go to designated shops to buy seeds if they want to access the seed subsidy. However, the
designated shops are normally managed or owned by government agents or relatives of
local officials or affiliates of local officials who have used bribes to gain their position.
The price of seeds in these shops is generally higher than in the market. At the end of the
day, farmers hardly get a seed subsidy and the subsidy funds allocated to them. These
subsidies directly flow into the pockets of business people and some well placed officials.
On the ground there are new intermediaries emerging between farmers and governments
due to the implementation of the government‟s subsidy policies. These new
intermediaries have become the new rich groups and they have done this by exploiting the
loopholes in subsidy policies.
More importantly, according to the OECD (2007), the level of support for rural
residents from the Chinese government is still lower than the OECD average. For
example, in the period from 2003 to 2005 the level of subsidy for rural people increased
to 8% whereas the OECD‟s subsidy average was 30% in the same period (OECD, 2007).
Although the level of agricultural support is low, the agricultural structure is dominated
by input subsidies and market price support. Some commentators point out that this
approach is the least efficient way to provide agricultural assistance and it causes the most
trade disruption. The practice of subsidy policy in rural China also demonstrates that
farmers have only received a small portion of this type of subsidy from the central
government (OECD, 2007). It is debateable whether the real objective of the Chinese
government is to enhance the income of rural residents or to ease the discontent of rural
people in order to maintain its hold on power.
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In order to counter the corruption associated with subsidies provided by the central
government, information on the subsidies has been widely published in China‟s official
media (including on television programs and in radio broadcasts). This has been done to
ensure that farmers know how much they are entitled to in terms of the subsidies. At the
same time local governments have been urged to ensure that subsidies reach the pockets
of farmers. The standard subsidy was around 10 yuan per mu (approximately AUD $9.00
per acre) for land planted with grain in my home village in 2004, although the central
government has stated that a provincial level government could set its own standard for
granting subsidies to farmers. By 2008 direct subsidies had been increased to more than
40 yuan per mu. In fact, rural residents could get approximately a per capita 20 yuan
subsidy accounting for 0.7% of per capita income with 2936 yuan in 2004 to 80 yuan
subsidy accounting for 1.68% of per capita income with 4761 yuan in 2008, as shown in
Table 6.1. In this sense the subsidies hardly increased rural residents‟ income particularly
if we take into account that China has a huge agricultural population with 2.03 mu of
arable land per capita. The subsidies have had only a minor impact on increasing rural
residents‟ income. In some rural areas the agricultural output has increased whereas the
income of farmers has not increased. In particular, in recent years with the sharply rising
price of the agricultural input such as fertilizer and agricultural water and electricity, it is
very difficult for farmers to increase their net income by farming. In other words, the
subsidies are equal or less than the rising price of the agricultural input. The official report
has showed that prices of major agricultural output such as wheat, rice and maize hardly
increased from 1996 to 2006 and some even decreased, whereas the price of daily
consumer goods such as edible oil, meat, eggs and milk sharply increased and the price of
some even doubled (Chen 2009). Undoubtedly, this situation deeply harmed the interests
of farmers over those ten years (1996-2006). Originally the subsidy policy was intended
to increase rural households‟ income and to reduce the urban-rural income gap and, at the
same time, encourage grain production. However, as Heerink, Kuiper and Shi (2006), and
Gale Lohmar and Tuan (2005) have argued, the direct subsidy policies have not reached
their original objective. Table 6.3 also demonstrates that the ratio of urban-rural income
inequality had increased from 3.20 in 2004 to 3.33 in 2009.
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Table 6.1 Percentage of subsidies in rural per capita income*
Year

Rural per capita

Average subsidies

Percentage of subsidies

income (yuan)

(yuan) per mu

in total income (%)

2004

2936

10

0.7

2008

4761

40

1.68

* The data is taken from the NBSC (2010) and Hansen et al. (2009)
In China the distribution of farming land is based on a household rather than an
individual. The direct subsidies have been granted to rural households based on the
amount of farmland they cultivate. Traditionally, elderly residents in the village are
members of a household. Normally the adult children in the village collect the subsidies.
In other words, the elderly as individuals, rather than as members of producing household,
are not entitled to agricultural subsidies. The day-to-day life of an elderly person has not
changed in light of the subsidies according to my fieldwork and observations. It is very
difficult to conclude that the income of an individual rural elderly person has increased as
a result of the subsidy program. For example, 17 of the 18 I interviewed elderly people in
Liujiahui have not directly received grain subsidies.
The Report on the Work of the Government and the “No. 1 Document” of the
CCCPC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China) have since 2004 annually
declared that a large quantity of funds has been channelled to the „three rurals‟ in order to
raise peasants‟ income and strengthen the development of agriculture and rural areas
(CCCPC&SC, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2010; Wen 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011). There
are also many reports, mainly from government agents (including media outlets such as
Xinhua News Agency and research institutions), on how much funds the central
government have allocated to „three rurals‟ and how big an achievement the program has
been. However, it is very difficult to get real information and data when it is hidden by
local officials in relation to the distribution, use and effect of subsidies at the level of rural
households (Stone 2009).
Indirect Subsidies and the Impact on the Rural Elderly
In order to stimulate domestic consumption in the face of the global financial crisis that
started in 2008, in 2009 an indirect subsidy program was adopted to benefit China‟s rural
residents. The program stipulated that rural citizens would receive a 13 percent subsidy
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when purchasing certain home appliances such as television sets, refrigerators, washing
machines, handsets, computers, and water heaters. The central government also
subsidized the purchase of agricultural machinery and tools ranging in price from 50,000
yuan to 120,000 yuan per unit, depending on the product. A subsidy program for vehicle
purchases was also extended to the end of 2010 and until January 31, 2013 for motorcycle
purchases (CBR, 2010; Xinhua, 1 January 2009). The central government actually has
provided subsidies to rural residents for purchasing designated brand home appliances
through a national program called “jia dian xia xing” (home appliances to rural areas)
since late 2007 (Xinhua, 1 January 2009). This is the rare time in the past 60 years when
rural people could buy industrial products at equal to or less than market price.
Compared to the direct subsidy where every household received a grain subsidy as
long as they cultivated their land and/or have a contract with their collectives to rent
farmland, the indirect subsidy program does not benefit every household in rural areas.
This program only benefits certain groups in rural communities. It only benefits those
who buy home appliances, agricultural machinery and vehicles. Poor households who
fight to survive have no extra money to buy these products and so do not receive the
subsidy. The program originally aimed to stimulate rural market demand and withdraw
money from the pockets of farmers to assist the home appliances industry, auto industry
and relative industrial sectors to be more profitable when facing particularly fierce global
competition at the time of the global financial crisis. This subsidy programme is now
increasing domestic demand in general and demand in the rural market in particular. It is
intended to off-set heavy dependence on the international market which in turn has
become one of the main tasks of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period for the Chinese
government (Wen 2011; NPC, 2011). On one hand, the program has stimulated rural
market demand and has improved the living standard of rural households. On the other
hand, the subsidies have had only a minor impact on improving the life quality of rural
residents. For example, when asked - Have you bought a home appliance in the past two
years? - Only one of my interviewees had bought a television set using a subsidy while
two had purchased refrigerators without using subsidies and none had bought a computer.
This reply implies that not many villagers have benefited from the home appliances
subsidy program since this indirect subsidy policy came into effect. In answer to the
question: Do you know about the subsidies for home appliances? Over half of my
interviewees did not know about subsidies for refrigerators and computers while the
majority did know about subsidies for the purchase of television sets. I do not know why
rural residents are ill-informed. It has indicated that there is a gap between policies and
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implementation. In Liujiahui only one third of households possess refrigerators and only a
few households possess a computer. Three households had cars used for taxi services in
2010. There is a huge space for the sale of home appliances and vehicles in rural China.
There is a reported oversupply of goods on one side of the equation and on the other side
there is a large demand from rural markets and there are subsidies available to farmers
with some (a minority of) rural residents lucky enough to be able to afford to purchase the
goods in question.
The central government has also stressed that 40 billion yuan in subsidies will be
provided in order to enable rural people to receive real benefit (Wen 2009). But there is
not enough extra money in the pockets of rural people to purchase these white goods. In
the context of the global financial crisis some media outlets including Financial Times
argued that rural people could contribute their savings to the crisis (Alloway 2011; Zhou,
J. G. 2009; The Economist, 13 November 2008). This argument has shocked academic
communities when looking at increasing cost of children‟s education, housing and health
care for rural people. Scholars with a background in Chinese history understand the
difficult day-to-day life of rural residents. It is impossible for rural residents to buy
consumer goods using their precautionary savings and so stimulate domestic demand
when their annual income has not reached US$800. Certainly rural residents‟ savings
could expand domestic demand but this will only happen when the government spends
more on rural social welfare such as health care and aged insurance and when rural people
are not worried about meeting essential service expenditure and costs.
It is too little to offer a 13% subsidy to rural citizens for the purchase of home
appliances when looking at offering a 10% subsidy to city citizens to purchase new home
replacement appliances. The latter‟s per capita income was 17,175 yuan in 2009, 3.33
times more than their rural counterparts with 5,153 yuan (NBSC, 2010; CBR, 2010). This
reflects not only the huge disparity in income and living standard between urban and rural
households, but also extends the unfair policies which have existed for over half a century
in China. In the long run, it is difficult to extract rural household money using indirect
subsidies that will support industrial growth if China‟s nongmin do not have rights equal
with their urban counterparts. China‟s nongmin must be entitled to welfare including
medicare, education and the minimum living standards.
More seriously, the indirect subsidy program has widened the gap in income and
living standard not only between urban and rural households, but also between rural rich
and poor urban and rural residents. For example, some city householders have bought cars
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and travelled overseas, while some rural residents cannot afford to buy a television set and
haven‟t experienced riding in cars and taxis or have even not ridden on a train. In my
fieldwork in Liujiahui, only three of 18 of my elderly interviewees have seen a personal
computer and none of them have touched one. They do not know what the Internet is.
Only one interviewee knew how to use a washing machine. In answer to the question: Do
you have plans to purchase home appliances using the subsidy program in the near future?
None of them had such a plan. However, when questioned over: Do you favour the rural
subsidy program? - Many middle-aged and young participants supported it, whereas
many elderly people don‟t care about it. This implies that middle-aged and young people
are potential buyers and the elderly are not likely to be white-goods consumers.
Consumer interest in rural areas should be protected in the process of indirect subsidy
programs. A survey cited by Zhao (2011) has showed that the quality of some home
appliances related to the subsidy program is poor. I also found that some retail shops
deliberately deceived rural residents in terms of prices, quality and after-sales service.
They were taking advantage of the subsidy program. For example, a rural resident could
pay 970 yuan to buy a television set priced 1100 yuan in some rural shops with a subsidy
of 130 yuan while such a television set is being sold at between 950-1000 yuan in the
provincial capital of Shijiazhuang. In other words, rural residents have not received any
real benefit from this subsidy program. There is no efficient practical system and
monitoring system for the subsidy program. Subsidies can too easily flow into the pocket
of business people, government agents and new emerging intermediaries (Xi 2010).
Terminating the Agricultural Tax and the Impact on Rural Areas
In my fieldwork the majority of villagers misunderstood the cancellation of the
agricultural tax. When I asked - Do you know that you need to pay other taxes including
personal income taxes even though the agricultural tax was terminated? – All my
interviewees replied that the cancellation of the agricultural tax meant that they would not
need to pay tax anymore. In answer to the question: Do you know why the central
government terminated the agricultural tax? - Many interviewees replied that local
officials extracted too much money from rural citizens using taxation. The government
will lose the support of the grassroots population if excessive rural taxation burden
continued.
The majority of rural people I interviewed strongly support President Hu Jintao and
Premier Wen Jiabao (Huo 2008-2009). They argue that the beneficial policies of these
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leaders will reach grassroots people. They said that President Hu and Premier Wen are
representatives of ordinary people‟s interests and they are presiding over the best empires
except for the Mao Zedong period in Chinese history. The state run media has advocated
over the benefit of policies adopted by the Hu-Wen government (Liu & Dong 6 March
2006). This situation could easily plant the seed of dissatisfaction among rural residents.
This is particularly the case when the following situation is considered. The cancellation
of agricultural tax does not mean that rural citizens do not need to pay any taxes at all.
Rural residents as citizens of the country still should pay all other taxes such as the valued
added tax, income tax, deposit tax and vehicle and vessel usage tax. The personal incomes
of the absolute majority of rural residents haven‟t reached a taxable threshold so far. In
answer to the question: Would you still support the government if the agricultural tax was
resumed? - 15 of 30 of my interviewees would not support the re-instatement of an
agricultural tax, 13 believed that they must follow the direction of the central government
and two didn‟t know what their reaction would be.
Compared to the direct subsidy policy, the abolition of the agricultural tax has had an
important influence on easing discontent among farmers even though it has only provided
a modest increase in rural citizens‟ incomes (Gale et al. 2005; Heerink et al. 2006; Shi
2009:359-372).
The data provided by official statistics in relation to the percentage of agricultural tax
in a rural household income is different in different situations. For example, the NBSC
has stated that rural residents‟ income has been significantly increased, whereas a report
from the Agricultural Ministry suggests that farmers‟ income has not changed a lot with
the abolition of the agricultural tax. The results from some scholars like Shi (2009:362372) demonstrates that taxation reform has had a minimum impact when it comes to
increasing farmers‟ income, but it has had a significant impact on their thinking in relation
to farming and this has increased their agricultural output. This tells us that it is difficult to
judge the role of the termination of the agricultural tax in raising a rural households‟
income. The abolition of the agricultural tax should be scrutinized using a wide lens. The
abolition of the agricultural tax and fees could lead to a deterioration in public service
provision and hurt regional economic growth (Zhao, X. F. 2010; Sato et al. 2008;
Kennedy 2007). This means that the systemic discrimination against rural residents has
not changed and a fair systemic policy framework for public service provision in rural
areas has not been built up. Therefore, in the long run, the effect of agricultural tax
abolition is still unclear. Chang (2002) argues that the scheme for transferring funds to
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rural residents through reforming the taxing systems is badly designed because the tax has
the capacity to damage the growth of the modern urban sector and this could adversely
affect the economic growth of the Chinese nation and it could affect the absorption of
surplus rural labour. At the same time, it is very likely that local governments will
continue to collect miscellaneous and informal fees, levies and fines. This is particularly
the case when rural residents have not been allowed to develop their own organisations to
fight largely unreformed local administrations and institutions (OCED, 2007; Zhou 2011).
At this point in my argument it is worthwhile paying attention to the dispute in
relation to rented farmland between villagers, between local governments and local
households in the course of the rural land-use reform that began in 2008. In my fieldwork
in Liujiahui, the disputes over subsidies for farmland among some villagers (even close
relatives) have been happening since the implementation of rural subsidies and the
termination of agricultural taxation. For example, I was told a story in relation to the rent
of farmland and associated subsidies. An elder brother moved to a neighbouring village.
His younger brother rented his farmland. He asked his younger brother to return the land
to him after the abolition of the agricultural tax and the government provision of
subsidies. His younger brother refused. The two brothers engaged in verbal abuse and
physical conflict. This was not an isolated case in the village. This has broken the
harmony of rural communities. In the period of heavy taxation levied on farmers, some
villagers who are migrants lent their farmland to their poor villager fellows who had to
pay agricultural tax and levies for the farmland they had borrowed. It is common practice
among villagers that the one who cultivates the land must pay related agricultural taxes
and fees. A new issue arises with the implementation of subsidisation policies and the
abolition of the agricultural tax. This issue is: Who should be entitled to receive the
subsidies because subsidies are based on the amount of cultivated land? However, the
rules and regulations don‟t clearly state whether subsidies should go to the farmers who
originally had the right to use the land or to the farmers who rent and cultivate the land.
Furthermore, the majority of residents lent or unlawfully sold their land to a few
developers or farmers who conducted large scale farming efficiently and so got more
benefit from the government in some more developed rural areas in the course of rural
land-use reform. Moreover, some local governments have abused rural land-use reform
by violently occupying farmers' farmland and demolishing their houses. This has resulted
in violence and conflict between local officials and residents in some rural areas. Premier
Wen Jiabao has warned that the conflict associated with the transfer of land use rights
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between local officials and residents has become one of the central issues in rural areas
(Xinhua, 4 April 2011). Rural residents use access to cultivatable land as a hedge against
unemployment. If access to land is blocked the gap between rural rich and poor will
widen. It also has the potential to trigger social unrest in rural areas. The central
government consistently stresses that the transfer of land-use rights must be on the basis
of compensation. It must also be voluntary and be practised in accord with the law (Wen
2009; CCCPC&SC, 2009). However, many local governments have neglected this
approach and have brutally expropriated the farmland of rural households in order to
pursue maximum economic profit. It is reported that local government administrators in
more than 20 provinces have forced farmers to abandon their homes and move into
apartment buildings (China Daily, 4 April 2011). It is also reported that all levels of
government made a profit of 2.7 trillion yuan in 2010 from land sales. This was an
increase of 70% compared with 2009 (Sun 2011). Land sales have become not only a
backbone of local economies and been called “land finance (tudi caizheng)” (Cao & Feng
2008) but also a hot-bed of corruption in some rural areas. This is a new form of
deprivation of wealth for rural people in the post-tax and fees era.
Budget Priority given to Investing in Rural Infrastructure
The new policy in relation to „three rurals‟ has also emphasised enhancement of
investment in rural infrastructure. The “No. 1 documents” presented in 2010 and 2011
stated that the budget would prioritise investment in rural infrastructure and construction
in order to improve the income and livelihood of rural residents (CCCPC&SC, 2010,
2011). Premier Wen Jiabao in his 2011 government report promised that the central
government would increase funding for agricultural and rural infrastructure in order to
benefit farmers (Wen 2011). This means that significant funds will be channelled into
China‟s vast rural hinterland in coming years. Rural infrastructure such as roads and
irrigation systems are expected to be significantly improved. However, only 30% of the
appropriated funds have been spent on agriculture, rural areas and rural residents. The rest
of the funds have been covertly embezzled according to a survey presented by the
Development Research Centre of China‟s State Council (Gale et al. 2005). Most
embezzled funds have been used for operating expenses by various levels of government
or government agents. They have been used to purchase luxurious cars and for paying for
banquets. For example, a tragedy happened in Guizhou Province, one of the poorest
provinces in China, in 2010. A local policeman abused his power and deliberately killed a
rural resident who was the father of two young children (Bao 2009; Fa 2010). News of the
165

tragedy rapidly spread over the Internet and caused anger nationwide. The local
government then garnered a large quantity of rural subsidy funds that had been granted to
the sannong to compensate the victim (Fa 2010).
When undertaking my fieldwork, I found that a new cement road in Liujiahui had
recently been built and that a new irrigation system had recently been finished. Funds for
this infrastructural development had come from the central government. However, many
interviewees believed that the funds were partly embezzled by the local officials at
county, township and village level because the road and the irrigation system are of poor
quality. For example, the new road is only one-way (and not two-way) and one car has to
stop otherwise a crash will happen if another car is approaching. Nobody believed that the
road was designed to be a one-way road. In answer to the question: Do you know how
much funding has been granted to the village for infrastructural development? - None of
my interviewees knew the answer to the question. For example, in order to safeguard
drinking water for the villagers special funding was granted to the village, but the funding
has not been used as intended. Instead, village cadres distributed it (200 yuan) to each
village group. Then the money went equally to each household in the group because a
standard piped drinking water station couldn‟t be built with this money. A standard
drinking water station has not been built in the village under the program for safe drinking
water for rural residents. Villagers still have to use unsafe drinking water. The extent of
the funding allocated by the central government to the village for this special program is
unknown and so a realistic profile of the distribution of the funds is not possible. It is
worthwhile paying attention to efficiently monitoring central government funds provided
for the benefit of rural residents. Otherwise, grassroots‟ government may well shake the
foundation of the central government. Local governments who pay only lip service to
upper level government goals have often distorted central government policy
implementation. Unsurprisingly, strengthening the government's internal reforms and
building transparent government mechanisms are objectives and tasks for the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan period of the Chinese government (Wen 2011; NPC, 2011).

Urban-Rural Inequality, Subsidies, and Discontent among Rural
Residents
It is broadly recognised that urban-rural disparity has not reduced but widened in recent
years in China. Tension between grassroots-local ruling groups and local residents has
escalated in some rural areas.
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China‟s government-run media such as CCTV (China Central Television – zhongguo
zhongyang dianshi tai) and the People’s Daily frequently has reported that the enormous
progress made in implementing the government‟s economic goals over the past three
decades. There is a reluctance to acknowledge widening social and economic disparity
between rural and urban, rich and poor households in official documents. However,
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have to face this growing inequality, which
has led to escalating social unrest and resentment nationwide (Tan 2009; Xinhua, 22
January 2010). Shao (2010) in Qiu Shi, an academic journal authorised by the CPC, has
urged that the widening disparity between urban and rural, rich and poor has threatened
the ruling power of the CPC. This is the first time that an authorized academic journal has
argued that the ruling power of the CPC will be at risk if growing inequality cannot be
reduced. Cong & Li (2010) from Xinhua News Agency (they are senior research fellows)
also recognized and warned that China‟s Gini coefficient reached its highest recorded
ratio in 2008.
Urban-Rural Inequality
Many “mass incidents (qun ti shi jian)” have broken out in both urban and rural areas
recently (Yu 2007; Stone 2009). The Gini coefficient (or index) is an internationally
accepted measurement of income disparity. Most developed countries have Gini
coefficients of between 0.24 and 0.36 (China Daily, 19 June 2005). There are different
versions of China‟s Gini coefficients in different sources. According to the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) the China‟s Gini coefficient stood at 0.496 in 2005
while the OECD put it at 0.41 (Song 2010), the NBSC 0.4494 (He 2007) and the World
bank put the figure at over 0.45 in 2005 (López et al. 2008). In spite of different sets of
figures, it seems safe to conclude that China‟s Gini coefficient has climbed from 0.24 in
1984 to 0.4008 in 1994, and to over 0.4 in 2000s (He 2007; López et al. 2008). This
indicates that income inequality has widened in the past decades as shown in Table 6.3.
The level of China‟s Gini coefficients is similar to that of many Latin American and
African countries and higher than that of the US or any other developed country (López et
al. 2008). The NBSC officially released the Gini coefficient in 2004; it was 0.47. This is
well above the internationally accepted alarm threshold of 0.4 (China Daily, 25 July
2005). The debate on China‟s Gini coefficients and its association with social crises has
attracted considerable attention (He 2007). Some scholars such as Cai Fang (Liu 2011;
Wang & Meng 2011), Li Yining (Cui 5 January 2012), and Zhang Wuchang (Li, M. 13
September 2008) and politician including Liu Ji (Li, M. 13 September 2008) argue that
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the Gini coefficient does not suit the situation in China, whereas many others including
Cong & Li (2011), He (2007) and China Daily (25 July 2005) are concerned that China‟s
Gini coefficients are already above the internationally accepted warning level.
Undoubtedly, the rural-urban income disparity is one of the main contributors to China‟s
income inequality and high Gini coefficients.
The living standard of disadvantage groups like the elderly in Liujiahui has not
essentially changed in recent years. In contrast, the number of the billionaires in China has
dramatically increased from 26 in 2009 to 64 in 2010 (Forbes, 2010). The income of the
richest 10 % of the population was 23 times that of the poorest 10 % in 2007, whereas
only 7.3 times in 1998 (Chen 2010). This also implies that wealth and capital have been
concentrated among the few richest people whereas many if not most of China‟s rural
residents have not significantly changed their economic situation and living conditions.
Table 6.2 China‟s Gini Coefficients from 1984 to 2006*
Year

1984

1994

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Gini

0.24

0.40

0.37

0.38

0.39

0.41

0.42

0.43

0.44

0.44

0.45

0.46

*Sources: The data is taken from China Daily (25 July 2005), He (2007), López et al. (2008),
CIA, 2010 and Song (2010).

The following story demonstrates how big the income gap between urban-rural
households is and how big difference is between the living standard of these groups.
Shocking images of a chain locking a baby boy in Beijing were put on the Internet on
4 February 2010. The incident happened in a Western suburb on the outskirts of Beijing
(Fangshan, Liangxiang) at the shopping centre. A two-year-old boy was chained to a post
outside the shopping centre when his unlicensed motorbike taxi driver father, Chuanliu
Chen, from a rural village of Sichuan province, a migrant, was at work nearby. He had
already tied his son there for three or four days. Chen would bring the boy back home
after work every day. His four-year-old daughter had gone missing a month before from
the same location where the boy was being chained, and this is the extreme measure the
father had taken to keep his son safe. He had no relatives in Beijing and he had to work to
support his family and he had no time to take care of his baby son. He could not also
afford to send the little boy to a kindergarten. This is why he chained his son rather than
let the boy go missing. He stopped the practice on 5 February 2010 after intervention
from the local government and this was due to the widespread dissemination of the news
on the Internet. This type of information could threaten the political career of local
officials. The boy's mother is reportedly mentally disabled (People’s Daily Online, 3
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February 2010). His family and his son can‟t get any welfare and help from the local
government due to his rural resident status, i.e. his family doesn‟t have a Beijing hukou.
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Table 6.3 Urban-rural income gap from 1978 to 2010*
Year

Urban

Rural

Gap (¥)

Ratio

Urban

1978

316

133.6

183

2.56

-

-

1979

-

-

-

2.42

-

-

1980

439

191

248

2.50

-

-

1981

-

-

-

2.20

-

-

1982

-

-

-

1.95

-

-

1983

564

254

310

1.82

6.4

14.7

1984

-

-

-

1.83

-

-

1985

752

397

355

1.89

23.8

1986

827

424

403

2.12

-

-

1987

916

463

453

2.17

-

-

1988

1119

545

574

2.17

-

-

1989

1260

602

658

2.29

-

-

1990

1387

686

701

2.20

-

-

1991

1544

709

835

2.40

-

-

1992

1826

784

1042

2.59

-

-

1993

2336

922

1414

2.80

-

-

1994

3179

1221

1958

2.86

-

-

1995

3892

1578

2314

2.72

-

-

1996

4377

1926

2451

2.51

-

-

1997

5160

2090

3070

2.47

3.4

4.6

1998

5425

2162

3263

2.51

5.8

4.3

1999

5854

2210

3644

2.65

9.3

3.8

2000

6280

2253

4027

2.79

6.4

2.1

2001

6860

2366

4494

2.90

8.5

4.2

2002

7703

2476

5227

3.11

13.4

4.8

2003

8472

2622

5850

3.23

9.0

4.3

2004

9422

2936

6486

3.20

7.7

6.8

2005

10493

3255

7238

3.22

9.6

6.2

2006

11759

3587

8172

3.28

10.4

7.4

2007

13786

4140

9646

3.33

12.2

9.5

2008

15781

4761

11020

3.31

8.4

8.0

2009

17175

5153

12022

3.33

8.8

8.2

2010

19109

5919

-

8.9

9.7

-

Rural

11.8

*Note: This data is based on the NBSC (1997, 2010, 2011) and Wen (2011).
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Per capita income in yuan (¥). Percent change (%) in real terms from a year
earlier. Gap (¥) = Urban per capita income – rural one. „-‟ means that data
cannot be collected via the NBSC.
While poor rural people have had to work hard to survive, the rich in general, and
some public servants and management level staff of state-owned companies in particular,
have been enjoying an extravagant day-to-day life. Some have been charged with
gambling for high stakes and spending thousands of dollars on dinners and entertainment.
The ordinary Chinese are angry about the general manager of the state-owned Sinopec
cooperation squandering 40,000 yuan ($5,882) a day on banquets, whereas a man in the
countryside committed suicide because he couldn't pay 4,800 yuan a year for his son‟s
university tuition fees (Liu 2009). Table 6.3 shows how huge the rural-urban income gap
is and how fast the gap has increased in the past three decades.
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Figure 6.1 The increasing urban-rural income gap from 1978 to 2010
Note: In Figure 6.1, the blue curve is the change in urban per capita income. The red
curve is the change in rural per capita income.
Drawing from both Table 6.3 and Figure 6.1 it can be seen that the rural-urban
income gap has widened in the past three decades. Table 6.3 demonstrates that it has been
a trend that the growth rate of rural residents‟ income is lower than that of urban residents
in the period since the 1990s. Furthermore, the growth rate of peasants‟ income had
continually decreased from 4.6% in 1997 to 2.1% in 2000, while the rate of city residents‟
income has continually increased from 3.4% in 1997 to 6.9% in 2000. In 2009, the urban171

rural income gap climbed to the highest point recorded: 17175 yuan against 5153 yuan
over the past 32 years when China‟s reform and opening-up policies started in 1979
(NBSC, 2010). Some scholars like Wang Xiaolu (senior research fellow at the National
Economic Research Institute of the China Reform Foundation. This is an independent
non-governmental research organization in China) have argued that the data on income
distribution released by the NBSC is suspect (KW, 2010). His surveys show that the
disparity between the rich and poor and urban and rural income per capita is much higher
than that of the NBSC. For example, the highest income in urban areas is 65 times the
lowest average in rural areas instead of the 23 times released by the NBSC. This is nearly
3 times the official estimate (KW, 2010). His results were cited in China‟s mainstream
media outlets including Time Weekly (Cui 5 January 2012) and The Economic Observer
(12 May 2012). Urban-rural inequality is a growing social issue. The Chinese government
has tried to mitigate this disparity through a series of beneficial policies that focus on rural
areas. This has been happening since 2004. Since then, the difference in growth rate
between urban and rural areas has slowed, but the disparity in residents‟ income has
continued to be large. The widening rural-urban income gap has not changed, but the
speed of growth in the gap has been somewhat reduced. The urban-rural income gap is
even bigger when taking into account the welfare provision that urban citizens enjoy.
Moreover, inflation in rural areas has been higher than in the cities in recent years (Subler
2008) and this means that any increase in rural residents‟ income has been eroded by
rising prices.
Surveys clearly show that the excessive disparity of income between urban and rural
citizens is a major issue and a top threat to China‟s future development (Xinhua, 22
January 2010; Cong & Li 2010; López et al. 2008; OECD, 2007). The rights and interests
of China‟s nongmin have been sacrificed through the price scissors in the period from
1950s to 1980s, excessive taxes and fees in 1990s and cheap labour and land provided to
cities in the 21st century. The question then is: Why have the rights and interests of
Chinese nongmin been consistently sacrificed?
Subsidies and Dissatisfaction among Rural Residents
Members of local ruling groups are either local officials or business professionals and
intellectual elites. Since the 1990s tension between local ruling groups and local villagers
has become a big issue in rural areas.
The majority of the villagers I interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with local grass172

roots officials such as village and township administrators. For example, in answer to the
question: Do you think that local officials represent villagers‟ interests and rights? And,
are you satisfied with their governance and services? - None of my interviewees answered
“Yes”. They stated that it is the job of the central government or an upper level leader to
force local officials to stop hurting the interests and rights of rural residents. My
interviewees clearly recognized that local officials have been obtaining illegal or grey
incomes by abusing central government provided funds and subsidies. For example, many
villagers believe that local officials and businessmen appropriated part of the special
funds provided for the construction of the village road and irrigation infrastructure. The
villagers suspect that the majority of the appropriated funds have been embezzled.
Another example is related to the program of financial support for villagers to plant
walnut trees to increase their income. Under this program the county government
provided a subsidy of 3 yuan per tree including 1.5 yuan for a sapling and 1.5 yuan for
digging a hole to plant the tree. This means that villagers would get a 3 yuan subsidy for
planting just one tree. However, they haven‟t received this subsidy. On the contrary, they
have had to pay 1.5 yuan to purchase a sapling. In this process the 3 yuan subsidy per tree
has been misappropriated by local officials. At the same time, local cadres received an
extra 1.5 yuan per tree from the villagers. It is easy to calculate how much the local
officials misappropriated because tens of thousands of trees have been planted in the
village in the name of increasing the income of rural residents. Surprisingly no villagers
knew the truth of the subsidy story. They think that they should pay if they have a sapling.
During my fieldwork I found a document setting out the situation. The document came
from the Pingshan County Council. I found it when doing some local archival research.
The dissatisfaction with local officials is easily seeded into the heart of villagers when
local officials abuse their power and benefit from bribes and corruption. For example, a
group of elderly residents of Nongtai Village, Donglan County, Guangxi Province, found
they had to plead to local government officials for a road to be built connecting their
village to the outside. This would allow them to more easily load drinking water (Ma
2010). For five years the villagers had been levied for the construction of a road to
connect their village to the outside, but the road was not built until March 2010 when
there was a drought lasting a few of months and the village elderly found they had to go
5-10 kilometres away to fetch drinking water every day because the young villagers had
gone to the cities as rural-urban migrants. The villagers were entitled to the road, but they
did know where their levy money had gone. This information was not available and the
road was only built once matters had become critical.
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The following is another incidence of the self-interested behaviour of local officials.
The villagers in Weidi Village, Sui County, Henan Province, did not receive
compensation after their farming land had been illegally requisitioned by local
government officials. The villagers had to petition their township government. However,
an elderly person aged 70-years-old was arrested by the local police. Then, over 20
villagers were also arrested when they protested over the illegal arrest of the elderly
person (Xinjing Bao, 2010).
Dissatisfaction in Liujiahui
Compared with the majority of villagers, township and village cadres are richer, and have
a higher standard of living. This is reflected in their clothing, housing, and overall income
and expenditure. Becoming a local cadre improves a person‟s economic situation.
Villagers quite reasonably question the legitimacy of these cadres‟ income claims. The
essential reason for the villagers‟ dissatisfaction is that local ruling groups have distorted
social fairness and justice. In answer to the question: How do you evaluate your rich
village fellows? - Many villagers stated that they respected those who are richer through
working hard, whereas they looked down on those who got rich through abusing power
and seizing public assets. One of my interviewees noted that villagers had known each
other very well for generations and so they could assess how much of their income was
legally received. The villagers said that they did not want to topple the government, but
they did want to express their concern over social fairness and justice. One of my
interviewees said that a vicious incident had happened in the village. In the 1990s every
household in the village was obliged to plant special corn in order to generate high quality
seed, but the county government agency didn‟t pay them when they collected the seed.
This happened year after year. The money would have been a lifeline for the villagers. No
institution or official cared to remedy this matter even when faced with hundreds of
complaints. The villagers, including the elderly and even children, found they had to
petition for payment of their money. They presented their petition in the front of the
county government building. When lacking an effective channel to voice their
dissatisfaction or grievance they had had to resort to using a petition. Premier Wen Jiabao
(2011) has stressed that all levels of government must pay more attention to effectively
addressing people‟s grievances. They must directly address soaring dissatisfaction or
grievance of ordinary people. When asked: How do you assess the gap of income and
living standards between local officials and elderly people? - All my interviewees claimed
that they hated some officials abusing their power in order to sustain a relatively luxurious
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life-style. Two of my interviewees directly said that „9 out of 10 cadres are corrupt (shege
gangbu, jiuge tan)‟. These officials, however, are hardly punished by the judicial system.
It is clearly a long term and urgent task for the Chinese government to promote clean
government and combat corruption (Wen 2011).
Some local cadres not only grab public assets, but are also reluctant to provide
professional services for villagers, especially for disadvantaged groups such as the elderly
and women. Traditionally, and particularly in the period between the 1950s and 1980s,
local cadres mediated disputes between villagers and between family members such as
parents-in-law and daughter-in-law. In answer to the question: Would you ask cadres for
assistance in settling your disputes if you were abused by your adult children or family
members? - Only two of 30 of my interviewees answer „Yes‟. This leads us to question
why villagers have changed their traditional way of settling their disputes in the period
since the introduction of reform. One elderly person stated that local cadres don‟t like
providing services for the elderly because they are unlikely to receive any material reward
for their trouble. Elderly villagers know that cadres are not intending to address their
disputes and they no longer request assistance. This is one of the possible reasons why
violence in the village has increased since the 1980s. Three of my interviewees, former
cadres, stated that village cadres took responsibility not only for public services but also
for the private life of villagers during the collective system of the Mao era. In my
memory, an elderly person could ask for help from local cadres if their adult children
bullied them or if their children didn‟t fulfil their responsibilities. With the collapse of the
collective system local cadres have withdrawn rather than continued their traditional
duties toward villagers.
The question of how to build an effective administrative and fiscal system and
provide public services to meet local needs is a difficult issue. It has been made even
more difficult by the removal of the agricultural tax (Wen 2011; Sato, Li & Yue 2008;
Tao & Liu 2005). Otherwise, local governments and officials would still be able to find
ways to grab the assets of farmers as they do when they abuse farmland requisitions. And,
township and village governments have been charged with the important responsibility of
providing local public services. The transition of local governments from agents for the
distribution of resources to agents for the provision of public services has not necessarily
reduced the importance of local institutional arrangements and their influence on rural
households, but it has strengthened the importance of a local government as a provider of
local public goods. This has had a direct influence on household income and according to
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Sato (2008), the different degrees of delivery and financing of local public goods by local
governments has had different impacts on the income of the local residents.
Providing more public goods is associated with the quality of economic growth and
with poverty reduction (López et al. 2008:7). China has experienced a remarkable
achievement in economic growth and poverty reduction in past decades and this is a
necessary condition for providing satisfactory public services in rural China. The Chinese
government has put institutional reform as the main task in the 12th Five Year Plan period
from 2011 to 2015 and the building of a service-oriented government (Wen 2010; NPC,
2011). The question now is - What will happen at the local level?
Soft Voices of the Elderly in Liujiahui
The World Development Report 2006 (World Bank, 2005:2) has demonstrated that poor
people are „associated with inequalities of voice or influence both in the shaping of policy
and in its effective implementation‟. The soft voice of the elderly residents of Liujiahui is
an example.
The Party claims to represent the interests of all rural people (Constitution of the
PRC, 2004), but a truly autonomous rural citizens‟ organisations are illegal and not
allowed in China. The villagers have no formal institutions to rely on to voice their
particular grievances and wishes. In fact, none of representatives or groups at any level of
government or government organisations and agencies has visited the village to listen to
the voice of the village elderly and collect their opinions. For example, in answer to the
question: Did a representative or agent come to the village to listen to your grievances,
complaints, wishes, opinions and suggestions in relation to the principal interests of the
elderly? - None of the 18 elderly residents I interviewed had ever been asked for their
opinion by a representative or official. There is an urgent need to establish organisations
or institutions in rural areas that represent the voice of the rural elderly. Serving all people
wholeheartedly (quanxin quanyi wei renmin fuwu) including listening to all citizens‟
voice to pacify their grievances and to meet their wishes is the basic duty of the Chinese
government (CCPC: Chinese Communist Party Constitution, 2007; Wen 2011). In answer
to the question: How do you know that the oldest of old villagers are eligible to receive a
pension? - None of those I interviewed had received formal notice or documents in
relation to the pension. They obtained their information from television programs or from
their fellow villagers. Then, village cadres informed the qualified elderly that they could
collect money from the village committee office. I do not know the correct procedure for
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informing villagers or executing this policy in rural areas because the cadres I interviewed
had not received a formal document. They were also following oral directives this time
from the township government.
It is difficult to correctly gauge the actual situation in rural China because some
elderly residents are not well educated. Many of the village elderly are illiterate or semiliterate. Nevertheless, rural citizens have a right to receive formal documents and
information that relates to their welfare.

Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the subsidy policies related to the „three rurals‟ and their
impact on China‟s rural elderly. More specifically, I have explored rural and agricultural
policy reform and the widening of urban-rural inequality. China‟s agricultural and rural
development policies have been a vital component of the development of agriculture and
these policies have had a direct effect on rural residents‟ income and standard of living.
The introduction of the “five township-pooling funds” and the “three village levies”
system and the fiscal reform in the late 1980s and 1990s led to a situation where rural
residents were subject to an excessive financial burden. Rural-urban inequality increased
and the situation resulted in dissatisfaction and protests by farmers nationwide. In
response, and in order to consolidate and protect the political legitimacy of the CPC, the
central government decided to institute a “tax-for-fee” reform. This was an attempt to set
a limit on rural residents‟ tax and fee burden. However, this reform did not significantly
reduce the financial load borne by rural households. Indeed, it increased their excessive
financial burden and at the same time public services such as education and health care
that had been provided to rural areas declined drastically. The result was further
dissatisfaction among villagers. In 2004, the Hu-Wen government decided they must
address the situation. The central government implemented policies that began to change
their country‟s entrenched urban-bias policies. A series of new rural and agricultural
policies were introduced. One of the most important of these new policies was the
termination of agricultural tax nationwide in 2006. However, the termination of the
agricultural tax and the introduction of new rural subsidy policies have had little overall
impact on the bid to increase both farmers‟ income and agricultural production. Urbanrural inequality has continued to increase. The urban-rural income ratio reached 3.33: 1 in
2009. This was the highest level for over 32 years.
The termination of the agricultural tax has brought new challenges for the Chinese
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government. The tension between local ruling groups and local villagers has escalated in
some rural communities. My fieldwork demonstrated that the elderly in the village gained
hardly any direct benefit from the new policies. The rural elderly have no institutions or
organisations through which to voice their grievances and wishes in the current political
system. It is an urgent need to establish organisations or institutions in rural areas that
representing the elderly rural residents‟ voice. However, there is still a long way to go
before the Chinese government will have addressed rural people‟s grievances and the
needs of the rural elderly in particular.
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Conclusion

For the past three decades China‟s economic reform has led to rapid and unprecedented
economic growth and social change. These socioeconomic changes have had a significant
impact on China‟s elderly rural citizens. While in the most general sense China‟s
economic reform has promoted the livelihood of the country‟s rural population, the
majority of China‟s elderly rural citizens continue to be obliged to rely on their adult
children for support and care. They have not enjoyed the same degree of benefit from
China‟s economic reform as their urban counter-parts. They often lack income security
and in a substantial number of cases neither family support nor government assistance are
providing them with sufficient resources. Access to affordable health care is a big issue.
My research indicates that China‟s current generation of rural elderly, including the
oldest of the old, haven‟t benefited from traditional filial piety and they have derived
much less benefit from economic reform than other citizens. In this situation they are
victims of both Old China (before 1949) and modern China and economic reform. Their
parents were the beneficiaries of traditional filial piety from Old China and their children
and grandchildren (the current cohort of middle-aged Chinese citizens and their children)
have benefited a great deal from reform. A substantial number of the old have also found
that they must offer financial support to their adult children. For example, they have
funded the building of village houses and the purchase of units in cities and towns. They
have used their precautionary savings when their adult children have needed funds. The
old are then open to risk in terms of their on-going care. The crisis in rural elderly care
has the potential to challenge the legitimacy of the Party and threaten social stability in
rural areas.
The main goal of China‟s economic reform has been to transform the planned
economy into a market integrated economy. The essence of China‟s economic reform is
decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation. The implementation of the
household responsibility system through agricultural decollectivisation is actually the
decentralisation, liberalisation and privatisation of China‟s agricultural sector.
Decentralisation, privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation have influenced and
permeated almost every aspect of economic reform and social transformation as well as
people‟s lives. On one hand, these processes have sped-up China‟s economic reform and
socio-economic transformation; on the other hand, they have brought many challenges
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such as the widening of the disparity between rural and urban areas and between rich and
poor citizens. The provision of public goods and services in rural areas has moved from a
collectively based system to a market-orientated system and to an individual or household
based system. This has been done in the name of agricultural reform and has resulted in
some groups, particularly elderly rural residents, finding themselves in a vulnerable
economic and social situation.
Over past decades China has undergone significant demographic transformation
including population ageing, decreased family size and increasing rural-urban migration.
These demographic changes have directly affected the lives of elderly rural residents
including those living in Liujiahui Village. Population ageing, decreased family size, and
increasing rural-urban migration have all challenged traditional household-based elderly
care in the village. Filial piety has been the core of Chinese traditional culture, but this
social norm is now challenged and this has meant that family-based traditional provision
for elderly rural residents has been subject to stress and crisis.
The village elderly have made a significant contribution to not only their individual
households, but also to their communities. They have also made a significant contribution
to China‟s industrialisation and urbanisation and yet the majority of the rural elderly are
pessimistic about their fate when it comes to the latter part of their life. When we compare
the socioeconomic status of the elderly in the village in the commune period (1950s to
1970s) and the reform period (1980s-onward) their difficult situation is evident. With the
collapse of the commune system and the implementation of a market integrated economy
governments gave up their obligation to the elderly and have not honoured their moral
responsibility with regard to them. The last resort for the elderly is reliance on their
children. However, as I have been arguing in my thesis, their adult children are not able
to, or are not willing to, take care of the elderly under present economic and social
conditions and in the context of present attitudes.
The sorry plight of many of China‟s rural elderly is a direct consequence of a
combination of factors that include a decline in filial responsibility and a low level of
economic development. It is also predicated on the absence of a mature and effective
social security system in rural China. The campaign for “building a new socialist
countryside” launched by the Chinese government in 2006 was aimed at achieving social
fairness and justice, but in reality it has not significantly improved the living standard of
China‟s village elderly. In a substantial number of cases the elderly, particularly those
suffering chronic disease, suffer deprivation.
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China‟s social security system, based on the principle of industrialised urban areas
and city citizens having priority over agriculture-based rural areas and rural citizens, is a
discriminatory, unfair and unequal system. China‟s social security provision for rural
residents has experienced the collective based social security provision of Mao‟s era, then
the family/individual based provision during the Deng government era and then the
individual/family centred and government subsidised provision of the more recent HuWen era. The successful rural social security provision in place during Mao‟s era was
based on the „five guarantees‟ and the rural cooperative medical care system (RCMS).
The collectives (communes, production brigades and production teams) guaranteed the
basic livelihood of the rural elderly although this security was limited and provision was
rudimentary. Many felt that they were truly the masters of New China (after 1949)
although their living conditions were basic during this period. When China‟s economy
transformed from a collective/state-owned economy to a market integrated economy and
to the HRS in rural areas in the Deng period, the social security provision in rural China
was transformed from an integration of collective-supported and family-supported
provision to solely family-based social security provision. The individual household had
become the main source of old age security in rural areas. The basic livelihood guarantees
provided by the collective including health care and old age security in the Mao era were
no longer available in the Deng era. When the government withdrew support from rural
social security provision the „five guarantees‟ system and RCMS successfully practised in
the Mao period collapsed in the Deng era. A „fee-for-service‟ system (FFS) based on
market forces replaced RCMS. The majority of China‟s rural citizens were no longer
covered by any form of social security provision. Elderly rural people found that they
were a vulnerable group with the majority of them unable to afford to pay for even basic
medical care. Many of the elderly found that they faced hard times during the Deng era.
The Hu-Wen government adopted and implemented new policies relating to rural
social security provision. These new policies have benefited rural people, particularly
elderly rural citizens. Under these new programs the basic livelihood needs, including
food and clothing, have been basically secured for the majority of rural elderly. However,
the provision of basic medical care services needed by the rural elderly has not been
secured. Many rural elderly continue to face difficulties as they are ageing because the
new rural cooperative medical care system (NRCMS) and the rural minimum livelihood
allowance aim only to relieve destitution among the most vulnerable groups. There are
only a small number of China‟s rural elderly who do not need to worry about their basic
needs when it comes to seeking medical or dental assistance. The majority of elderly
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people are still excluded from the national social security system that their urban
counterparts enjoy. Rural families have still been obliged to shoulder responsibility for
their elderly members. Under this circumstance the rural elderly are a disadvantaged
group in my home village. Some of the village elderly rely on their own labour to support
themselves. Some have suffered, particularly when illness and chronic health problems
are involved. My fieldwork demonstrates that the rural elderly are much more likely than
other rural residents to fall into poverty. They are also more likely to be bullied or abused
physically or verbally by a member of their family and/or by a member of the public such
as service personnel and public servants. Their opinions are ignored and they are not
consulted on family matters in the same manner as in Mao‟s period and it is obviously
quite comfortable for service personnel to ignore and trivialise senior citizens‟ requests
and needs.
In light of the living conditions and the current economic, social and health status of
the rural elderly, there is an urgent need for an effective system of social security for this
group of Chinese citizens. The Chinese government must provide the country‟s citizens
with their basic needs regardless of their household registration and regardless of
legislation passed and the propaganda used. It is not enough for governments to hide
behind Chinese traditional culture. Meeting the needs of the people is a basic component
of the harmonious society promoted by the Chinese government. It is quite clear that
China‟s elderly rural citizens are unlikely to have a decent life without a basic rural social
security system covering all rural residents and meeting rural people‟s basic needs.
However, the establishment of a basic and comprehensive rural social security system is a
long process and to date the basic framework for this system is still under debate and has
not yet been realised.
Taxation in general and personal income tax in particular is not only an important
means for collecting national financial revenue, but is also a major tool used by
governments to redistribute national wealth and income. It is an important tool for
achieving social fairness and justice. Not only a nation‟s social security provision, but the
taxation system is directly related to the day-to-day lives of ordinary people. This means
that a nation‟s social security provisions should be connected to its taxation system and
particularly to personal income tax. In China, however, social security provision and
taxation are separated. China currently has a regressive taxation system. Under this
system rural citizens are not entitled to social security benefits although they have
contributed their labour and a large portion of their income to the nation‟s revenue
182

through formal, informal and implicit taxes and fees. Their urban counterparts, city
citizens, are entitled to social security benefits although they did not pay direct taxation
from 1950 to 1994 and even after 1994 the majority of city citizens have not needed to
pay personal income tax based on the starting point for levying individual income tax.
Unfair taxation measures and a lack of social security provision for rural citizens are
responsible for chronic poverty in rural areas and an ever-widening disparity between the
income and living standards of urban and rural households. Therefore, the current taxation
system should be reformed in order to establish a new redistributive mechanism for
reducing inequality between urban and rural areas and between rich and poor. This new
redistributive mechanism should combine taxation with social security provision. A
taxation-based nationally unified social security system should be designed and adopted.
In this system every citizen should pay tax as long as their income reaches the starting
point for levying tax and in turn every citizen is equally entitled to social security
provision as long as he/she meets uniform criteria regardless of whether they are urban
citizens or rural citizens.
China‟s agricultural and rural policies are also responsible for rural poverty and
urban-rural inequality of income and living standard. The introduction of the „five
township-pooling funds‟ and the „three village levies‟ system and the fiscal reform in the
late 1980s and 1990s led to a situation where rural residents were subject to an excessive
financial burden. Rural-urban inequality increased and the situation resulted in
dissatisfaction and protests by China‟s rural citizens nationwide. The „tax-for-fee‟ reform
did not significantly reduce the financial burden placed on rural households. Indeed, it
increased their excessive financial burden and at the same time public services such as
education and health care that had been provided to rural areas declined drastically. The
result was further dissatisfaction among villagers. In 2004, the Hu-Wen government
decided to address this issue. The central government then promulgated and implemented
a series of new rural and agricultural policies. These policies were intended to address the
country‟s entrenched urban bias. The most important of these new policies were the
termination of agricultural tax nationwide in 2006 and the implementation of subsidy
policies. However, these two policies have had little overall impact on the bid to increase
both farmers‟ income and agricultural production and urban-rural inequality has
continued to increase. The urban-rural income ratio reached the highest level recorded by
2009.
Obviously, it is very difficult to increase farmers‟ income and living conditions and to
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narrow urban-rural disparity if policies of systemic discrimination against rural residents
have not been eradicated. As I have noted, increasing disparity between rural and urban
households and between rich and poor has the potential to challenge the legitimacy of the
Party. Tension between local ruling groups and local villagers has escalated in some rural
communities since 1990s. My fieldwork demonstrated that the elderly in the village
hardly gained any direct benefit from recent policies and measures. It is also noticeable
that the rural elderly have no institutions through which to voice their grievances and
wishes in the current political system. There is an urgent need to establish organisations or
institutions in rural areas that represent the voice of the rural elderly. It is not enough for
the government to merely pay lip service to the needs of the Chinese people, particularly
the rural elderly. There is a long way to go before the Chinese government has addressed
rural people‟s grievances and met their needs. Without effective government policies the
lives and security of China‟s elderly rural citizens cannot be significantly improved.
There are still many issues to address in order to achieve „a common prosperity for all
(gongtong fuyu)‟ (Deng 1993; Hannan 1995; Wen 2011). The conclusion I have drawn
from my research for this thesis is that changing social and economic policies without
changing at least part of China‟s fundamental administrative system means that policy
results are likely to be at best disappointing and at worst self-defeating.

Postscript
A major theme of the Chinese government‟s 12th Five-Year Plan for economic and social
development is addressing the need to boost social welfare benefits for China‟s rural
population including the rural elderly. Social equality and fairness is then to be promoted
by expanding the government-funded social welfare and health care system (NPC, 2011).
Research results have shown that over one in four rural residents would be 65 or older by
2035 (Eberstadt 2009) and that less than two taxpayers may have to look after one retiree
by 2039 (Lam 2011). The net present value of the social security system‟s unfunded
liabilities in America is equal to one third of a year of its total output. The estimated
liabilities in China would be over 100% of its GDP (Eberstadt 2009). This would lead to
the collapse of China‟s social security system. In light of this situation it is extremely
doubtful whether the Chinese government‟s present policies to boost social welfare
benefits and expand the country‟s social welfare and health care system can be realized.
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